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Abstract
THE IMPACT OF PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS ON PLEA BARGAINED
DISPOSITIONS IN KINGS COUNTY SUPREME COURT
Adviser: Professor Harriet Pollack, Ph.D.
This study examines the presentence function of probation
from an historical and empirical perspective which argues that the
purported diminution of the role of the presentence report (PSR) in
the sentencing process--as a result of sentence bargaining--is more
reflective of a prevailing disenchantment with the rehabilitative
ideal than any thoroughly considered, reliable validation of the PSR's
dispensibility.

It is demonstrated, through a review of the

literature, that poorly conceived, polemically biased empirical
research has helped to perpetuate the notion that these reports have
little value.

A survey of studies and inquiries conducted in New York

over the past twenty years highlights this argument.
PSRs, formerly considered an "enlightened" fulcrum for the
ameliorating correctional and sentencing reforms of the Progressive
era, eventually were linked to the potential and/or actual abuses of
indeterminate sentencing schemes by civil libertarians (concerned with
sentencing disparity) and anti-positivist criminologists (critical of
rehabilitation-directed correctional theory and practice).

Such

arguments, absent any sustained or substantive rebuttal from the

probation community, bolstered executive branch efforts to scapegoat
the judiciary and gain more control over an instrument potentially
regulative of jail/prison intake during an era of chronic overcrowding
and attendant federal court intervention.
The author's own study of a random sample of PSRs from Kings
County Supreme Court in New York City finds considerable evidence for
the proposition that PSRs account for a significant proportion of the
observed variance between sentence promised and sentence imposed.
Path analysis finds that the custodial status has the most effect on
the plea bargain and the recommendation of the probation officer, but
the latter is the single most important predictor of the eventual
disposition.

Further analysis suggests that PSRs containing the most

relevant information are more likely to result in amendments of the
sentence bargain, while perfunctory reports are most likely merely to
endorse the sentence already promised.
An examination of reaction to a recent attempt to evxo»_erate
the PSR's content in New York lends further support to this study's
hypothesis that presentence reports have much more utility in the
criminal justice system than the revisionist literature suggests.
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INTRODUCTION
In his history of the American criminal justice system,
Samuel Walker identifies three distinct cycles of correctional
reform: the last cycle commenced "slowly in the 1930s, reached its
peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then collapsed suddenly
after 1971."

Walker further notes that "the concept of

rehabilitation, of individualized correctional treatment, has
energized each of the great reform cycles."1

Although Walker

virtually ignores it--there is no reference to probation at all in
his survey of the past four decades--one of the major developments in
criminal jurisprudence during the period, 1930-1971, was the
widespread adoption of the presentence report as the cornerstone
instrument of individualized justice throughout the English speaking
world.

In a sense, presentence investigations (PSIs), which

resulted in presentence reports (PSRs)2 written by probation

1Samuel Walker, Popular Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980), pTo3
2"PSI" connotes the investigative process conducted by the
P.O. (researching police, prosecutorial and court records;
interviewing defendants, their families and complainants; and
obtaining financial, educational and medical verification of
defendants' backrounds). "PSR" refers to the actual document
summarizing the foregoing data, including a recommendation as to
sentence, which is submitted to the court. For the sake of
consistency, I have used the unhyphenated spelling of "presentence"
throughout, except for footnote and bibliographical references to
titles which contain the common earlier usage, "pre-sentence."

1

2
officers (P.O.'s), had become living embodiments of the rehabilita
tive ideal.

By supposedly allowing courts and correctional

authorities to gear punishment to the particular offender--by
considering his "social circumstances," his criminal history and his
crime--rather than simply and classically to let the punishment fit
the crime, the presentence report came to be seen by correctional
theorists and practitioners as the diagnostic stage in a carefully
orchestrated course of treatment.
This rehabilitative ideal promised much more than it could
ever have hoped to deliver.

But it is instructive to note that the

withering bombardment which the "medical model" has suffered during
the past decade, with the principal targets comprising what some
critics have dubbed an "unholy trinity" of probation, parole and the
indeterminate sentence, is very much reminiscent of earlier
criticisms of the correctional components of the criminal justice
system which marked the "Roaring Twenties," a decade similarly beset
by public anxiety over "crime waves."

It is the intention of this

dissertation to demonstrate that the present low esteem in which the
presentence report is held was not only an inevitable by-product of
the last "great reform cycle" of corrections, but also the result of
the reactive nature of probation's function within a criminal justice
system that underwent rapid change in the I960's.
Chapter I will provide an extensive historical overview and
analysis of this shift.

In it I will trace the presentence report's

evolution from the sine qua non of progressive correctional practice
and the indispensible mechanism which allowed the sentencing judge

3
to mete out individualized justice, to its present embattled status.
I will show how dissatisfaction with sentencing disparity and with
the rehabilitative concepts of the Progressive era which has informed
correctional practice and theory throughout most of this century,
prompted critics of widely divergent ideological and criminological
viewpoints to attack the PSR on two fronts.

Those concerned with

checking the power of deviance processing agents pointed to the lack
of scrutiny of probation officers' decision making--arguing that
P.O.'s have too much unchecked discretion--while governmental
commissions, court administrators, and those scholars of bureaucratic
and organizational determinants of criminal justice system operations
and workflow advanced arguments revolving around the unfocused
quality of the PSR and labeled its accompanying recommendation an
exercise in futility because of the prevalence of sentence bargaining.
In Chapter II, previous empirical studies of the impact of
the presentence report are examined.

Most are found wanting,

partially because of methodological errors, but also because of the
narrowness of their focus, indeed their preoccupation, with the
congruence (or lack of it) between the presentence investigator's
recommendation and the eventual sentence.
In Chapter III, the logical inconsistencies evident among the
critics of the presentence report are shown to be particularly
evident in New York, where inquiries conducted by municipal and state
ad hoc commissions empanelled by executives and legislators concerned
about the administration of justice have generally repeated the

condemnations of previous surveyors of the PSR, who in turn relied on
secondary sources of dubious validity.

Glaring by its abscence in

most of these studies is anycritical assessment of the forces
underlying chronic court and

correctional underfunding, or

the impact

of prosecutorial policies on the justice system.
As described more fully in Chapter IV, an empirical study
which replicates the methodology of the more salient research noted
in the literature was conducted in a state court--Kings County
Supreme Court in Brooklyn--to answer the following questions:
Does the PSR have a significant impact on sentencing?
other factors equally influential in sentencing?

1)

2) Are there

3) Is the quality

of a PSR an important factor in determining its impact?

Through

statistical and content analysis of 340 randomly selected PSR's, I
attempt to determine whether the PSR, out of more than 40 other
observed independent variables, has the most significant impact on
sentencing.

My findings are

presented in Chapter V.

As governmental scrutiny of PSR's

in New York City and New

York State became increasingly critical of a perceived diminution of
their quality and importance, the focus shifted from streamlining
their content and making them more uniform (pursuant to a loss of
faith in rehabilitation and a desire to reduce disparity) to an
emphasis on client-specific sentencing programs.

The latter trend

can be viewed as a means of promoting more active alternatives to
incarceration (day-fines, restitution, comnunity service, etc.) among
a citizenry grown weary of unsupervised probationers but unmoved by

political appeals to solve endemic correctional overcrowding by
funding prison building programs.

These issues will be explored in

Chapter VI against a backdrop of the 1981 PSI speed-up in New York
City, which brought into focus judicial resistance to attempted
executive devaluation of the PSR.
The importance of this study is underscored by similar
chronic overcrowding of correctional facilities throughout the United
States since the 1970's.

And it is also germ •“ to the ancillary

debates involving the efficacy of identifying and targeting career
criminals for scarce prison resources on the one hand, and selecting
the best candidates for alternatives to incarceration programs on the
other.
Indeed, most probation agencies assign the majority of their
staff to the production of presentence reports because of the concern
of municipal executives to reduce or prevent overcrowding of
detention populations.

The timely submission of these reports speeds

sentencing, which in turn allows for prompt transfer of prison-bound
detainees to the state correctional system and the immediate release
of other detainees sentenced to community supervision.

These

outcomes, which can reduce the jail population dramatically if the
time period separating conviction date from sentence date can be
shortened, depend heavily on the prompt submission of PSR's.
Probation administrators' performance in jurisdictions suffering from
jail overcrowding is thus most likely to be judged on their ability
to deal efficiently with the constant perturbations in the PSI
workload generated by judicial and prosecutorial case processing--

which in turn is a by-product of arrest/indictment rates.

Knowing

which components of the PSR are most important to the court and which
are most relevant to arriving at a strongly buttressed sentencing
recommendation are therefore essential ingredients for successful
probation management in times of crisis.
streamlined?

What data can be omitted?

obtained more quickly?

What data can be
How can essential data be

These are questions not easily answered absent

any thorough assessment of the PSR's impact on sentencing.
If, however, the PSR can be shown to have little impact on
sentencing decisions, regardless of the quality of the report, pro
forma PSR's satisfying only the statutory minimum requirements are
given such greater justification.

The implications for probation

staffing and management goal setting are, in either eventuality,
crucial.

Should the often argued contention that PSR's have little

impact on judges' decision-making be borne out by this dissertation,
the implications for probation would appear to be evident: a
deemphasis on the preparation of presentence reports and a
concentration on supervision.

Since probation presently (and

traditionally) regards presentence investigations as its primary
function, this would mean a pronounced shift in policy.
On the other hand, a detailed analysis of the data might
reveal that presentence reports have much more influence than generally
believed.

In which case future research might better address itself

to the truly ethical questions related to criminal sentencing instead
of concentrating so narrowly on bureaucratic exigencies.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TIE PRESENTENCE REPORT

The Origins of The Presentence Report
The court process we have come to know as probation originated
in large urban centers (Boston and London), where judges presumably
had limited knowledge of the social and criminal background of
defendants before the bar, unlike rural areas, where informal
knowledge of the accused and available familial and community
resources might have obviated any need for a probation officer.

By

extension, probation itself could thus be interpreted, like the first
appearance of urban police departments in the 1830's and 1840's, as an
instrument of expanded social control, in this case by empowering
others to literally serve as the "eyes and ears" of the court in an
increasingly anonymous urban environment.*
The "Father of Probation," John Augustus, placed great stress
on the probationer selection process when he began approaching young
alcoholics in Boston courtrooms in 1848 to determine their interest in
reforming under his supervision.

Thus, his cursory background checks

of probation candidates could be considered the first presentence

*The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, "The
Selective Pre-Sentence Report," Federal Probation 38 (December 1974):
47-54. Also see John Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971).
7
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investigations.

"Great care was observed," Augustus wrote in his

Journal, "to ascertain whether the prisoners were promising subjects
for probation, and to this end it was necessary to take into considera
tion the previous character of the person, his age, and the influences
by which he would in future be likely to be surrounded."1

Despite

the care he exercised in selecting his "caseload," and despite his
reported success, John Augustus' innovation did not take immediate
root.

In fact, the adoption of probation and other reforms, such as

parole, the reformatory and the indeterminate sentence was very slow
indeed until the first two decades of this century, when the United
States criminal justice system began to experience an extraordinary
revolution in its correctional component.

Whereas in 1900, only six

states had salaried probation officers, by 1919, 34 states had
developed probation staffs.2

Similarly, in 1900, indeterminate

sentence laws held sway in only five states, but during the next 20
years 31 other states enacted statutes which effectively transferred
from a court to an administrative authority the power to determine

Ijohn Augustus, First Probation Officer (New York: The
Probation Association, 1939), p. 34. This was a reprint of Augustus'
Journal, first published in 1552.
2Edwin H. Sutherland and C.E. Gehlke, "Crime and
Punishment," in Recent Social Trends in the United States, edited by
the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1933), p. 1156. People Ex Rel. Forsyth v. Court of
Sessions of Monroe County, 141 tf.Y. 288 (1894) provided the final
judicial benediction needed to formalize probation by establishing
that the "power to suspend sentence is inherent in every court having
criminal jurisdiction." See Sandra Shane-DuBrow, Alice P. Brown, and
Erik Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content
and Effect (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S.
Department of Justice, 1985), p. 6.

what portion of an imposed sentence would actually be served.
Finally, by 1900, parole laws had been passed in only 12 states, but
by 1920, there were 40 states which had embraced parole supervision.1
It was during this halcyon era of penological reform that
probation threw off its informal, volunteer trappings and began to
produce written reports, handbooks, regulations and a body of
literature.^

The new field's theoretical underpinnings were greatly

influenced by the emerging disciplines of sociology and psychology, as
embodied in that new figure in the urban landscape--the social
worker.

Thus, in tracing the development of presentence investiga

tions, Robert Carter identifies William Healy's "Juvenile Psychopathic
Clinic," established in Chicago in 1910, as the logical starting
point.^

Healy cried out for accurate "diagnosis" of the offender as

a prerequisite for "treatment," and in his seminal 1915 text, The
Individual Delinquent, he specified eleven different areas for the
youth worker to investigate as a means of pinpointing the cause of the

^Sutherland and Gehlke, "Crime and Punishment," p. 1156.
^"Originally the probation officer submitted orally to the
judge information used for screening candidates for probation. With
the expansion of probation, this process became formalized and written
reports were prepared." From "Probation: National Standards and
Goals," in Corrections: National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals (.Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 324.
^Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Report Hardbook
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978J, p. 3. The first
juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, an institution
which also helped spur probation's adoption, since 30 states first
established probation bureaus or "clinics" as an integral part of
juvenile court procedure. See New York State Division of Probation,
Manual for Probation Officers in New York State, 6th edition (Great
Meadow Correctional Institution, I960), p. 1U1.
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delinquency.1

Carter also cites Mary Richmond's Social Diagnosis

(1917), addressed to social workers as well, which called for exact
definitions of a client's personality and social background, as an early
influence in determining the content and structure of PSR's.2
Since the presentence report was initially developed by
probation officers who emerged from a background in social work, these
early reports emphasized "a social work model that involved strong
emphasis on the person's life history."-*

The medical model

orientation of probation's pioneers helps to explain not only the
shaping of the content of the presentence reports themselves, but also
accounts for the structuring of the entire probation bureaucracy as
well.

For just as medicine clearly separates diagnosis and treatment

both chronologically and procedurally, so did probation adopt the same
division.

It was Edwin J. Cooley, director of a demonstration project

in New York City's Court of General Sessions, who pioneered the
fundamental dichotomy in probation organization in 1925, when he
divided the probation staff under his direction into the "Investigative
Corps and Supervision Corps.'"1 By the same token, Cooley's
influential prescription for the presentence report divided the
document into a legal history and a social history, with a concluding
"diagnosis" of the offender integrating all that preceded it.^
As probation's popularity grew, enshrining the "casework

1Ibid.

2Ibid., pp. 3-4.

^National Advisory Committee, Corrections, p. 325.
“^Carter, The Pre-Sentence Handbook, p. 4.

5n)id-
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method"! 0f the social scientist in its practices, initial resistance
to this ameliorating reform of the criminal law faded and then was
revived in the early 1920's, when a perception of increased
lawlessness after the lull of the war years precipitated a backlash
against the liberalizing reforms which lasted well into the Great
Depression.

Thus, the dean of American criminologists, Edwin H.

Sutherland, in a 1933 survey of the criminal justice system
commissioned by the federal government, found that during the decade,
1917-1927, there was a discernible shift in favor of "longer prison
sentences, increased use of the death penalty and more opposition to
the trend towards humane treatment of the criminal (probation, parole,
the indeterminate sentence, as well as improvements in the condition
of prison life)."2

New York provides us with an excellent example

of this trend.
In 1926, New York's Baumes Commission, responding to public
concern about crime, particularly in New York City, recommended a
series of draconian measures to the State Legislature, which speedily
enacted them.

The new laws all but eliminated the indeterminate

philosophy in sentencing, their authors arguing that since
"criminology, psychiatry, psychology and sociology have not yet become
exact sciences...adoption of the theory that all criminals are sick

iThis method "assumes that if knowledge can be acquired of
all the facts about an offender, the cause of his criminality can be
discovered and a course of corrections determined." From "The
Selective Pre-Sentence Report," p. 49.
Sutherland and Gehlke, "Crime and Punishment," p. 1156.
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would not remedy the (crime) situation."1

Other crime commissions

in other states came to similar conclusions as public officials "tried
to limit the discretion of court and correctional personnel in the
administration of indeterminate sentences, probation and parole."2
Raymond Moley, one of the foremost political scientists of his
time, who was later to become a member of the "New Deal" inner sanctum
seemed to have the Baumes Laws in mind when he wrote in 1930, after
studying New York's criminal courts: "If the limitations of
legislation were frankly recognized and sufficient discretion given to
someone to insure that the infinitely varied human types of conduct
which fall within the confines of the criminal law would be subjected
to more equal determination, justice in its most enlightened sense
could be more definitely achieved."-*
Moley's argument seemed prescient when a later commission
found that, instead of deterring crime, the Baumes Laws served only to
make judges, juries and prosecutors work harder to find legal
loopholes to circumvent their harshness.

In fact, the legacy of the

Baumes Laws was a decrease in the number of defendants sentenced to
state prison during years of rising crime rates.

Accordingly, the

JNew York State Crime Commission ("The Baumes Commission"),
Report, New York State Legislative Document No. 99 (1929), pp. 10-11.
2Nathan Couthit, "Police Professionalism and the War Against
Crime in the United States, 1920's and 1930's," in Police Forces in
History, George L. Mosse, editor (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p.
321. See also, John Pfiffner, "The Activities and Results of Crime
Surveys," American Political Science Review 23 (November 1929): 930-55.
^Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (New York: Minton, Balch
$ Co., 1930), p. 174.

13
Lewisohn Commission of 1932 restored the indeterminate sentence for
all felonies except murder.1
President Hoover's Crime Commission, in its 1931 report (the
"Wickersham Commission") also countered the drift toward repression
when it demonstrated with telling effect the final result of an
unbridled "war against crime: "police illegality in arrest,
interrogation and detention.2

Although the Great Depression added

a further impetus to undercut correctional programs in an era of
chronic municipal funding shortages, dissatisfaction with what J.
Edgar Hoover dubbed the "cream-puff school of criminology" eased as
public concern over crime rates leveled off and receded.-*
During World War II, the rehabilitative ideal once again began
to gather steam, abetted by the country's need for manpower (convict
or not), by a decrease in social anomie occasioned by the national
unity on behalf of the war effort, and by the conscription of the most
delinquency-prone segment of the population.

Lingering unease over

the concept of imprisonment in the aftermath of the totalitarian
barbarities perpetrated in Europe, coupled with the general elevation

iCommission to Investigate Prison Administration and
Construction ("The Lewisohn Commission"), Prisoners: Their Crimes and
Sentences, Special Report to the New York State Legislature (Albany,
19^3), p. 54.
2The United States National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931).
\j. Edgar Hoover's speech of November 9, 1937, "Crime's
Challenge to Society," reported in Couthit's "Police Professionalism
and tne War Against Crime," p. 315. Hoover was fond of telling his
audiences that he was a member of the "machine gun school of
criminology."
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of the standard of living in the post-war era ushered in what appears
to have been a golden age of huraanitarianism in correctional
history.^
decade

Such an atmosphere stands in marked contrast to the

following World War I, but it is reminiscent of post-Civil War

America when correctional philosophy entered the reformatory era and
gave birth to parble, the indeterminate sentence and "the belief that
the way to succeed was through e d u c a t i o n . I n much the same way
the 1950's saw the widespread use of group therapy in corrections, the
rise of halfway houses, work and study release, therapeutic
communities and a generally favorable acceptance of probation and
parole among policy makers and the public.

Thus, by 1954, every state

except Mississippi had institutionalized probation as part of its
sentencing structure.^

The Ascendancy of the Presentence Report
Asprobation, parole and the

indeterminate sentence became

fixed in the post-war correctional firmament, the presentence report
came to occupy a sanctified position, since it provided the
philosophical justification for all three practices.

Raymond Moley

appears to have been one of the first to recognize the key position
which the presentence function of probation had assumed in the

!charles Silberman, Criminal Justice, Criminal Violence (New
York: Random House, 1978), p. 30.
^William E. Amos, "The Philosophy of Corrections:
Revisited," in An Introduction to the Federal Probation System
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976J, p. N-l.
^Shane-Dubrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p.6.
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sentencing process: "Probation has come to mean much more than a
method of supervising persons...Its more important function is to
provide for many courts a species of intelligence service.

It studies

the prisoner at the bar...and when the court finds it necessary to
pass judgment upon him, is able to provide intelligent information and
advice upon which to base the decision."*
Not only were these reports assisting judges, they were also
forwarded to prison officials, parole boards and the line offices in
parole and probation.

Thus, "the investigation report," wrote Edmund

Fitzgerald in 1956 (then Chief Probation Officer in Kings County Court
in New York City), "had come to be the repository for all biographical
data needed not only for supervision...but also for planning and
executing rehabilitative programs for offenders committed to
prisons."

Reflecting the still dominant medical model orientation of

his field, Fitzgerald concluded that "the investigation (diagnostic)
process has become as important as the rehabilitation (treatment)
process.

It is, in fact, of greater importance, since it is the

bedrock of treatment.

Quantitatively, it is now the most significant

part of all probation work."^
The Supreme Court's validation of the presentence investiga
tion as having "high value" for "conscientious judges who want to
sentence persons on the best available information, rather than on

*Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts, p. 158.
2Edmund Fitzgerald, "The Pre-Sentence Investigation,"
National Probation and Parole Association Journal, no. 2 (1956), p.

JIT.---------------------------------
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guesswork and inadequate information" in its 1949 decision,
Williams v. New York, provided the most important impramatur for the
individualized style of criminal jurisprudence and correctional
practice that would reign during the following two decades.1
Briefly, in Williams the Court held that a defendant convicted of
murder could be sentenced to death despite a jury's non-binding
recommendation for a non-capital sanction (life imprisonment), based
on material independently gathered by the probation officer from
police and other sources which linked the defendant to numerous other
crimes and found him to be possessed of a "morbid sexuality".
Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black noted that the
officer investigating the convicted before the bar was not motivated
by a zealous desire to root out unfavorable information about the
subject because probation officers "have not been trained to prosecute
but to aid o f f e n d e r s . T h u s did the Supreme Court unwittingly
provide the legalistic underpinnings for rehabilitative excess.

For

although Black correctly observed that "retribution is no longer the
dominant objective of the criminal law" and that "reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence,"^ he erred in assuming that due process concerns over
the presentence investigation were misplaced simply because of the
professionalism of the investigators:

^Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), at p. 249.
^Ibid.

^Ibid., at p. 248.
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Undoubtedly, the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modem
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender
and not merely the crime....For indeterminate sentences and
probation have resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers
exercised in fixing punishments.

In general, these modem changes

have not resulted in making the lot of offenders harder.

On the

contrary a strong motivating force for the changes has been the
belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of
convicted offenders, many could be less severely punished and
restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship.
belief to a large extent has been justified.

This

(Underscoring

added.)*
While agreeing with the majority opinion "as to the value and
humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern
penologists," Justice Murphy dissented.

Since the damaging material

upon which sentencing was based "would concededly not have been
admissable at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the
defendant," Murphy argued that "the high demands of due process were
not o b e y e d . E v e n Black allowed that "broad discretionary
power...susceptible of abuse can result from a sentencing judge's
reliance on

out-of-court information," but eschewed "a requirement of

rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence" in assessing
punishment.^

^Ibid.

2Ibid., at p. 250.

^Ibid., at p. 249
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The abuse which unscrutinized discretion can sometimes
engender in bureaucracies left to police themselves is illustrated by
the "treatment" afforded a defendant who was convicted of robbery in
the same court which had sentenced Williams four years earlier.

This

defendant, who came to my attention as the subject of a PSI conducted
a quarter of a century later in Brooklyn Supreme Court, was ordered to
undergo a psychiatric evaluation as an aid to sentence following a
jury conviction in 1953.

In a letter contained in the case file,

addressed to the investigating probation officer by the examining
psychiatrist at Kings County Hospital, the defendant is described as
continuing to maintain his innocence.

The psychiatrist then writes:

"He was given Sodium Amytal [a "truth serum" drug usually administered
intravenously] and interviewed while under [the influence of] this
drug.

He continued to protest his innocence...He admits that he

indulges in alchohol to excess at times and states he was drinking
when he got into this present difficulty."1
Although Black's major concern in exempting out-of-court
material from adversarial review was to prevent a time consuming
re-trial of collateral issues at the sentencing stage, the inference
in Williams--that due process safeguards placed unnecessary limits on
the rehabilitative efforts of social workers (and also by extension
upon the discretion of judges)--helped to usher in an era of
correctional supremacy.

In much the same way that probation, parole

1Letter dated 23 May 1953 contained in N.Y.C. Probation
Department case file KS82-04199.
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and indeterminacy had first swept the country in the early part of the
century, now maximum discretion in the post-conviction stage was
legislatively enthroned, reaching its full glory in states such as
California where (until sentencing reform in 1976 toppled it) "one of
the most extreme forms" of indeterminacy permitted sentences of one
day to life for even relatively minor offenses.1
Although indeterminacy, like its handmaiden, parole, arose out
of a desire for prison reform in the second half of the nineteenth
century, its use first became widespread in the United States during
the 1930s ("given nearly irresistible impetus by the rise of the new
social sciences, such as psychiatry and social work"),2 until, "by
the 1960s, every state of the nation had an indeterminate sentencing
structure of some variation."-*

And the increased discretion which

the indeterminate sentence bestowed upon judges rendered the
presentence report just as important to distant wardens and parole
commissioners as the essential repository of legal and social data to
be consulted at each decision-making stage in administering the
imposed sentence.
Thus by 1965, which Carter identifies as the high water mark
for the presentence report,^ the rehabilitative ideal had become

1Shane-DuBrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p. 33.
2The Executive Advisory Committee on Sentencing ("The
Morgenthau Committee"), Crime and Punishment in New York: An Inquiry
Into Sentencing and the Criminal Justice System (Albany, New York,
March 19?9), pT 14.
%hane-DuBrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p. 6.
4Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Report Handbook, pp. 5-6.
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entrenched in our criminal law, in the courts and in corrections:
Much as the precise mix of Bible reading and hard labor necessary
to achieve reformation had occupied the attention of reformers a
century earlier, correctional personnel now debated the problems
of diagnosis and formulation of treatment plans.

Criticism of the

correctional and sentencing system did not question the
assumptions...but focused exclusively upon the need for more
resources and better therapeutic techniques.*

The Eclipse of the Rehabilitative Ideal
Within ten years, this consensus had not only fallen apart,
but in some states probation, parole and the indeterminate sentence
once again faced abolition.

What happened?

First, the unpredicted

crime wave which suddenly commenced in the mid-1960s undoubtedly
played a key part in spreading dissatisfaction with the system, just
as spiraling crime rates did in the 1920s.

But now the opposition no

longer consisted of polical and law enforcement spokesmen such as
Edward Simons^ or J. Edgar Hoover, but respected scholars, legal
historians and correctional administrators themselves.

Secondly, it

would appear that the sheer numbers of offenders which now engulfed
the courts and prisons dramatized the need for judgments based on more

1Morgenthau Committee, Crime and Punishment in New York, p.
14.
2A s President of the Chicago Crime Commission in 1920,
Simons blamed better prison conditions, as well as probation and
parole, for the crime increase. See his article, "Fighting Crime in
Chicago," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 11 (May 1920): 22.
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rational, equitable and expeditious procedures.

The traditional

reliance on ill-defined, subjective, decision-making came to be seen
as rooted in times more conducive to unpressurized scrutiny of
offenders: in short, the "careful study" conducted by a probation
officer came to be viewed as a luxury.

Thirdly, the Warren and Burger

Courts' extension of due process protection to the post-conviction
stage, combined with an emerging prisoner rights movement, focused
interest for the first time on sentencing disparity and the rights of
the convicted.*
Perhaps the first cracks in the foundation of the presentence
report were detected by the "San Francisco Project" of the mid-1960s.
Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, among others, conducted the first
empirical study of the presentence investigation in northern
California's federal courts and began to identify what would become
seminal issues in the coming debate.

The utility of gathering so much

information on the accused (at the time of this study, the federal
presentence report was organized into 16 separate sections)^ was
seriously questioned by their finding that so much of the information
figured not at all in the sentence recommendation.^

The Project's

finding that P.O.'s used very little information in selecting a
recommendation was based on a study of 14 P.O.'s and five PSRs, one

^Alexander B. Smith and Harriet Pollack, Criminal Justice:
An Overview (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), pp. 211-33.
^Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Handbook, p. 5.
Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter,
Decision-Making and the Probation Officer: The Presentence
Investigation Tberkeley: University of California, June 1966), p. 16.
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of which was described as a clear cut probation case and the other an
open-and-shut imprisonment case, which led to later criticism that "to
generalize about levels of information usage on the basis of five
cases from a universe of thousands is indefensible."*

I will

examine the San Francisco Project at greater length in Chapter III.
It will suffice to note here that the importance of the PSR was, by
extension, diminished by the finding that the judge uses the same data
triumvirate as the probation officer in making nearly all of his
decisions: namely, the seriousness of the crime, the prior criminal
record and social stability of the defendant.2

All of which led

Carter and Wilkins to pointedly observe that "the increasing problems
of crime and delinquency are being addressed by the application of
correctional principles and practices which have not been
substantially modified, or even questioned, since their inception.
The length of the presentence report and its meandering focus
also provided much fuel for subsequent studies.

The President's

Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967)
complained of the "high manpower levels required to complete reports"
at the expense of better supervising offenders, noting that there was
no clear-cut "need for the kind and quality of information that is

*William P. Adams, Paul M. Chandler and Mark G. Neithercutt,
"The San Francisco Project: A Critique," Federal Probation 35
(December 1971): 50.
2Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, "Some Factors in
Sentencing Policy," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science 58 (December 1967): 503-14.
^Ibid., p. 503.
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typically gathered and presented."

As a remedy, it urged experimenta

tion with a shortened, simpler format for the reports which some
probation agencies had recently developed out of sheer necessity to
cope with the rising intake of cases.

The Commission, taking notice

of the San Francisco Project's findings, also identified the PSR as
contributing to disparity in sentencing because of its susceptibility
to "arbitrary and random influences," such as the personality of the
probation officer or bureaucratic exigencies.*

The prevalence of

plea bargaining--which the Commission partially defended while
criticizing its frequent uninformed decision-making--nevertheless also
called into question many of the PSIs preconceptions.

The Commission

proposed remedying this state of affairs by the adoption of procedures
"which would enable the parties to call upon the probation office...to
obtain what is in effect a presentence investigation for use in the
(plea) negotiation discussion."2

Not addressed by the Commission is

the inherent inconsistency posed by its identification of probation
officers as conduits of inappropriate and potentially harmful extralegal considerations into the sentencing arena, while simultaneously
urging their expanded influence on plea bargaining itself through
pre-pleading investigations (PPIs).

As discussed more fully in

Chapter III, this call for expanded use of PPI's, echoed by a number
of subsequent critics, forms one of many paradoxical leit-motifs in

^President's Commission, Task Force Report on Corrections
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Minting Office, 1967), pp. 27-37.
^President's Commission, Task Force Report on Courts
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 12.
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the literature produced by purveyors of the argument that sentence
bargaining renders PSRs virtually useless.
The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice (1970) was also critical of lengthy reports, reminding the
probation community that "the primary purpose of the presentence
report is to provide the sentencing court with succinct and precise
information" and while recognizing its use by correctional decision
makers, it urged such ancillary considerations "be subordinated to its
primary purpose" so as to keep the report at a length less intimidat
ing to busy judges.

The American Bar Association also joined the

President's Crime Commission in urging short-form reports as a
strategy for coping with scant resources.*
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals (1973) in turn endorsed the American Bar Association's
proposals and complained of the PSR's over-emphasis on the defendant's
"life history," emphasizing that "judges want to know the 'here and
now' of the offender, not a detailed life history."1
Self criticism was also abundant, as probation professionals
fought to stay afloat amidst the drowning of many of their once
cherished ideals.

Chester Bartoo (1963) found a probation officer's

sentence recommendation was not always an outgrowth of careful
synthesis and analysis of relevant data: rather, it might also be a

1American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to Probation (New York: Institute of
Judicial Administration, 1970), pp. 33-34.
^National Advisory Committee, Corrections, p. 327.
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reflection of his morale, geography, public opinion, the judge's
personality, administrative policies or his own manner of collecting
data in the first place.*

John Wallace (1964), then head of the New

York City Office of Probation which serviced the lower courts, called
presentence reports chock full of information "for everyone but the
main user, the j u d g e . A decade later federal probation
administrators traced the social work origins of probation and
identified a "a tendency to provide exhaustive historical accounts
of an offender's life, perhaps from anxiety that some single pertinent
factor, however insignificant it might appear at the time, might be
excluded and lost to the future."-*
While some administrators had become critical of the
"compulsiveness" inherent in the "case method" approach, Richard
Quinney (1970) identified the social work background of most probation
officers4 as contributing to inconsistent sentencing recommendations

^Chester H. Bartoo, "Some Hidden Factors Behind a Probation
Officer's Recommendation," Crime and Delinquency 9 (July 1963): 278-79.
2John Wallace, "A Fresh Look at Old Probation Standards,"
Crime and Delinquency 10 (March 1964): 124-25. Lower court PSR's, of
course, have no prison or parole board utility in any case, leading us
to conclude that Wallace must have been a somewhat parochial theorist.
^Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, "The Selective
Pre-Sentence Report," p. 49.
4Not all probation officers are trained as social workers.
Donald Newman, for example, notes that a number of Michigan courts
employ "a high percentage" of ex-police officers to prepare PSI's that
are as a consequence minimally about the defendant and more concerned
with arrest details. See Conviction (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp.
14-15. Charles Lindner, in a series of articles on the history of
probation published in 1984 by Federal Probation, also noted that many
probation officers originally came from the ranks of the police.
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because of "incompatible role obligations" arising out of difficulties
in balancing the authoritative/punitive demands of the job with the
social worker's orientation to "help" one's clients.1

Law professor

John Coffee (1978) expanded this argument and identified other
extraneous variables that might lead probation officers to contribute
to sentencing disparity:
...whether they have a law enforcement perspective or a social
welfare one, whether he writes his presentence report in a vivid,
novelistic prose style or in a cold bureaucratic one, whether he
edits out unverified information or leaves the reliability of the
data for the judge to determine--these and other factors are
likely to have an impact on the sentencing judge's impression of
the defendant.^
Coffee chastized fellow attorneys for ignoring these and other
sentencing factors controlled by the probation officer and criticized
their unfettered power, taking this cue from legal scholar Fred Cohen
(1968), who was the first to point out that "probation, unlike law
enforcement and prosecution, has been allowed almost total freedom to

iRichard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston:
Little Brown, 1970), p. llY. Quinney's argument is rebutted by a
number of empirical studies, however. See Charles Shireman, "A Study
of the Agreement of Probation Officers on the Influence of Specific
Factors Upon the Dispositional Recommendation," Social Science Review
40 (September 1966): 339; and Herbert Langerman, "Determinants of
Probation Officers' Pre-Sentence Recommendations” (Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University, 1976).
2John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing:
Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the
Sentencing Commission," Georgetown Law Journal 66 (April 1978): 1044.
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fashion its own decision-making criteria and procedures."1

A third

professor of law (and psychiatry), Willard Gaylin (1974), attacked the
courts' "enormous dependence" on PSRs, concluding that "in many courts
the probation officer rather than the judge is the sentencer."^
What Gaylin found to be even more objectionable than the PSR's poor
quality ("[they] are not very good.

Those that I have inspected would

not have been highly valued in a department of sociology")-* was the
fact that probation officers "are not open to the public scrutiny of
the actual decision maker, and they are protected by the false
assumption of the objectivity of the social scientist, reinforced by
the paternalistic jargon and attitudes of modem day social workers.
Whatever their intention, whatever their purposes, disparity exists at
an incredible rate..."11 Coffee takes up this theme in his mono
graph, comparing investigating probation officers to seventeenth
century "ministers who stood quietly behind the throne," manipulating
the monarchs they served by letting the kings hear only what they
wanted them to hear: "Today the judge must operate in a system that
processes a high volume of criminal cases, and therefore he must rely
heavily on his own ministers, the probation staff."5

^red Cohen, "Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative
Ideal: The View from Mempa V. Rhay," Texas Law Journal 47 (December
1968): 32.
^Willard Gaylin, Partial Justice: A Study of Bias in
Sentencing (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p.13.
^Ibid., p. 99.

^Ibid., p. 13.

5John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 984.
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The large number of cases found in state courts leads one of
Gaylin's interview subjects, "Judge Garfield," to observe: "While I
have the appearance of great discretion, I don't have the reality of
it.

I work under the constant awareness of the burden of cases in

this court which demand resolution."1

Gaylin agrees, suggesting

that his disparity paradigm is directed more at federal courts:
"Whether discretion is good or bad...is somewhat irrelevant.

For all

practical purposes, discretion is minimized in the crowded calendar of
the big city court."2

And to deal more rationally with such a large

caseload, "Judge Garfield," who sentence bargains 50 percent of his
dispositions, urges expanded use of PPIs to induce more pleas and
thereby reduce congestion.^
One of the landmark works on sentencing disparity was written
by another judge, now a very successful New York defense attorney, who
served as a U.S. District Court Judge in the busiest federal juris
diction in the country, the Southern District of New York, in the
early 1970s.

Marvin Frankel's Criminal Sentences (1972) describes

how m s fellow jurists arrive at sentencing decisions in the absence
of guidelines, training or uniformity of penal philosophy.

In such an

atmosphere it is not surprising that judges lean heavily on probation
officers and their recommendations.
Indeed, as a federal probation officer who once served in the
Southern District of New York, I can attest to this reliance; many, if

iGaylin, Partial Justice, p. 77.
^Ibid., p. 80.

^Ibid., p. 71.

29
not most, federal judges prefer to discuss the case with the P.O.
before sentencing, and some even prefer the P.O. to be present at
sentencing.

(The P.O.'s presence is often helpful to the court in

structuring the plethora of sentencing options under the federal rules
of criminal procedure.)
Frankel is thus one of the few recent lawyer-practicioners who
posits substantial value in the presentence investigation, which he
describes, in a phrase reminiscent of Moley, as "indespensible in any
sentencing scheme that does not treat the infinite varieties of people
as entirely fungible."1

It is also worth noting in this regard that

even a harsh critic like Gaylin is forced to admit from his survey of
state and federal jurists that PSRs, although "not good on an
absolute scale, in comparison with what else is offered to the
sentencing judge, they seem spectacular."2

However, unlike Gaylin's

easy dismissal of PSRs as laughable exercises in sociological jargon,
Frankel is more concerned with the probation officer's "difficient
techniques of fact gathering" and his "establishmentism" which relies
too heavily on the prosecutorial viewpoint of defendants, thus frustra
ting the hypothetically mediating role which the PSR sould occupy.3
Noted criminologists, upon entering the debate on sentencing

^Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 35.
^Gaylin, Partial Justice, p. 99. A federal judge told
Gaylin: "I study those reports very carefully. I generally take them
home with me...Very often I will reread a report. Then I will always
confer with the probation officer who wrote it." Ibid., pp. 103-4.
■^Frankel, Criminal Sentences, p. 33.
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disparity in the 1970s, also tended to side with legal scholars in
identifying the manner in which presentence investigators collect
their data, and the manner in which the data is embodied in their
reports, as the two key ingredients contributing to unequal justice.
Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, citing the San Francisco Project,
argued that "it is primarily differences in the way information is
categorized and perceived (by judges)...which explain disparity in
sentencing."1

Since the PSR determines which pieces of information

the judge will receive, the probation officer is seen as playing "an
important part in the sentencing p r o c e s s . L e s l i e Wilkins, the
foremost empirical criminologist in this field, is even more forceful
in labeling the probation officer as the operative decision-maker:
"There is considerable empirical evidence that judges in the
sentencing decisions tend to be 'ratifiers' and that probation
officers, in operational terms, perform much of the sentencing
function."3
While presentence reports were coming under increasing attack
because of their "exhaustive" length, poor quality and their
unscrutinized inconsistent influence on sentencing which led to
disparity, others somewhat paradoxically attacked the PSR as

^Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 159.
^Ibid., p. 166.
^Leslie T. Wilkins, "A Typology of Decision-Makers? A
Theoretical and Speculative Contribution," in Parole: Legal
Issues/Decision-Making/Research, William Amos and Charles L. Newman,
editors (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1975), p. 168.

31
superfluous because of the prevalence of sentence bargaining.
Although his study is based on observation (and experience as
a probation officer), Abraham Blumberg's pioneering work, Criminal
Justice (1967), is probably the most cited source for the argument
that the need for PSRs is obviated by the court's reluctance to amend
sentence bargains and thereby risk losing dispositions sorely needed
to cope with the bone crushing volume of cases.

Blumberg claims that

the PSR's major utility is its service to the modern urban court's
"bureaucratic due process" model, which he defines as "a non-adversary
system of justice by negotiation (consisting) of secret bargaining
sessions, employing subtle, bureaucratically ordained modes of
coercion and influence to dispose of onerously large case loads in an
efficacious and rational manner."1

Thus, judges routinely "pass the

buck to the district attorney...and prefer to ratify the plea
negotiated by the district attorney, the defense counsel and sometimes
even the police."

Rarely do they exercise "their responsibility to

review the propriety of a plea," argues Blumberg, because of bureau
cratic pressures to speedily obtain as many dispositions as possible so
as to prevent being strangled by burdensomely heavy calendars.^
Because the actual sentence usually is bargained at the time of the
plea negotiation in New York City felony courts (since at least the

G r a h a m Blumberg, Criminal Justice (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1967), p. 21.
^Ibid., p. 131. Abraham Goldstein argues from an opposite
perspective in The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and The
Guilty Plea (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1981) that
judges have avoided review of plea decisions because of a misplaced
Belief in prosecutorial expertise and an unfounded fear of abridging
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
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mid-1960s),1 Blumberg argues that a probation officer's
recommendation has no impact at all on a sentence but instead the
report is "cynically employed to validate judicial behavior or is
otherwise used to reinforce administrative action already taken in
connection with a plea."^

Blumberg concludes that "the importance

of the presentence investigation as a decision-making tool for the
judge is overrated" since it is full of "unverified, speculative,
hearsay material about an accused" which is "tailored to fit some
preconceived model of the offender" and is "replete with cliches and
appropriate stereotypes, all serving to rationalize and codify the
basis for disposition."-*
Referring to the Williams decision, Blumberg finds that the
"Supreme Court's confidence in the presentence investigation as an
impartial means of gathering facts is hardly justified" because of
civil service bureaucracy, large caseloads, probation officers'
professional dissatisfaction, etc., all of which "cast serious doubt
on their objectivity, validity and integrity.'"1

In essence,

probation officers, "in order to avoid being deceived or manipulated
by administrators or clients...adopt an intellectual stance of
misanthropy" which in turn is injected into presentence reports "which

lnYou don't get a plea without a bargain and part of the
bargain is the sentence,"--an unidentified judge quoted in the New York
Times, 26 September 1972, at p. 1, column 1. See also New York State
Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control and Effect
on Society ("The Hughes Committee"), Report, New York State
Legislative Document No. 26 (1971), pp. 7-15.
^Blumberg, Criminal Justice, p. 131.
3lbid., pp. 160-61.

4lbid., p. 157.
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reflect these harsh attitudes of displaced hostility."1

Despite the

"vituperative and prejudicial epithets of the most loose, inaccurate
and vague" description which characterize the offender in a typical
report, the probation officer does perform perhaps his most
"significant function" for the court bureaucracy by "cooling out" an
accused who has pleaded to a lesser offense," i.e., by allowing the
defendant to ventilate frustration with the courtroom processes and by
simultaneously ensuring that the offender does not withdraw the
plea.^

Blumberg displays similar contempt for the defense counsel

and the judge in his "metropolitan court" (in actuality, Manhattan
Supreme Court).

He sees the defendant's lawyer as a "confidence man"

whose major objective is to get his client to plead guilty as quickly
as possible,-* and pictures the typical county judge as a mediocre
political hack.4

However, these actors remain relatively unscathed

compared to his overwhelming assault on probation officers as
prejudiced, discontented, lazy, self-important, whining, intemperate
and unprofessional minor functionaries in a bureaucratically ruled

^bid., p. 158.
2Ibid., pp. 157, 161-62. Blumberg decries a widespread
ignorance of the fact that the probation officer interviews the
defendant immediately after his plea is entered. However, Blumberg
himself appears to overlook that the probation officer is also a
cathartic agent for complainants.
•*Abraham Blumberg, "The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game," Law and Society Review 2 (January 1966): 1-25.
4Blumberg, Criminal Justice, pp. 137-39.
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sentencing process controlled by the district attorney.1
Criminal Justice spurred much research into plea bargaining and
courtroom procedures.

It also stands as the most damning indictment

of the PSR ever written and undoubtedly had an impact on subsequent
studies,^ particularly those undertaken by governmental agencies in
New York State, which we will examine in Chapter III.

Prosecutorial Dominance
Blumberg was by no means the first to recognize the gulf which
had developed between the ideal and the reality since Justice Black's
1949 characterization of the probation officer as an impartial
mediator between the court and the defendant.

As early as 1962, Paul

Keve found that "this ideal relationship does not exist anywhere in
America...a probation department's 'independence' and 'impartiality'
are inevitably tainted by its involvement with the organizational
motives and designs of the court itself."3

Bigene Czajkoski, a

decade later, found the probation officer's professional role
undermined more by prosecutorial controlled sentence bargaining than

lit is tempting to see the same misanthropy Blumberg
attributes to probation officers' descriptions of defendants as
reposing in Blumberg's merciless portrayal of probation officers.
^Donald Cressey, in a phrase most reminiscent of Blumberg,
had this to say on the subject in a 1976 aside: "Frequently, the
probation officer has no special training and the reports are nothing
more than moralistic statements or gossipy accounts," from his and
Arthur Rossett's study of plea bargaining, Justice by Consent
(Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1976), p. 3T!
3Paul Keve, "The Professional Character of the Pre-Sentence
Report," Federal Probation 26 (June 1962): 46.
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by a judiciary which had "abdicated a major portion of (its)
sentencing role (to) the chief plea bargainer," the prosecutor, "who
in reality determines sentence."1

Echoing Blumberg, Czajkoski also

finds the probation officer's major function consisting in soothing
the accused who has just pled guilty in the "production-oriented and
confidence game-like system of expeditiously moving defendants through
the court by means of plea bargaining."2

Not surprisingly then,

Czajkoski posits little value in the recommendation since "whether or
not a defendant is sentenced to probation probably depends more now on
his success in plea bargaining than on his promise of reformation,"^
and concludes that "it is now probably more appropriate for the
probation officer to counsel the prosecutor on rehabilitation
potential than the judge.
Indeed, this suggestion proved remarkably prescient.

A

defense attorney some six years later was to write (in describing
current sentencing practices in Wisconsin):
...the prosecutor is often influenced by the recommendation in the
report and the information underlying it.

Some prosecutors

frequently adopt the report's recommendations as their own to the

^ g e n e Czajkoski, "Exposing the Quasi-Judicial Role of the
Probation Officer," Federal Probation 37 (September 1973): 9.
^Ibid., pp. 9-10.

^Ibid., p. 10.

^Czajkoski speculates that "if the probation officer ties in
more with the prosecutor, then the probation officer's quasi-judicial
function may paradoxically increase because of the judicial
aggrandizement of the prosecutor's office through plea bargaining and
other arrangements." Ibid., pp. 11-13.
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court or use it as a benchmark in deciding on their recommenda
tion.

Sometimes a plea agreement will include the condition

that the

proseuctor will adopt the report's recommendation as

his own.*
As more states abandon the indeterminate sentence,
prosecutorial influence on sentencing must of necessity expand; and as
judges and parole boards are stripped of their former statutory
discretion, the PSR must also undergo change, suggesting perhaps that
the pre-pleading investigation--which by definition is devoid of a
sentence recommendation--will form the final redoubt for probation's
much reduced decision-making function.

Conclusion
Viewed from an historical perspective, the ebb and flow of
scholarly and governmental estimations of the value of the presentence
investigation suggests a number of observations.

First, the

literature reveals that the presentence investigation originally
developed in the late nineteenth century as a means to screen
potential candidates for probation supervision.

As probation assumed

all the trappings of a formal institution in the first two decades of
this century, its role was expanded.

Presentence reports now became

lengthy case studies used by the court, the prison, the parole board
and probation and parole officers as decision-making tools at each
step of an indeterminate sentencing process which was initiated by a

^Walter Dickey, "The Lawyer and the Accuracy of the
Pre-Sentence Report," Federal Probation 43 (June 1979): 30.
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judge and modified by a parole board.
During an era of quiescent crime rates extending from the
middle of the Great Depression until the early-1960s, the agencies of
social control enjoyed a stable intake which encouraged a concomitant
trend toward professionalization (civil service appointments, educa
tional requirements, expanded training, technological improvements)
and an increased sense of self-importance attached itself to their
respective roles.

For probation, this meant perfecting diagnostic

tools and "treatment modalities" for offenders:
The role of the probation officer emerged as part of a two century
social movement concerned with the humanitarian reform of western
penal systems.

The principles of casework used by probation

offices were originally intended to assist the probation officer
in keeping the person already given probation from re-offending.
However, with the introduction of probation reports into the
sentencing process, and with the request for probation officer
recommendations based on these reports, new significance was given
to the social background information collected.^
The presentence report thus came to be viewed less as a
screening device and more as an offender biography with multiple uses,
only one of which involved sentencing.

The social work ethos also

Ijohn Hagan, "The Social and Legal Construction of Criminal
Justice: A Study of the Pre-Sentencing Process,” Social Problems 22
(June 1975): 635.
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dictated a "non-judgmental" approach to a client's behavior and this
striving for clinical detachment (although frequently violated because
of the law enforcement tension in the probation officer's dual role,
it nevertheless dictated the structure of the report itself) militated
against the report's being more directed and pointed in its
evaluations.

When there were manageable sentence calendars in urban

courts, the unfocused nature of the report could be compensated for by
personal contact between probation officer and judge.1
However, when the number of defendants increased dramatically
during the 1960s, organizational constraints brought about a
"bureaucratization of justice."

In dispensing justice to three to

five times as many offenders,^ the system, rather than grind to a
halt, adopted different strategies: judges, to induce speedy
dispositions, made specific sentence promises at the time of the
guilty plea--promises which were usually dictated by prosecutorial
policy; and probation reports in turn became shorter, less
descriptive, more judgmental and less reliable.
Secondly, empirical validation for the anti-rehabilitation
arguments of prisoners, civil libertarians and conservatives alike
began to gain prominence and coincided with growing public impatience
with correctional promises unfulfilled.

Since the presentence report

*In federal courts, probation officers are still routinely
invited to judges' chambers to discuss their report and recommendation
prior to sentencing.
^Alexancder B. Smith and Harriet Pollack, "The Courts Stand
Indicted in New York City," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 68
(No. 2, 1977): 252-61.
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stood at the nexus of the correctional triumvirate, it naturally came
to be identified as a sore spot by critics of every persuasion:
Francis A. Allen (1964), John P. Conrad (1967), Robert 0. Dawson
(1969), Fred Cohen (1968), American Friends Service Committee (1971),
Marvin Frankel (1972), Jessica Mitford (1973), Norval Morris (1974),
David Fogel (1975), Ernst van den Haag (1975), James Q. Wilson (1975)
and Andrew von Hirsh (1976)1.

These and other critics have, in

effect, "demolished for the current generation the idea that an
individualized approach to sentencing that emphasizes treatment and
rehabilitation is either feasible or safe."^
Indeed, Robert Martinson's 1974 oft-cited study of the
literature on correctional treatment's efficacy concluded rather
glumly that "these data, involving over 200 studies and hundreds of
thousands of individuals as they do, are the best available and give
us very little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of

^Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); John P. Conrad, Crime
and Its Correction: An International Survey of Attitudes and Practices
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Pobert 0. Dawson,
Sentencing (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); American Friends Service
Committee” Struggle For Justice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971);
Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1973); Norvall Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1974); bavid Vogel, We Are the Living Proof: The
Justice Model For Corrections (Cincinatti: W.H. Anderson, 1975); Ernst
Van Ben Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning A Very Old and Painful
Question (New York: Basic Books. 1975); dames Q. Wilson, Thinking
About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Andrew Von Hirsh, Doing
Justice: The Choice of Punishments (New York: Hill and Wang, 19761"!
2John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 977.
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reducing recidivism through rehabilitation."1
Thirdly, as the criminal justice system became the object of
increasing scrutiny by the federal government, political commissions,
the legal community and scholars, the evils of unchecked discretionary
powers became apparent.

Although perhaps failing to recognize that

the distance between the ideal and the actual is more palpable today
than it was in the more orderly justice system extant in 1949, Fred
Cohen nevertheless eloquently sums up this argument:
Implicit in the Williams rationale, and explicit in the opinion of
many courts and correctional administrators, is the belief that
the goals of corrections can be best obtained by the preservation
of maximum discretion on the part of judicial and correctional
authorities.

[They] confused benevolent purpose with actual or

potential arbitrary outcome.

2

Others convincingly questioned whether anyone could predict an
offender's future behavior with any certainty, arguing that the
possible inequities of such unscientific guesswork outweighed whatever
gains it promised.

In short, early critics of discretion urged more

standardized techniques of decision-making while later critics

^Robert Martinson, "What Works? - Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform," The Public Interest 35 (Spring 1974): 54; see
also, Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson and Judith Wilks, The
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment, A Survey of Treatment
Evaluation Studies (few York: Praeger Publishers, 1^5).
^Fred Cohen, "Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative
Ideal," p. 15.

41
eventually came to recommend demolition of the indeterminancy
principle itself.
These developments cannot be viewed in isolation, for it is
important to recognize that as public alarm over crime levels
increased, funding for the institutions of social control became
disproportionately distributed: police and prosecutors expanded their
share of the criminal justice dollar while the courts and corrections
lost ground.

In such circumstances, it is not hard to see how

prosecutors came to gain more control over the sentencing process
through sentence bargaining and the further narrowing of sentencing
options.

With the decline of judicial authority, probation, the

foremost ancillary service of the court, necessarily suffered a
reduction in its influence.
Thus, the literature would appear to suggest that as
prosecutorial hegemony over sentencing increased, the value of the PSR
has decreased.

Since it will be the intention of this dissertation to

examine empirically this proposition, we must first determine what
prior empirical studies of the PSR have shown.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Introduction
Georgetown Law Professor John Coffee, in a lengthy review of
the current debate over sentencing disparity, chides his fellow
lawyers' "culture-bound vision of the legal system" which has led to
"the belief that the sentencing process is one in which the only
participants are lawyers and judges."

Noting a "transformation in the

sentencing process" which has occurred in the United States over the
past thirty years, Coffee writes:
The key event in this process has been the professionalization of
the probation staff...the simple turnkey of an earlier era has
given way to the modem, highly trained P.O., equipped with a
master's degree in criminology, a manual of standard operating
procedures, and a highly developed sense of the importance of his
role in the sentencing drama.

A by-product has emerged, however,

from this process of professionalization: a developing bureacuracy
that defends its institutional turf zealously...[There is a
tendency for probation officers] to define their success in terms
of their ability to obtain acceptance of their sentencing
recommendations from judges; the higher the percentage of
concurrence between the judicial decision and their
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recommendation, the greater the evidence...of their recognition as
"professionals.
Coffee is undoubtedly correct in identifying this
preoccupation with the influence of recommendations upon sentences,
but as the following discussion will attest, the "percentage of
concurrence" has come to be offered as evidence of the diminution of a
probation officer's professional role.

California
The first major tabulation of recommendations and sentences in
American courts was performed by the California Department of Justice
which found that in 1963, 97.6 percent of all adult defendants in the
state superior courts who were recommended for probation were so
sentenced, while 82.5 percent of all adult defendants who were not
recommended for probation were denied probation.

Further tabulation

of the period 1959-1965 in California Superior Courts revealed a
remarkably consistent average agreement rate of 96 percent between
judge and P.O. on recommendations for probation and an 81 percent
agreement rate for denial of probation.^
These statistics caught the eye of an ex-probation officer and
a British criminologist who were then engaged in an otherwise
"supervision-oriented study" of the federal probation system in the

Ijohn Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 983.
^State of California, Department of Justice, Delinquency and
Probation in California, 1963 (Sacramento, California: 19641, pp.
226-23.
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Northern District of California funded by the National Institute of
Mental Health.

Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, as part of the San

Francisco Project (1965-66), focused on the decision making process of
P.O.'s and judges in Northern California's federal courts and found "a
very high relationship between the probation officers' recommendations
and the court's dispositions."

In essence, they found a 96 percent

agreement on the recommendation for probation and a 88 percent
agreement on the recommendation for imprisonment, much like the
figures reported in state courts.*

In attempting to explain this

consensus, a number of legal and demographic factors in each of the
300 sampled reports were later analyzed.

A rank of about 30 such legal

and demographic factors utilized by both P.O.'s (for determining
recommendations) and judges (for determining sentences), according to
probability and contingency coefficient values, revealed "an extremely
high and significant rank order correlation”^ which indicated that
the sentence and the recommendation were both more oriented to the
crime than the offender:
It appears that there is little "shaping" of presentence
recommendations, but some very close agreement on the significance
of certain factors and characteristics as being particularly

1Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter, 300
Presentence Report Recommendations (Berkeley: University of
California, June 196$), p. 12.
2Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter,
Presentence Recommendations and Demographic Data (Berkeley: University
of California, February 1966), p. 687
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important for either probation or imprisonment recommendations or
dispositions.
Although they found wide variation among particular P.O.'s
recommendation patterns (a frequency range of 25.9 percent to 93.3
percent was tabulated for probation recommendations submitted by
individual P.O.'s ),^ they also observed that formal and informal
pressures exerted by superiors tended to reduce such fluctuations.5
Perhaps the most crucial finding, however, was that "probation officers
make decisions relating to presentence recommendations with relatively
small amounts of information,"^ customarily placing the most stress
on "prior record, current offense and largest period of (a defendant's)
employment."5

(In a later experiment utilizing Wilkins' "decision-

game" technique again, Carter found that P.O.'s arrived at recommenda
tions after selecting the first few items of information about a case
which they consistently deemed most important.
In a later analysis of their empirical studies, Carter and

^Ibid., p. 71.
2Lohman, Wahl, and Carter, Decision-Making and the Probation
Officer, p. 7.
5Ibid., pp. 17-18.

^Ibid., p. 16.

5Ibid., p. 3.

^Robert Carter, "Hie Pre-Sentence Report and the Decision
Making Process," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, no. 4
(1967), pp. 203-11.
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Wilkins identified four possible (interacting) factors which might
account for the observed ,rhigh degree of agreement between probation
officer recommendations and court dispositions": 1 ) judges follow the
probation officer's expertise in sizing up offenders; 2 ) many
offenders are "obviously probation or prison cases"; 3) P.O.'s
accurately second-guess the judge's intended disposition; and 4)
P.O.'s make their recommendations based on the same factors which
judges employ in arriving at sentences.*

The third factor was to

be frequently cited by subsequent critics of the PSR, foreshadowing as
it did the debate about the utility of recommendations in
jurisdictions where sentences are bargained.
In retrospect, the San Francisco Project set the agenda for
future research into the impact of presentence reports on sentencing.
However, the applicability of its empirical findings to state courts
is limited by the fact that federal courts enjoy uncongested criminal
calendars, a plethora of resources, and no need to sentence bargain.
Thus, a concomitant conservation of judicial autocracy over the
sentencing process obtains there.

Britain and Canada
Although not widely recognized, a considerable body of
literature has accumulated during the past decade in Canada and Great
Britain on the impact of presentence reports on sentencing, clearly
influenced by the San Francisco Project methodology.

Since both

^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy,"
pp. 509-10.
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nations employ common law based systems of jurisprudence, there are
great similarities between their criminal jurisprudence and ours--but
there are also major differences.

It is beyond the scope of this

study, however, to conduct any rigorous comparative analyses, although
the topic does cry out for some investigation.

(Immediately most

striking about presentence reports in Canada and England is the fact
that they were only very recently incorporated into the sentencing
process--specifically, during the

post-World War II era*--and

would thus appear to lend themselves to a more thorough-going
organizational analysis.)
The earliest empirical study of British PSRs appeared in 1965
and the results were somewhat dissimilar from the American studies,
but therein lies a clue to their slightly different roles in the
respective systems.

Taking a sample of 272 recommendations prepared

between 1955 and 1960 in Cornwall, Jarvis found a 70 percent agreement
rate (suprisingly low, compared to most U.S. studies) between judge
and probation officer on probation dispositions but an 86.7 percent
agreement rate (almost identical to that found by most American
studies) on non-probation dispositions.2
These findings were duplicated three years later in London's

1David Mathieson, "The Probation Service and Sentencing"
Probation Journal 25 (March 1978): 22-25; Stephen White, "The Effect
of Social Inquiry Reports on Sentencing Decisions, British Journal of
Criminology no. 12 (1972), pp. 230-249; and John Hogarth, Sentencing
As a Human Process, p. 246.
2F.V. Jarvis, "Inquiry Before Sentence," in Criminology in
Transition, T. Grygier, et al., editors (London: Tavistock, 1965), pp.

43-66.
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Queen's Court by McWilliams, who found a 77.5 percent agreement rate
for probation sentences and a 79 percent agreement rate for prison
sentences, with an overall agreement rate of 73 percent for the 170
cases tabulated.1

Jennifer Thorpe and Kenneth Pease, in a study of

212 reports during 1972 in Kent and Nottingham, found some points to
dispute with Jarvis et al., but of most interest was their observation
that "recommendations against probation were less likely to be
rejected than any other type of recommendation.
Recalling the California Superior Court tabulations and the
San Francisco Project's finding that judges are much less likely to
agree with a P.O.'s recommendation for prison (81 and 88 percent for
state and federal courts, respectively) than a recommendation for
probation (96 percent in both state and federal courts), Carter and
Wilkins have argued that there is considerable evidence that the
"probation officer is more punitive than the judge"-* in the U.S.
However, there are organizational and legal constraints on state court
judges here that are absent in England (and less prevalent in federal
courts) which appear to explain more of the discrepancy, not only
between acceptance of probation and prison recommendations as a whole,

*-W. McWilliams, "Pre-Sentence Study of Offenders," Case
Conference, no. 15 (1968), pp. 136-39.
2Jennifer Thorpe and Kenneth Pease, "The Relationship
Between Recommendations Made to the Court and Sentences Passed,"
British Journal of Criminology 16 (October 1976): 393-94.
^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy," p.
507.
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but which also help to explain the differential between state and
federal courts of seven percentage points on the rate of judicial
acceptance of prison recommendations (81 percent vs. 88 percent).

(A

subsequent study--the Witztum Report, discussed more fully in Chapter
III--proposed an alternate explanation, however: that judges primarily
use PSR's in state courts to "guard against mistaken decisions to
release"* offenders on probation.)
Probation officers in England meanwhile, are more apt than
their American counterparts to see the overall consensus between their
recommendations and the court's sentences as cause for alarm,
eschewing John Coffee's arguments of "professionalism" in this regard.
In fact, Helen Napier argues that presentence investigators could be
in danger of losing their independence by colluding with the court in
the sentencing function and urges P.O.'s to assume the role of an
"indepedent expert witness" in framing objective reports.2

Martin

Davies, in a similar vein, but more blunt, criticized P.O.'s for
attempting to match their recommendations to the anticipated sentence
of a particular judge.

In effect, Davies here uses Carter and

Wilkins' "third factor" mentioned above to explain the degree of
congruence between recommendation and sentence, to wit: the P.O.
tailors the recomnendation to the judge, rather than to the offender

iRuth Witztum, "The Utilization of Pre-Sontence Reports in
Kings County," unpublished report submitted to the Mayor's Criminal
Justice Coordinating Council, November, 1972.
2Helen Napier, "I>robation Officers and Sentencing,"
Probation Journal 25 (December 1978): 122-24.
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and his crime.

Since sentence bargaining is not uncommon in felony-

level courts in urban England--although appearing in somewhat
different guise than in its more obvious American incarnation--this is
not an impossible task for the British P.O., but the argument is
nevertheless not very convincing when one considers the relatively low
rate of agreement between judge and P.O. observed by McWilliams.1
TWo of the most elaborate empirical studies of the impact of
PSRs on sentencing were conducted independently in Canadian courts in
the early 1970s by Toronto sociologists John Hogarth and John Hagan.
Hogarth's 1971 study did not tabulate recommendations and
dispositions because at the time of his investigation, probation
officers were "not permitted by law or policy to suggest a particular
sentence" in Ontario; they merely indicated the "likely response of
the offender to probation if granted."2

Instead, Hogarth conducted

"decision-games" (using the Wilkins model) with P.O.'s and judges,
interviewed 71 magistrates, and compiled data on 2400 reports in the
province.

Hogarth's findings were significant, relevant and timely

but have yet to assume their rightful place in the literature, perhaps
because of their "foreign" origin.
Basically, he found a sentencing process benumbed by
information overload, widely divergent judicial attitudes on the aims

^Martin Davies, "Social Inquiry for the Courts," British
Journal of Criminology 14 (No. 1, 1974): 18-33. For an excellent
comparative study of American and British plea bargaining in action,
see Silvia Suzen Giovanni Casale, "The Plea Compromise Process in the
Criminal Courts of New York and London" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University, 1977), pp. 346-48.
2John Hogarth, Sentencing As A Human Process, p. 248.
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of sentencing, unstandardized reports, and nunerous intervening
variables which produced sentencing disparity.

Hogarth found that: 1)

"very often urban magistrates ...'skim' reports and in some instances
they read only the summary at the end";* 2 )"magistrates tended to
seek information consistent with their preconceptions [and] tended to
avoid information which was likely to present a picture of the
offender that was in conflict with their expectations;"^
3) presentence reports were requested in cases for which magistrates
were considering sentences that are not normally or usually given for
that type of offence"-* (e.g., prison for dangerous driving or
probation for armed robbery); and 4) since "communication tends to be
more effective when the receiver does not feel that the communicator
is trying to convince him," then the PSR presents problems because not
only can it be "viewed as an attempt by the P.O. to affect the
magistrate's decision" but the report is the product of a group 49
with a lower status (P.O.'s "tend to accept magistrates' views of the
cases, while magistrates would resist any effort of persuasion from
P.O.'s").4

Hogarth concludes that if PSRs are to have any impact

on sentencing, then they must be read by the judge, the judge must
have informal access to the P.O. to discuss the case and the judge
must subscribe to the theory underlying the reports themselves, i.e.,
the individualization of justice.5
John Hagan's study focused less on judges and instead

llbid., p. 262.

2 Ibid., p. 374.

4 Ibid., p. 263.

5 Ibid., p. 262.

^jbid., p. 373 .
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attempted to determine the impact of seven independent variables upon
the P.O.'s recommendation and the judge's disposition.

Four of the

variables were extra-legal--race, socio-economic status, the
defendant's demeanor and his/her success prospects (as perceived by
the P.O.); and three were legal variables--seriousness of offense,
prior record and number of present charges.

In analyzing 507 reports

and recommendations collected from 15 cities, Hagan computed
correlation and path coefficients seeking to relate all nine variables
collected.

He found that "recommendations alone account for more than

fifty percent of the variation in final dispositions.

In tabular

terms, probation officers and judges agree in 79.7 percent of the
cases."!

Hagan attempted to find validation in his study for three

major schools of criminological thought: the conflict theorists (since
the defendants studied were all from the lowest socio-economic class);
the interactionist school (P.O.'s perceptions of his subject--i.e.,
the subject's personal characteristics interacting with the P.O.'s
prejudices); and the organizational perspective (when judges request
recommendations they elevate the P.O.'s sense of importance and
transform the resultant reports into more evaluative, less factual
exercises that overemphasize the importance of extra-legal variables
on sentencing).2
Nkich like the California examples presented earlier, the
applicability of these British and Canadian studies to American urban

!john Hagan, "Social and Legal Constraints," p. 628.
^Ibid., pp. 635-36.
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courts is diminished by their failure to deal with plea bargaining as
a crucial dimension in today's sentencing process.

In this respect

the studies thus far surveyed are much alike: they make no distinction
between trial and plea bargained convictions; they treat sentences as
dichotomous variables (prison vs. probation); and they ignore sentence
bargaining.

"Western City"
The most important recent empirical study of the impact of
presentence reports, however, did attempt to incorporate the effect of
sentence promises into the research design.

This was a study

conducted by sociologist Rodney Kingsnorth and probation administrator
Louis Rizzo in a California city identified only as "Western City."
The authors chose 302 cases (from the calendar year 1972) where
defendants had pled guilty to felonies.

These cases were then

categorized into two groups according to sentence promise:

those

guaranteed "no state prison" by the court (126) and those given no
such guarantee (176).

A 99.2 percent agreement rate (125/126) between

promise and disposition and a 97.6 percent agreement rate (123/126)
between recommendation and sentence were found for the group promised
no prison sanctions.

In fact, only four cases prevented this group

from achieving perfect congruence for promise, recommendation and
sentence (in one case a defendant promised "no prison" was nonetheless
sentenced to prison as per the probation officer's recommendation; in
the other three cases involving defendants recommended for prison, the
court kept its original promise of "no prison").

For the second

54
group--in which no promise was made--a 90.3 percent overall agreement
rate between recommendation and sentence (159/176) was found, with an
88.1 percent agreement for non-jail dispositions (118/134) and a 97.6
percent agreement rate for jail dispositions (41/42).!

The authors

conclude from this data that "P.O.'s are influenced in their
recommendations by knowledge of prior agreements between prosecution
and defense.
So convinced are Kingsnorth and Rizzo of this hypothesis that,
echoing Blumberg, they urge future studies of the PSR's impact on
sentencing be placed within the broader context of court
administration, because:
...the autonomy of the P.O. in fully 40 percent of all cases that
do not go to trial [i.e., those cases where a "no state prison"
sentence has been promised] has been severely eroded by pressure
on P.O.'s to function within the constraints imposed by guilty
plea bargaining

The single most potent source of pressure is

the judiciary which, committed to managerial efficiency within the
court system, will assert the primacy of plea bargaining
agreements over P.O. recommendations when those are in conflict,
rather than permit the withdrawal of the guilty plea and the
return of the case to the bargaining stage.^

!Rodney Kingsnorth and Louis Rizzo, "Decision-Making in the
Criminal Courts: Continuities and Discontinuities," Criminology 17
(May 1979), pp. 3-6.
^Ibid., p. 8.

3Ibid., p. 11
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Borrowing Hagan's organizational perspective and Blumberg's
bureaucratization of justice observation, the authors create a
synthesis in arguing that "the probation officer is a member of a role
set within a court system committed to the pursuit of managerial
efficiency, i.e., the efficient processing of an ever-expanding
backlog of cases...latent pressures on probation officers to 'go
along' with plea bargaining agreements would be readily mobilized
against 'deviant' o f f i c e r s . S e e n from this vantage point, Supreme
Court decisions which have established that a plea bargain not kept is
a conviction which can be overturned2 are what explain the court's
reluctance to follow P.O.'s recommendations for prison when no
incarceration sentence has been promised: "they are not necessarily
doing so because they are more 'lenient' but because they are oriented
to norms of managerial efficiency and are reasserting the primacy of
the plea bargain."-*

Thus, P.O.'s learn they have very little

impact and "tailor their recommendations accordingly."4
Because of the sentence bargain's sacred status, they see only
three alternatives to the present sentencing process for the probation
system: 1) abolish plea bargaining (but most American criminologists
counter that this would be inefficient and is a doomed proposal); 2 )

1Ibid., p. 9.
2See Santobello v. N.Y., 404 U.S. 257 (1971); McMann v.
Richardson, 3§7 U.S. 759 (1970); and North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 2$ (1970).
^Kingsnorth and Rizzo, "Decision-Making," p. 6 .
4 Ibid.
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incorporate the P.O. into the plea bargaining process at an earlier
stage (through use of pre-pleading investigations and by providing
pre-trial services); or 3) abolish PSRs since "the consequences of
such abolition would be negligible.Launching into their final
peroration, Kingsnorth and Rizzo sum up the past decade's universal
displeasure with probation reports: "The presentence report's attempt
to fit treatment to the criminal rather than punishment to the crime
is a spurious exercise in treatment logic incompatible with equity in
law and as such should be abolished."2
However, Kingsworth and Rizzo's conclusions are not supported
by the data because their methodology is seriously flawed.

First,

only three variables were coded for each case (promise, recommenda
tion, sentence), ignoring numerous other important factors
(including both legal and non-legal variables such as custodial
5 tatus, seriousness of crime, number of prior arrests, and social

stability).

And secondly, the plea bargain and recommendation were

each coded as a dichotomous variable, a gross oversimplification which
seriously skews the results of all the comparisons they present.

In

fact, closer scrutiny of the 176 cases in which no promise was made
tends to give greater support to alternate explanations for why judges
and P.O.'s agree so frequently on sentence (e.g., Carter and Wilkins'
finding that each considers the same legal and extra-legal variables
as overwhelmingly important).

The reason is simple.

The inexact

coding of Kingsnorth and Rizzo rendered 13 cases within the "no

1Ibid., p. 13.

2Ibid.
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promise" group as anomalous, when the authors themselves note that
their dichotomous coding "may reflect a degree of conflict between
P.O.'s and judges greater than actually exists."1

The authors erred

when they reduced the congruence between recommendation and sentence
in this group from 172 out of 176 (97.6 percent) to 159 out of 176
(90.3 percent) by coding 13 "probation denied" recommendations as
recommendations against imprisonment when arguably they should have
been considered as recommendations for jail.

This extraordinary

agreement in cases where defendants had in effect been promised
nothing (60 percent of the court's workload in "Western City".') flies
in the face of their argument in the same paper that there are few
"obviously" prison or probation cases (they cite the San Francisco
Project's finding that 1,232 recommendations showed a span of 50
percentage points between individual P.O.'s recommendations).
Since there is no organizational pressure to carry through on
a sentence bargain in the no promise group, an identical 97.6 percent
agreement rate for sentence bargains and for cases where no sentence
promise is made deals a serious blow to the authors' argument that the
goal of organizational efficiency causes more congruence.

Juveniles and Misdemeanants
There has been some research on the impact of probation
reports in juvenile and misdemeanor courts over the years, but it
seems meager compared to the emphasis in the literature on adult
felony cases.
1 Ibid.

Yonah Cohen's 1963 study of criteria employed by P.O.'s

58
in making juvenile case recommendations is of interest in that he
found objective information to predominate over subjective data.

Thus

a typical report would be more apt to include a description of the
crime and the defendant's family finances than to contain a discussion
of the juvenile's personality and his family relationships, although
the latter are considered all-important in a casework approach.

Cohen

concurs with this prejudice against social work oriented reports,
arguing that juvenile reports should focus on information relative and
pertinent to the decision being made by the judge and not on the
proposed course of treatment.1
Seymour Gross, taking his cue from Carter and Wilkins,
attempted to rank the variables most affecting a P.O.'s recommendation
(by interviewing P.O.'s).

The juvenile court P.O.'s ranking was found

to be: 1 ) details of offense; 2 ) family background; and 3) prior
arrests.

Noteworthy here is that the same P.O.'s were then asked

their perception of what the juvenile court considered most
important.

The results were only slightly dissimilar: 1) details of

offense; 2) prior arrests; and 3) the juvenile's attitude.

(P.O.'s

therefore suspect judges of being more swayed by subjective transient
factors such as "attitude," than by the more objective "family
background").

In addition, both judges and P.O.'s considered the

1Yonah Cohen, "Criteria for the P.O.'s Recommendations to
the Juvenile Court Judge," Crime and Delinquency, no. 9 (1963), pp.
262-75.
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juvenile's interests, activities and religion the least important.1
Probation officer James Davis' 1979 doctoral dissertation
stands out as the first comprehensive overview of the sentencing
decision in the lower criminal courts.

From a random sample of almost

a thousand misdemeanor cases in Brooklyn Criminal Court, Davis found
that judges follow P.O.'s recommendations in 81 percent of the cases
(793/979).

Path and discriminate analysis of a number of legal and

non-legal variables found that judges based dispositions on (in order
of importance): 1) P.O. recommendations; 2) custodial status of
defendant at time of plea; 3) prior arrests; 4) prior violation of a
probation sentence; and 5) seriousness of offense.

In a separate

sample of 100 defendants sentenced without a PSR, Davis found judges
relied most heavily on: 1 ) seriousness of offense; and 2 ) prior
arrests.

Finally, recommendations were found to rely most heavily on:

1) prior arrests; 2) custodial status; and 3) prior violations of a
probation sentence.

Not surprisingly, then, Davis found that

defendants in detention with a history of many arrests were
overwhelmingly recommended for jail sentences and usually received
them.^

Davis found the judicial sentence promise to be of minor

significance in criminal court since "promises were loosely

^Seymour Gross, "The Pre-Hearing Juvenile Report: The P.O.'s
Conception," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, no. 4
(1967), pp. 212-17.
2James R. Davis, "The Sentencing Dispositions of New York
City Lower Court Criminal Judges" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York
University, 1979), pp. 279-80.
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constructed, with several alternatives, very flexible,"* with the
nature of the promises most strongly affected by the defendant's
custodial status.

Davis found PSR recommendations to be so

influential that he concluded (in a phrase that would probably cause
critics such as Willard Gaylin to shudder): "this research implies
that P.O.'s might do the sentencing in misdemeanor courts."2
Because misdemeanant and juvenile courts operate with a
completely separate set of organizational procedures, goals and
constraints, the findings of Davis and others are not transferable to
adult felony courts.3

What This Research Will Replicate
In devising my own research, I have decided to incorporate: 1)
the San Francisco Project's rank order correlation methodology to test
whether judges and P.O.'s consider the same variables most important
in decision making; 2) John Hagan's and James Davis' path analyses of
legal and extra-legal variables to determine their impact on
recommendations and dispositions; and 3) Kingsnorth and Rizzo's
comparison of promises, recommendations and sentences to determine if
the court's goal of organizational efficiency outweighs the probation
officer's judgments.

Finally, I will also take into account the

*Ibid., p. 263.

2 Ibid., p. 284.

3For an excellent discussion of the more predominant role
played by judges in sentence bargaining in lower criminal courts, see
Joseph Hoane, "Strategems and Values: An Analysis of Plea Bargaining
in Urban Criminal Court" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University,
1978). Also see Casale, "The Plea Compromise Promise."
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intervening variables in the sentencing process observed by Hogarth,
which center around the actions of the sentencing judge.

CHAPTER III

PUBLIC AND POLITICAL INQUIRIES INTO THE
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION IN NEW YORK

The Early History of New York City Probation
Any analysis of the history of the public administration of
probation agencies in New York City (and probably nationwide)* must
start from one inescapable conclusion: probation has never been funded
in a manner commensurate with its responsibilities.

This lack of

resources traditionally has been offered by the predominately
rehabilitation-directed correctional theorists and practitioners who
have held sway in this field for generations as the response to the
recurring charge by more retribution oriented critics that probation
just does not work.

Regardless of the merits of the argument, there

appears to be more evidence of probation underfunding in the lower
courts than in the felony courts of New York City until the
cataclysmic decline of the past decade.

A few examples will

illustrate this point.
In 1922, Chief City Magistrate William McAdoo, (a former New
York City Police Commissioner) in a "Manual of Probation Work"

*See Jim Atkinson, "The Proving Ground," Texas Monthly, June
1982, pp. 180-88, for a study of the Dallas Probation Department beset
by all the ills afflicting New York City P.O.'s (e.g., 1,000 P.O.'s
supervise 135,000 Texas offenders).
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prepared for the 38 Magistrates' Courts scattered throughout the City
(in effect, the forerunners of what are now New York City's family and
lower criminal courts), reported that 91 P.O.'s supervised 13,741
offenders and prepared 17,352 presentence reports during the previous
year.
This "enormous amount of work" caused "acute and massive
administrative problems" because the probation staff was "limited and
entirely inadequate in number and constantly overworked."1

New York

probation pioneer Edwin J. Cooley made the same complaint in 1923 when
he wrote that "one of the commonest weaknesses in probation work is
that most probation officers have more work than they can do well."
Cooley, anticipating present P.O. union activism, added:

"There is no

greater duty incumbent upon probation officers in all communities than
that of keeping constantly before the proper appropriating bodies, the
need for an adequate staff, a just compensation and sufficient
clerical help."^
Other plaintive wails of despair have permeated the
professional probation literature in New York City during every decade
since the 1920s.

The federal probation system also experienced

relative stagnation in staffing for the first two decades of its
existance.

(In 1931 there were 65 federal P.O.'s in the U.S.,

supervising 15,448 cases for an average caseload size of 237; by 1942

^William McAdoo, "Manual of Probation Work," Magistrates'
Courts of the City of New York, 1922, pp. 13-14.
2Edwin J. Cooley, "Standards of Probation," Magistrates'
Courts of the City of New York, 1923, p. 5.
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the caseload average was still an unmanageable 137.)1

This appeared

to be a universal phenomenon in community corrections until the
post-World War II era in New York City when the separately
administered county probation offices (which were controlled by the
state judiciary) dramatically outstripped the probation offices
serving the lower city courts (which were controlled by local
automonous probation administrators) in salary, prestige and
professionalization.

In fact, recognition of this administrative and

qualitative disparity between the probation departments servicing the
City's courts and those servicing the state (felony level) occasioned
the first important modem study of probation's performance in New
York City.

When 1960 court reorganization legislation initiated the

eventual merger of the probation bureaus of the Special Sessions and
Magistrates' Courts (consolidated in 1962 to form the City's lower
Criminal Courts), and the probation bureau of the Domestic Relations
Court (consolidated with the Children's Court in 1962 to form the
City's Family Courts) into a unified New York City Office of
Probation, Mayor Wagner was prompted to appoint a committee to study
why these "three probation systems had fallen markedly from the high
esteem in which they were once held throughout the country."2

^Victor H. Evjen, "The Federal Probation System: The
Struggle To Achieve It and Its First 25 years," in An Introduction to
the Federal Probation System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976), p. A-13.
^The Mayor's Committee on Auxiliary Services to the Courts
of New York City: Report (New York, 1961), p. 3.
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The Mayor's Committee
In studying the deteriorating quality of probation services in
the City courts, the Committee found understaffing

to be "a situation

of many years' standing" and concluded that "since 1930 there have
been many protracted periods in which there was virtually no change in
the number of probation officers, although the need for additional
personnel increased greatly."1

Furthermore, management of the

City's probation system was found to be grossly inadequate: "probation
officers are too often inadequately trained, overburdened with
excessive caseloads, and hampered by a poverty of resources and the
absence of any over-all planning, procedures and administrative
s t r u c t u r e . T h e Committee placed part of the blame on the lower
salaries in the city probation service which had "not been attracting
high-level probation personnel."-*
Although its mandate was to examine only probation services in
the lower courts, the Mayor's Committee repeatedly turned to the
county departments in its evaluations, finding there a model which the
City should emulate.

In virtually every qualitative comparison of job

performances between the local and county courts, the felony court
P.O.'s outdistanced their peers.

In the preparation of presentence

reports, for example, their findings (which I have condensed in Table
1 ) were derived from a comparative content analysis of 680 reports:4

1 Ibid., p. 52.
4 Ibid., p. 60-61.

^jbid., p. 5.

^Ibid.
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TABLE 1
MAYOR'S COMMITTEE COMPARISON OF COUNTY

Job Function
Horae Visits
Educational Contact
Employer Contact
Comnunity Contact
Diagnosis of Offender
Analysis of Family Environment

f,CITY PSR'S

Rate of Accomplishment
County P.O.
City P.O.
5lT
49f
781
55%
821
261
86 %
87%
86 %
51%
90%
55%

In sumaarizing its survey, the Committee attributed the better
performance of county probation to a "higher degree of skill" resulting
in part from "a higher pay scale [which] attracts on the whole a more
competent staff, many of whom have worked dilligently to raise
professional standards in probation service."1

Significantly, the

Committee's conclusion that the lower court PSI "produces a collection
of facts which are usable, but which have not been correlated or
analyzed,"2 like all its other unfavorable conclusions, refers only
to the lower court probation services.

However, over the years this

phrase has reappeared time and again in other reports completed by
other committees as proof of the long standing poor quality of PSRs
in felony courts, suggesting perhaps a polemical bias against
probation among politicians and the legal community which might help
explain the miniscule funding so much in evidence.
After 1962, the underfunding, understaffing and mismanagement

1 Ibid., p. 46.
"Salaries for P.O.'s in county courts are
fixed by the judges of the county courts under their mandatory powers
and are thus on the whole higher...".
2 Ibid., p. 45.
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prevalent in the lower court structure infected and then consumed the
adult courts with the advent of the 1974 consolidation of all
probation services in the city into a single mayoral agency, the
Department of Probation, and the subsequent loss of one third of staff
during New York's 1975 "fiscal crisis."

Whereas during the period,

1945-1962, a position as a P.O. in county court was deemed the most
prestigious, with fierce competition among federal and city P.O.'s (as
well as state parole officers) for appointment to these better paying
slots, there has now been a complete reversal of this pecking order,
owing to shrinking municipal correctional budgets, with federal and
state positions now recruiting most of their staff from the
demoralized New York City Department of Probation.1

In a recent

letter to the State Legislative Committee on Expenditure Review, the
former President of the City's Probation Officers' Union summarized
this process:
In 1957, when I entered employment in the Kings County Court
Probation Department, as a promotional opportunity after a few
years experience in the then Magistrates Court Probation Bureau,
the qualifications of staff and the salaries were the highest in
the nation....The specialization of caseloads for drug-addicted

1The state and federal correctional establishment has been
better able to shield their budgets from the depredations of public
and political pressures in the past decade. However, although
professionalization of federal P.O.'s continues apace, its performance
has also been criticized in the past decade. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Probation and Parole Activities Need to be Better
Managed: A Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: General
Accounting Office, 1977).
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offenders, psychiatrically based offenders, the provision of
special employment and referral services on an "in- house" basis,
were all innovations emulated by other departments.

As time went

on, however, particularly with the consolidation of agencies
within the City of New York and the elimination of differentials
of qualification, experience, pay, and the equalizing- downward of
delivery of services to the least-passable, probation itself as a
professional field of employment and as a credible alternative to
incarceration of offenders--have both become distasteful jokes.1
This "equalizing-downward" process in the quality of probation
services, particularly in the preparation of PSR's in Kings County
Supreme Court, will concern us later.

For the moment it is sufficient

to point out that chronic resource problems began to penetrate the
county probation unit level at precisely the same time (1962) that
county court judges themselves suffered a statutory diminution of
their mandatory powers and prestige.2

When one adds to the equation

the crime explosion of the late 1960s, which dramatically increased
the workload of the courts, all the ingredients for organizational
change present themselves.
In fact, a 1977 study by Smith and Pollack of the reasons
behind the increased use of plea bargaining in New York State courts

^Letter of Ross L. Umans to N.Y.S. Chairman of Legislative
Committee on Expenditure Review, A. Kremmer, 19 September 1982.
2Their powers of mandamus were stripped effective 1 Sept
ember 1962, when state reorganization transformed the county court
into the State "Supreme Court."

69
(97 percent of all convictions were a result of pleas in the peak
years of the early 1970s)1 found that between 1952 and 1974, while
the felony workload of judges had increased six times, the number of
judges had only doubled.2

In addition, lengthier trials

necessitated by the U.S. Supreme Court's expansion of due process
rights and its imprimatur for plea bargaining helped spur the wider
adoption of "sentence bargaining" as a bureaucratic refinement of plea
bargaining to induce speedier dispositions.

(An interesting ancillary

question not raised by recent apologists for plea bargaining, who have
convincingly demonstrated that guilty plea dispositions accounted for
the majority of convictions in state courts since the second half of
the nineteenth century, is: what percentage of pleas were sentence
bargained prior to the 1960s?)
The fact that the five district attorney offices in New York
City expanded dramatically at the same time that sentence bargaining
gained ascendency in county courts appears to add support to the
theoretical perspective which posits a shift in de facto sentencing
power from the judge to the assistant district attorney.

To

illustrate, when Eugene Gold became District Attorney of Kings County
in 1968, his Office had a staff of 90 prosecutors and an annual budget
of two million dollars.

When Gold retired in December of 1981, he

ruled a veritable empire of more than 300 ADAs and a 14 million

1Hughes Committee, p. 14.
2Alexander Smith 6 Harriet Pollack, "The Courts Stand
Indicted in New York City," pp. 252-61.
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dollar annual budget.1

Comparing these resources to the workloads

of the courts and corrections in the same period is a sobering
exercise but to date there is very little attempt in the literature to
relate this power shift to less pedestrian perspectives, such as socio
economic trends.2

Instead, the focus has been on dispositional

modes in the daily courtroom processing of the workflow and sentencing
disparity largely attributed to judges.
In fact, the periodic reports of political and legal
committees, commissions and agencies have been uniformly lacking in
any systematic overview of how organizational changes might have
evolved from efforts to cope with the inefficient consequences of the
extension of due process rights or how the imbalance in resources
allotted to the police, prosecution, courts and corrections affects
case processing.5

Instead, there is a narrow preoccupation with

lnGold, Near Retirement, Asks Justice System Aid," New York
Times, 9 August 1981 , p. 47. Smith and Pollack ("Courts Stand
Indicted," p. 257) note that in New York City, "the entire criminal
justice system outside the Police Department receives only 1-1/2
percent of the city budget."
2Anthony Platt attempts a non-empirical overview from a
radical perspective in his 1977 epilogue to The Child Sayers, claiming
that increased funding for the criminal justice system since the 1960s
has been the result of governmental desires to repress dissent and
cope with worsening economic situations. Platt's argument lacks
substantive documentation and is too simplistic.
5F. D. Cousineau and S. N. Verdun-Jones come closest to such
a perspective, criticizing the lack of research in this area, since
prosecutorial bargaining practices have major implications "for the
whole range of criminal justice agencies." See their monograph,
"Evaluating Research into Plea Bargaining in Canada and the United
States: Pitfalls Facing the Policy Makers," Canadian Journal of
Criminology 21 (July 1979): 305.
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what is inevitably labelled the "crisis in our courtrooms and jails."
Scapegoating is coimnon and procedural changes are advanced as
paliatives until the next commission is appointed.

This avoidance of

larger questions and the failure to acknowledge the impact of public
sentiment upon the funding and public administration of the
politically sensitive institutions of social control renders these
reports (prepared by lawyers and politicians absent input from public
administrators and technocrats) remarkably similar, imbued as they are
with what John Coffee elsewhere has labelled the legal community's
"unconsciously egotistical vision of the legal process" and its
"tendency toward a culture-bound vision of the legal system."1

The Hughes Committee
Thus, the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime
(the "Hughes Committee"), in its 1971 Report, took note of the "new
practice in the criminal courts in New York City in response to case
load pressures" --sentence bargaining--arising from the discovery of
judges in felony courts that "pleas of guilty in any significant
number cannot be obtained without sentence committments in advance of
the p l e a . T h i s practice was presented as simply the dubious
consequence of judicial work load pressures and the solution offered
was to restrict judicial discretion by enacting more regulations for
plea bargaining into the Criminal Procedure Law.

Such changes were

Ijohn Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 1044.
^Hughes Committee, p. 14.
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enacted, with the result that fewer felony indictments were bargained
down to misdemeanors, more defendants were incarcerated and sentence
bargaining continued to remain the predominant means of obtaining
dispositions.
The Hughes Report ensured its honored position in the
subsequent literature on presentence investigations when it
observed--absent any empirical validation--that "once a sentence
committment is made by a judge, the PSR is subtly tailored to justify
the sentence."

The Committee, anticipating Kingsnorth and Rizzo by

eight years, concluded that "a very important component in the
sentencing process is thus distorted to fit the exigency of having to
keep the dispositions flowing."*

(This observation appears to have

been borrowed from Blumberg but he is not credited.)

The Committee,

again by inductive reasoning (absent any study of PSR's and relying
only on interviews with judges and offenders),2 concluded that the
"subtle tailoring" of the PSR introduces distortion into the entire
correctional process because the PSR is used for prison assignment and
classification, for parole elligibility, and for community supervision
purposes.

Consistent with the recommendations of the 1967

Presidential Crime Commission and the American Bar Association
Standards Committee, the Hughes Committee urged expanded use of

*Ibid., p. 15.
2In a Staff Report on "Guilty Plea-Bargaining and Prisoner's
Attitudes," March, 1971, N.Y.S. prisoners were found to be largely
resentful of the bargaining process; 47 percent of Attica inmates were
reported to feel the judge did not keep his sentence promise. Ibid.,
p. 7.
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pre-pleading investigations and a reduced role for PSRs.1
In the same year that the Hughes Committee issued its
influential report, another committee--the Interdepartmental Committee
on Probation Reports of the Appellate Division^--surveyed the
attitudes of 65 county court judges in New York City on PSR's.

If one

were to believe the Hughes Committee, this survey would be expected to
indicate judicial consensus that the PSR is non-essential.

On the

contrary, almost every one of the 17 data elements of the PSR which
the judges were asked to rate as either "essential," "desirable" or
of "little value" was considered "essential" by an overwhelming
majority of judges.

This Committee concluded that

failed to conclusively identify any items as being
value,' all should be retained."3

"the judges, having
of 'littleor no

(Considered most essential were:

1) prior criminal history; 2) circumstances of offense; and 3)
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.)
A third subcommittee (the Subcommittee on the Functioning of
Probation, a task force

formed from the

state legislature's

Subcommittee on Liaison

with Public and

Private Agencies) studiedNew

York City PSRs in 1973,

and, noting the

great increase in workloads

for P.O.'s, found the reports to be

"water[ed] down [in] their

informational content" and increasingly contained "unverified and

1Hughes Committee, pp. 15-17.
^Interdepartmental Committee on Probation Reports of the
Appelate Division, First and Second Departments, Report, 1971, p. 4.
3 Ibid.
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inaccurate information."1

This sudden intense interest in New York

City's PSRs was spurred by jail overcowding caused by record numbers
of indictments and convictions.

Since a significant number of

detainees were awaiting completion of PSRs,2 many observers argued
for the elimination of an expensive, time consuming step in the
sentencing process, focusing narrowly on the lack of impact of the
P.O.'s recommendation on "bargained for" sentences.

At this time of

jail and prison turbulence across the state, two reports, both
prepared by law school students (for the New York City Board of
Correction) enshrined this anti-PSR point of view in New York State.
A decade later the probation community has yet to even attempt a
response to this direct attack on the raison d'etre for the PSI.
These two reports, combined with Kingsnorth

f,Rizzo's

1979 study, have

served only to hand further anmunition to the legal community's
attempt to exclude probation agencies from the sentencing process.

The Witztum Report
Ruth Witztum, then a student research associate for the

Subcommittee on Functioning of Probation for the
Subcommittee on Liaison with Public and Private Agencies, The Role and
Quality of Probation Services in New York City, Unpublished
manuscript, 1973, pp. 25-34. The Judicial Process Commission, A Study
of Probation, 1976, another unpublished manuscript, made many of the
same non-empirical claims.
2Up until overwhelming numbers brought about a change in the
practice in 1973, the Probation Department in county courts controlled
the sentence calendar, scheduling sentences upon completion of the
PSR. This practice naturally led to some abuse, including one
instance known to this writer wherein a defendant remained detained
for nine months waiting for a P.O. to complete the investigation (see
Chapter VI).
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Criminal Law Education and Research Center at N.Y.U. Law School, spent
the summer of 1972 on a project which was to be immediately utilized
by the New York City Board of Correction in its efforts to spur public
policy changes to improve jail conditions and which would eventually
be cited by all subsequent researchers in this field in New York
(although rarely directly).

Securing the probation administrator's

approval (in Brooklyn Supreme Court), she conducted the first
empirical study of the impact of PSRs on sentence bargaining.
Testing two hypotheses--that the PSR has little impact on sentence
bargaining and that a P.O. aware of the sentence promise is more apt
to ratify the promise than his ignorant counterpart--she purported to
find strong evidence for accepting both hypotheses.

Witztum found

that the PSR clearly influenced only 7.7 percent of bargained
sentences, with the promise and sentence agreeing 90 percent of the
time.

In other words, the judge amended his sentence promise to

follow the PSR's recommendation (a plea was withdrawn by the defendant
who would not accept such an amended promise) in less than eight cases
in a hundred.*

Secondly, where the promise was known to the P.O.,

the recommendation agreed with the eventual sentence in 14.8 percent
more cases than when no promise had been made, and an overall 70
percent agreement rate was found between recommendation and

iThe remaining 2.3 percent of the cases were those where
promise, recommendation and sentence were all dissimilar.
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promise.1

Witztum reasoned that since in 70 out of 100 cases the

PSR "merely endorses the plea bargain" and "in the majority of the
remainder the changes it suggests are not of major significance"
(i.e., recommending either a shorter or lengthier period of
incarceration than that promised, or recommending processing of the
defendant through a different correctional institution), then PSR's
were "largely superfluous, at best verifying the judge's perceptions
found at the time the guilty plea is taken...in any event the judge
will most often honor the agreement as to sentence despite a contrary
recommendation."2

Witztum, not surprisingly then, urges making

PSRs optional for sentence bargained cases in order to eliminate
delays in sentencing and free up manpower to reduce supervision
caseload sizes.
Once again, however, we find methodological error invalidates
many of Witztum's most salient findings.

In selecting 300 odd cases

for her study, Witztum introduced sampling error when she erroneously
assigned 107 cases to the category of "no promise" on the assumption
that no mention of a sentence promise in the probation case file or
PSR was sufficient proof that no sentence promise had indeed been made
by the court at the time of plea.^

However, this is faulty

iRuth Witztum, "The Utilization of Presentence Reports in
Kings County: An Analysis of the Value of Mandatory Presentence
Reports for Plea Bargained Dispositions," Unpublished manuscript,
November, 1972, pp. 17-32.
^Witztum, "Utilization of Presentence Reports," p. 29.
^Ibid., pp. 29-30.

^Ibid., pp. 9, 13.
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reasoning.

As a probation officer who examined case files in the same

Kings County office for almost ten years, I can attest to the fact
that P.O.'s frequently neglect to either ascertain or note in writing
the details of a plea bargain.

Some fail to do so because they claim

they do not want their own recommendation or their supervisor's to be
influenced by the bargain; others simply assume the details of the
bargain reported by the defendant are correct but don't report them;
and because some judges object to including mention of the bargain in
the report, other P.O.'s omit mentioning it altogether.

In addition,

Witztum's reliance on probation's reportage of the plea bargain--often
based on a defendant's statement to the P.O.--assumes accuracy when
there is no reason to do so, since defendants sometimes misunderstand
sentence promises and P.O.'s sometime misunderstand defendants.
Furthermore, Witztum fails to empirically consider an alternate
explanation for the 70 percent agreement rate between promise and
recommendation, namely, the San Francisco Project's finding that
judges and P.O.'s assign the same weight to the same legal and
extra-legal variables in their decision-making.

Finally, Witztum

posits no value to the content of PSRs, virtually equating the
recommendation with the report and ignoring the uses to which the PSR
is put by other actors in the criminal justice system.

The Board of Correction
Relying heavily on the Hughes Committee Report and the Witztum
Report, the New York City Board of Correction's 1973 Report (written
by Carol Gerstl, another N.Y.U. law student) presented a much quoted
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imprimatur of Witztum's research:

"If 95 percent of all convictions

are gained through guilty pleas and if in over half of these cases the
sentence is determined prior to any investigation so that the report
acts merely to confirm the already negotiated sentence, the City is
expending a great deal of money for rubber stamps."1

Foreshadowing

the 1981 "PSI Crisis" episode, this report blames the PSR and its
expanded mandatory use in the lower courts for overcrowding in
detention facilities, neatly sidestepping the impact of the
precipitous rise in arrests, convictions, and indictments, at a time
when new procedural safeguards resulting from the Warren Court's
rulings were also contributing to delays in dispositions.

In a less

than convincing argument, the report also dismisses the 1971 survey of
county court judges described above (which found judges placed
considerable value in PSRs), suggesting instead that the jurists were
merely playing by the rules of the game in politely perpetuating the
fiction which "assumes the smoothly functioning adjudicative system
where sentence is not determined until after the PSR has been received
by the judge."2

The study then recommends, like Witztum, that PSR's

be waived for cases involving sentence bargaining.

In a revolutionary

proposal which would pose more legal and ethical problems than it
would solve, the article concludes with a suggestion that the

1Carol Gerstl, "Presentence Reports: Utility or Futility?"
Fordham Urban Law Journal, no. 2 (1973-74), p. 41. Kingsnorth 8 Rizzo
found 40 percent of plea bargained cases to contain sentence
bargains. Like Witztum, their sample was drawn from the year 1972,
but a continent away.
2Ibid., pp. 34-37.
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admittedly understaffed probation department perform pre-pleading
investigations on every defendant in felony court prior to
conviction.' *

The Economic Development Council
In 1977, a citizen's group funded by the private sector, the
Economic Development Council, produced an 'Organization Report on the
New York City Department of Probation" after conducting some 200
interviews of probation staff.

However, the usefulness of the Report

is marginal at best, because the Task Force was unaccountably denied
"access to case records, observations of case worker interviews
and...raw material"2 and was specifically "not permitted to
examine...presentence records."-*

In a methodological leap of faith,

the Report first allows that "without hard information on the actual
impact of PRSs on the sentences imposed by judges, it is difficult to
assess their real worth,'"* but then nevertheless proceeds to
evaluate the PSR based on interviews of dubious reliability with
P.O.'s and administrators:
A substantial part of each report merely repeats or embellishes
upon information already in the court papers.

For example, a

major felony repeat offender, age 35, whose sentence and plea has
already been agreed upon, might be the subject of an 8 page single

llbid., pp. 46-53.
2Economic Development Council, Organization Report on the
New York City Department of Probation (New York, 1977), p. iv.
3lbid., p. 72.

4lbid., p. 44.
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space PSR which includes 3 pages of his past criminal record
(already in the NYSID printouts) and such "social" information as
his high school education, past employment, early family life and
personal drinking habits.*
Hie E.D.C. "study" then questions the value of assigning
"substantial resources" in adult courts to investigations, noting
"many unit supervisors and branch chiefs...seriously questioned the
value of PSIs," while "many P.O.'s and their supervisors...have
little confidence in the influence of PSRs--an attitude which affects
their morale and perhaps even the work product.
There are a number of points to make here.

First, the claim

that the PSR merely repeats information about the defendant's criminal
record already known to the court is a serious distortion of the
truth.

The authors fail to mention that the NYSID printouts (an

acronym for New York State's computerized criminal "identification and
data system") available to the judge contain no details of the arrest
and often lack dispositional data, two shortcomings remedied by the
PSR (see Chapter VI for a discussion of judicial reaction to deleting
this data).

They also ignore the consistent findings of both critics

and apologists of present sentencing practices that a defendant's
prior criminal record is invariably the first or second most important
factor weighed by sentencing judges.

Secondly, "social" information

on defendants promised state prison sentences has utility for prison

1Ibid.

^ibid.
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officials and the parole process.

The E.D.C.'s blithe assurance that

"the State correctional authorities reportedly perform their own
investigations and classifications" and that the "use of the
investigation's report by other agencies, an ancillary benefit,
has...been more 'potential' than actual,"1 is quite simply, not
true.

Proof of the "ancillary" value of PSRs was provided anew in

1981 when pro forma PSRs (instituted to quickly process defendants
out of overcrowded detention centers--see Chapter VI) caused numerous
complaints by correctional and parole officials.

In fact, parole

officers rely heavily on PSRs in conducting their own pre-release
reports, which focus only on residence and employment prospects.
Thirdly, the reported low morale of probation investigators might not
be a product of their perceived lack of impact but due to other
factors (such as low pay, overwork and sagging prestige) affecting
their self evaluation.
In the final analysis, the E.D.C. makes an excellent
suggestion when it contrasts an uncited "state sampling reported by
the State Division of Probation in which sentence promises were
changed about 20 percent of the time after receipt of a PSR" with
"other informal estimates--as low as 5 percent"2--and calls for an
empirical six month study of PSR's in Supreme Court, supplemented by a
polling of judges to find out "what causes changes in prior sentence
promises."-*

This exemplary proposal continues to gather dust nine

years after the fact.

1Ibid.

2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 67-69.
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As the 1970s wore on, public pressure for a more retributive,
incapacitating response to continuing high violent crime rates led to
numerous amendments to New York State's indeterminate sentencing
structure, limiting plea bargaining and increasing penalties for drug
dealers and second and third offenders (1973), violent and juvenile
offenders (1978) and fixing longer minimum state prison terms
(1978).1

The Morgenthau Committee
Against such a backdrop and amid escalating dissatisfaction
with sentencing disparity in New York State, Governor Carey in 1978
appointed the Executive Advisory Committee on Sentencing (the
"Morgenthau Committee") to "evaluate the effectiveness of the existing
laws relating to imprisonment, probation and parole in achieving
sentencing goal s."2

The Committee found a sentencing system

"marked by inconsistency and unjustifiable disparity," partly because
the "vast discretion" exercised by judges was "nearly inmune from
review" and partly because "the penal law presents no coherent set of
goals to guide the sentencing decision."3

The blame for disparity

ISee New York State, Chapter 481 of the Laws of 1978; Penal
Law, Sections 10.00, 30.00, 60.10 and 70.05; N.Y.S. Criminal Procedure
Law, Sections 1.20, 180.75, 190.71, 210.43, 220.10, 300.50, 330.25,
720.10, 725.00, and 725.20. See also Joan Edith Nufield, "The
Allocation of Sentencing Power in New York State, 1964-1970," (Ph.D.
dissertation, State University of New York, Albany, 1979), p. 180-212,
which details the first step in this process, the 1 September 1967
amendments in the penal law which decreased the discretion of the
parole board by collapsing maxima-minima.
^Morgenthau Committee, Report, p. ii.
^Ibid., p. vii.
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was also imputed to the usurpation of sentencing powers by parole
boards and to the "mechanical, inaccurate and unfocused" PSR,1 which
"fails to provide the basis for informed use of judicial discretion,
or to bring the sentencing decision the order and structure which the
penal law itself lacks."2
Like previous critiques of the PSR, the Morgenthau Committee's
Report not only blames PSRs for contributing to sentencing disparity,
but simultaneously labels them superfluous to the sentencing decision
because of bargained sentences.

Clearly, the reports cannot be both

at the same time, but this logical inconsistency appears not to have
been recognized by the Committee.

Variations on this basic

contradiction permeate the entire Committee's treatment of probation
investigations (analysis of this confusion suggests a final paradigm
for classification of the literature on the PSR presented below),
reflecting quite accurately a basic confusion which has been
introduced into the literature during the past decade.
Decrying the "all or nothing" dichotomy in sentencing
(incarceration or probation), one of the Committee's key proposals
called for expanded utilization of "intermediate dispositions-including restitution, day fines and community service."3

To this

end the Committee called for "encouraging and developing these
conmunity-based programs on a state-wide basis" by making "a single
state agency responsible" for creating them.^

*Ibid., p. 37.

p # 3g>

3Ibid., p. xv.

^Ibid., p. 149.

The dearth of
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sentencing alternatives and the resultant use of probation as a
"catch-all disposition,"* were both attributed to one salient
factor:

presentence

reports; and to remedy the problem the Committee

recommended that the investigative

function

be stripped from the

probation agency entirely.
Furthermore, the Committee attacked PSRs in general because
they "do not describe treatment alternatives nor--even more
important--do they state whether the offender needs probation
services," which leads to overuse of probation "for offenders who need
no supervision and for whom another community sanction...would be more
appropriate."2

Thus

the Committee

attention is paid to assessing the

claimed

that "insufficient

needs of

potential candidatesfor

probation or determining what programs could best meet those needs.
As a result, community sanctions other than probation have never been
energetically or systematically developed across the state."3

Here,

the Committee is clearly presenting a prescription for a treatment
oriented report.

In fact, it recommends that the presentence

investigation function should be "prepared by court investigators,"
and not by P.O.'s, for two interrelated reasons.
First, it argues such a change would allow probation

*Ibid., p. 100.
2Ibid., p. 97. Yet in the Committee's Appendix, a survey of
judges (pp. 242-46) found "most judges, but not all, say the PSR or
the Probation Department does inform them (of suitable alternative
programs of non-incarceration sentence)."
3Ibid., p. 102.
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departments to concentrate on doing the real work of probation:
"providing social services to probationers."1

Yet, in urging such a

radical step, the Committee nowhere asks (let alone resolves) the
question of how "court investigators" will be better able to assess
the treatment needs of offenders.

If the PSI is to be conducted by

court functionaries, how are they to develop treatment plans when
pressured by judges to sculpt reports to conform to organizational
pressures?

(The Committee, with perhaps unintentional irony, argued

that investigators "responsible to the Chief administrative judge"
would be more "responsive to the needs" of the c o u r t s . I n d e e d ,
elsewhere the Committee complains that probation spends too much of
its resources servicing the courts when it should be servicing
probationers, without recognizing the organizational and theoretical
pressures which made this preeminent concentration on presentence
reports inevitable.

But despite all this lip service to "treatment,"

the Committee's prescription for the presentence report completely
jetisons the rehabilitative reasoning presented above:
A presentence report... should primarily present information
relating to the offender's criminal history and facts relating to
the offense.

It would include an indication of the applicable

guideline sentence and elucidate any factors which might suggest
that a sentence outside the guidelines would be appropriate.^
Such a proposal is based on the Committee's belief that the

*Ibid., p. 148.

^Ibid., p. 147.

^Ibid., p. 148.
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"nature of the current offense and prior criminal history are the most
important determinants" in assessing any sentence,1 particularly
under the revised "justice model" system of sentencing guidelines and
presumptive parole which they envisage.

This type of report, the

Committee suggests, would eliminate extraneous variables from
interfering in the sentence recommendation: "...individual P.O.'s make
[recommendation] decisions on an ad hoc basis...[Fjactors such as the
probation department's own supervisory caseload and its perceptions of
the judge's customary sentencing practices may strongly influence
P.O.'s recommendations.2
So strongly does the Committee feel about these unwarranted
considerations impinging on sentencing that it offers as another
reason for transferring PSR production to court investigators the
following strong words:

"[We] are also convinced that probation

departments should not be afforded the opportunity to determine the
size of their own caseloads through their recommendations regarding
who and who would not be placed on probation."3

One might be likely

to conclude from the above discussion that the Morgenthau Committee
posited much power of influence in the report and its recommendation.
Paradoxically, it argued from the opposite perspective when it suited
its purpose:
...the presentence report is seldom more than a prolix offender
biography which recites facts having little relevance to the
sentencing decision.

Other features of the report, notably the

offense description and criminal record, are largely drawn from
llbid., p. 37n.

2ibid., p. 38.

3Ibid., p. 148.

87
the essentially duplicate information in the prosecutor's
file...[t]he reports [have been found to be] lacking in
necessary sentence and treatment recommendations.1
Finding the reports "often irrelevant to the sentencing
decision to be made," the Committee argued that sentence bargaining
severely undermined their utility,^ and, without integrating such a
proposal into their other prescriptions, they reconmended "more
extensive use of preplea reports."-*
The Committee's findings are based primarily on the previous
studies which we have detailed earlier.

It quotes liberally from the

non-empirical Economic Development Council's study and uses other
similarly tainted sources (Board of Correction report, Witztum,
Mayor's Committee, Hughes Committee).

The only examples it cites to

justify its proposal that probation not be allowed to determine its
own intake (by manipulating recommendations) are the 1927 and 1938 New
York State Crime Commissions, both of which refer to the New York City
Court of Special Sessions, then a misdemeanor court, which was under
fire from the public and politicians alike for granting too many
probation sentences in 1926 !^
Perhaps the most glaring methodological weakness of the
Morgenthau Committee's overview of probation can be found in its
utilization of the only original empirical data it generated--a survey

*Ibid., p. 37.

^jbid., pp. 37-38.

5Ibid., p. 149.

4Ibid., p. 197n. Its Appendix Survey finds only 23 percent
of judges and 17 percent of prosecutors feel P.O.'s might "sometimes"
be swayed in their recommendations by caseload considerations. In
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of the actors in the plea bargaining process conducted by Louis Harris
in late 1978.

In the main body of its report, the Morgenthau

Committee states: "criminal justice practitioners throughout the
state--and particularly in New York City-- question the accuracy of
the reports"1 and then refers the reader to the Appendix for
validation.

On the contrary, the Appendix reveals:

"Most judges and

prosecutors believe information in the presentence reports to be
generally accurate."2

And, further: "[f]ew judges and prosecutors,

downstate or upstate, criticize the report as usually inaccurate.
Only 10 percent of downstate judges and 17 percent of downstate
prosecutors find the PSI to be only sometimes accurate."-*
lastly:

And

"Most judges and prosecutors believe the reports are 'almost

always' or 'usually' accurate" while "many defense attorneys question
the reports' accuracy" although they admit "they are less likely to
challenge information on the defendant's background--perhaps to
emphasize mitigating factors or to make an argument for probation.
Elsewhere in the main body of their Report, the Committee
complained that "the offense description and criminal record" features

fact, this is one of the more spurious suggestions in the entire
Morgenthau Report since it seriously distorts the entire thrust of
probation history in this regard. Probation has consistently fought
to make probation a selective sentence and to weed out those offenders
for whom it would not be appropriate. Indeed, the PSI was originally
developed for this very reason, as noted in Chapter I above. The
impetus to use probation indiscriminately comes from other
quarters--from judges and ADA's who use probation as a dumping ground
to avoid troublesome or risky prosecutions or to avoid difficult
sentencing decisions.
Ubid., p. 37.

2Ibid., p. 225.

4lbid., pp. 227-28.

3Ibid., p. 228.
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of the report were worthless rehashes1 of information already known
to the participants.

But Louis Harris' summary of his survey on

presentence investigations is, in many ways, the direct opposite of
the Committee's reported findings, providing us with yet another
example of a government body refusing to be confused by the very facts
it had collected:
In sum, most judges and prosecutors feel that the presentence
investigation reports are generally accurate; provide valuable
information, particularly on the defendant's prior record; should
contain sentence recommendations by trained P.O.'s...

2

Furthermore, the emphasis which New York PSRs place on a
defendant's "legal history" is, in fact, largely justified by the
following finding of the Harris survey:
Almost half the judges and prosecutors list the defendant's prior
record as the 'one item of information most valuable to you' [in
the PSR].

The survey reveals that the length or seriousness of

the defendant's prior record is important to judges in several
respects.

Judges indicate that the prior record is the most

likely reason they might decide not to impose probation as a
sentence and is the major reason judges give for not following a
prosecutor's sentence recommendation.^

^Qutoing in full the paragraph from the E.D.C. report we
quoted above on p. 80--and if the reader will remember, the E.D.C.
source was a disgruntled probation supervisor's unsupported feeling.
2Ibid., p. 239.

-*Ibid., p. 226
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But if the sentence bargain is arranged at plea and if the PSR
merely "repeats or embellishes upon information already in

the court

papers,"* then why would judges and prosecutorsvalue such
"rehashes" so highly?

The answer, we suggest, is that the PSR often

provides more detail, more analysis and more verification of the
defendant's prior record than what was available to the sentence
bargain participants at time of plea.

One obvious example is

information on subsequent arrests and convictions not reported in the
computerized printouts which date from inception of the present
prosecution and therefore do not reflect arrests that occurred while
the defendant was awaiting trial.

Other examples: details of past

crimes; details of out-of-state and out-of-city convictions and arrest
histories; details on federal arrests frequently omitted from "rap"
sheets; details on parole and probation supervision; etc.2
Another case in point involves probation officers'
recommendations which the Committee (as per Witztum) rated as useless
and flawed.

But the survey participants did not express this view at

all:
The most important reason why judges and prosecutors favor
specific sentence recommendations in the presentence investigation

1Economic Development Council, p. 44.
2An ancillary finding of the survey was that "prosecutors
are three times as likely as judges to list family and job background
as the most valuable item of information in the presentence report (30
percent vs. 6 percent in NYC)" while the reverse proportion was found
regarding the value placed on description of the offense, with judges
more likely than prosecutors (by a ratio of 32 percent to 17 percent
in NYC) to find this information of great value. Morgenthau Committee,
Report, p. 226.
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reports is the belief that those who conduct the investigation are
more familiar with the defendant's background and the
circumstances surrounding the commission of

the crime...only 6t of

judges complain about the quality of report

preparation or

personnel as a reason (for not wanting recommendations).*
It is true that Harris found defense attorneys to be "much
more likely than others to question the quality
P.O.'s who prepare them."2
the survey.

of the reportsor the

This holds true for every questionin

Their displeasure might be an indication of support for

Blumberg's contentions that judges use PSRs and P.O.'s as "crutches"
in imposing sentence.

But it might also indicate the defense

attorney's disgruntlement at being "left out of the action."

The

investigating P.O. is least likely to contact the defendant's lawyer
because, unlike the judge's court file, the assistant district
attorney's prosecution file and the police officer's arrest file, the
attorney has no hard information to offer.

This also means that since

the defense counsel's familiarity with the details of the crime are
limited by whatever discovery motions and the defendant's statements
have garnered prior to the plea, the attorney is likely to be
presented the fullest account of the crime only minutes before
sentencing is imposed--when the PSR is made available by the court.
Unlike the P.O. however, the defense counsel has rarely interviewed
the complainant or the arresting officer or researched details of
previous arrests and so will be at a disadvantage in arguing

xIbid., pp. 230-31.

2Ibid.
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mitigation on the facts of the crime.

Thus, the attorney will be more

likely to concentrate on the social background of the report in
arguing mitigation or in casting doubt on the report's "validity,"
since his client's social circumstances are least likely to be known
to the ADA, and most likely to be familiar to defense counsel.
In any event, the anti-probation animus of the Morgenthau
Committee is further elucidated by a study of its portrayal of the
plea bargaining process.

In perhaps the best description of the

practice of sentence bargaining in New York City felony courts today,
the Committee compares the process to the method of settling a civil
lawsuit prior to trial:
...the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge act as a surrogate
jury; by assessing the evidence in relation to the seriousness of
the offense and the defendant's prior record, they arrive at a
charge and sentence agreement which they deem to be appropriate in
light of what they could reasonably expect to happen if the case
proceeded to trial.*
In such a system the image of a magisterial above-the-battle
judge poring over PSRs in order to arrive at a proper disposition
would, of course, be absurd.

But just as absurd is the Committee's

attempt to absolve prosecutorial decision-making from any share of the
blame for the sentencing disparity it so loathes.

The Harris survey,

for instance, found that "about half of the (polled) prosecutors held
the belief that their sentence recommendations were 'almost always' or

*Ibid., p. 27.
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'usually' equivalent to the final s e n t e n c e . Y e t , how prosecutors
arrive at their recommendations received scant attention from the
Committee, which preferred to utilize the artificial and spurious
device of a "simulation approach" whereby judges--unencumbered by
defense attorney arguments, ADA or probation recommendations--were
asked to read randomly chosen PSR's and then impose the best
sentence.2

Would the incredibly disparate results have been any

less disparate if prosecutorial decision-makers were administered a
comparable instrument?

Since the Committee failed to do so, we can

not answer that question.
In addressing the related subject of long-standing judicial
reluctance to supervise prosecutorial discretion, law professor
Abraham Goldstein points out that traditional unchecked prosecutorial
powers have resulted in: "the distorting effect of inaccurate pleas;"
misleading defendants who plead to lesser charges but who are often
sentenced for the "real" offense, rather than the adjudicated one;
and relying on ad hoc "correctional factors as a basis for choosing or
retaining a charge," thereby frustrating "the effort to make
sentencing more rational by relying

on...presentence reports."-*

Indeed, the leading legal scholar in this area, Albert A1schuler, has
noted that prosecutors are usually "unaware of information that even
a routine pre-sentence investigation would have uncovered."*

*Ibid., p. 193.

2Ibid., p. 193.

^Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary, pp. 44, 60, passim.
*Albert W. Alschuler, "The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining," Columbia Law Review 76 (1976): 1059.
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Finally, another compelling argument for the utility of
presentence reports can be found in the Harris survey's discussion of
judges' opinions on prosecutorial recommendations:
Judges whose sentences do not always coincide with the
prosecutor's recommendations were asked [why]...many judges cite
mitigating circumstances of the case.
and feel of the case."

One judge cited, "the facts

Another cited, "factors revealed in the

presentence report, of which the prosecutor is unaware."

Several

judges expressed a concern that the prosecutor's recommendations
are often too severe a sentence, "not taking all these
(mitigating) factors into consideration."

Another judge commented

that "the prosecutor nearly always recommends incarceration
in every case.

I personally believe I should attempt to take into

account...the individual case."1
In assessing the bias of the Morgenthau Report it is
interesting to note that in its survey of the "actors" in the plea
bargaining process, it excludes what Susan and Leonard Buckle have
referred to as "the only non-lawyer professional in a lawyer dominated
coramunity"2--the probation officer.
The Morgenthau Committee's recommendations constituted one of
four independent proposals made during a five year span to strip the
PSR function from probation and transfer it to the courts or to a

1Morgenthau Committee, Report, p. 193.Ibid.
2Susan R. and Leonard Buckle, Bargaining for Justice:
Disposition and Reform in the Criminal Courts (New York: Praeger
Publications, 1977), p. 153.
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not-for-profit agency.

In 1977, the New York State Division of

Criminal Justice Services promulgated as part of its criminal justice
standards that "[p]resentence investigation and ROR investigation
should be handled by an independent agency under the jurisdiction of
the courts separate from the probation department."1
A committee of criminal lawyers from the New York bar, in a
report on the New York City court system, also argued that probation
understaffing and underfunding made transfer of the PSR function to
the courts a sensible suggestion.^

The Correctional Association
The most recent call for the removal of probation departments
from the sentencing process comes from a 1982 report of the
Correctional Association of New York, the major focus of which was the
"crisis in our jails and prisons."
In a case of the blind leading the blind, the Correctional
Association cites the Morgenthau Committee citing the Economic
Development Council citing some disgruntled probation supervisors as
"evidence" that PSR's "concentrate on superficial backround
information and criminal histories and generally do not attempt to
formulate a specific post-conviction p r o g r a m . In a charge lifted

1New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,
"State Standards and Goals for Criminal Justice Corrections," Albany,
N.Y., 1977.
2"For the Record," The Chief (New York City civil service
newsweekly), 31 July 1981, p. 4.
•^Correctional Association of New York, The Prison Population
Explosion in New York State : A Study of the Causes and Consequences
with Recommendations for Change (New York, 1982), p. 71.
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whole cloth from the Morgenthau Report, the Association complains that
PSRs do not inform judges of suitable non prison programs for
offenders, but praises the purported success of "client specific
planning models" which are prepared by the Legal Aid Society in New
York City in order to "set out a program for [the offender] designed .
to ensure the future lawful conduct of the defendant and to serve the
interests of others...such as the defendant's family and the victims
of the crime.1

The Association thus urges transfer of the

investigative function to court administrators or a public benefit
corporation, since it feels "a prerequisite for an effective
presentence and pre-plea investigation system is the removal of this
function from already overburdened departments.

The PSR in New York: A Summary
It appears that recent overviews of the PSR in New York have
confounded and misused prior studies of the subject for polemical
reasons in an effort to: 1) accommodate the judiciary by urging that
the PSI function be subsumed under the court administration; and 2)
seize greater control of a device which could be used to better
regulate jail and state prison intake.

These issues will be explored

at greater length in Chapter VI in connection with the 1981 jail
overcrowding crisis in New York City.
Finally, it will be useful to point out in tabular form the
basic dichotomy which exists in the recent literature on this topic,
noting that a focus on sentencing disparty and P.O. decision-making
llbid., p. 72.

2Ibid., p. 74.

usually employs federal courts as the paradigm, while an emphasis on
the futility of PSRs because of sentence bargained dispositions is
always associated with research on the state court level.

Oir review

clearly illustrates that these two paradigms are mutually exclusive,
although many writers continue to inappropriately combine the two
because of an unfamiliarity with the day to day work flow of the
different courts.

This ignorance of the many informal rules which

hold sway in the sentencing process accounts for some of the erroneous
findings in this field to date.
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TABLE 2
SUKMARY OF PSR LITERATURE

STUDY

Federal Courts:
State Courts:
Disparity/Discretion
PSR's
Futility
8 P.O. Decision-Making
Data Base

San Francisco
Project

Yes

300 PSR's 8
Decision Games

John Coffee

Yes

Review of Lit.

Willard Gaylin

Yes

No*

Interviews
with Judges

Abraham Blumberg

Yes

Observation

Witztum Report*

Yes

300 PSR's

Kingsnorth/Rizzo* "

Yes

300 PSR's

Board of Correction*

Yes

Review of Lit.

Correct'l Ass'n."

Yes

Review of Lit.

Econ. Develop. Council

Yes

Interviews
w/P.O.'s

Morgenthau
Committee* "

Yes0

Yes

Interviews
w/Judges, ADA's

Hughes Committee*

Yes°

Yes

Interviews
w/ Inmates

Wilkins $ Carter

Yes

Decision Games

Wood § Sparks

Yes

Review of Lit.

Hogarth/Hagan

Yes (Canadian)

PSR's

* Both state and federal judges interviewed.
* Urges increased use of PPI's (pre-pleading investigations).
■ Urges probation be divested of investigative function in order to
concentrate on supervision.
o Based on study of state courts.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Hypotheses and Definitions
Blumberg, Kingsnorth and Rizzo, Witztum and others argue that
presentence reports have little impact on the sentencing judge-- not
because of the reports' assertedly "mechanical, inaccurate and
unfocused" nature* and "deficient techniques of fact-gathering"^
--but because once the plea and the accompanying sentence have been
bargained, the parties involved (judge, defense attorney and assistant
district attorney), intent on "moving things along," are loathe to
amend the sentence promise lest they jeopardize the plea.

Secondly,

amending the sentence promise would also run counter to the United
States Supreme Court's dicta in the McMann, Alford, and Santobello
decisions that a plea bargain not kept is a conviction which can be
reversed.

Thirdly, it is argued from a purely bureaucratic

perspective that the courtroom participants in the plea bargaining
process are reluctant to amend the sentence promise based solely on a
report delivered by a "non-lawyer professional"--the probation officer.
Based on my daily experience as a probation officer for more

*Morgenthau Committee, Report , p. 37.
^Frankel, Criminal Sentences, p. 33.
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than ten years, there is certainly much to support such arguments.
However, I am also aware of many cases where the plea bargain has
broken down or the sentence promise has been amended, based
principally on the efforts of an "in-depth" presentence investigation
by the probation officer.

I suggest two hypotheses to test the

arguments pertaining to the PSR's futility:
H* =

The court is more likely to agree with a presentence
rep>ort which recommends a sentence to probation than it is
to agree with a presentence report which recommends
prison, because a judge is more likely to amend a promised
sentence to a less severe outcome than a more severe
outcome due to the primacy of legal constraints.

H^=

A high quality presentence report has a significant impact
upon the actual sentence imposed for convictions wherein a
specific sentence is promised by the court at the time of
plea.
On the other hand, Coffee, Cohen, Hagan and others have argued

that the PSR contributes to sentencing disparity because of unchecked
P.O. discretion in framing the PSR.

In addition to the PSR, however,

critics have identified legal, extra-legal, organizational and
extraneous variables as sources of sentencing disparity, such as sex,
race, financial/employment status, custodial status, type of legal
representation, judicial temperment, publicity, and defendant
recalcitrance.
In order to test whether the impact of the PSR is overshadowed
by demographic/legal variables contained within it, I have framed the
following hypotheses:
H-*=

The PSR's recommendation and the court's sentence are
strongly correlated with the severity of the offense,
criminal history, and custodial/employment status of the
defendant.
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The PSR's recommendation and the court's sentence are not
correlated with sex, age, race, legal representation, or
financial status of the defendant.
H^*

Sentences which are not correlated with sentence promise,
or PSR recommendation or ADA recommendation are explained
by extraneous variables.
Lastly, our statistical analysis will be supplemented by case

studies of those dispositions in which promise, recommendation and
sentence appear to be anomalous.

Whenever possible, plea minutes were

obtained and the probation officer and assistant district attorney
assigned to each case were interviewed to supplement the written
record in an effort to identify extraneous variables not controlled
for in this study.

Methodology
There were 3,177 PSIs assigned to probation officers by
Brooklyn Supreme Court judges during calendar year 1979.

(About 150

modified PSIs were also completed for other jurisdictions, primarily
involving defendants residing in Brooklyn but convicted in other
states; these cases were eliminated from consideration).
Since I decided to study each PSI in depth, extract over 40
variables for each case, and computerize the data, it would have been
prohibitively time consuming to select the entire universe of Brooklyn
Supreme Court PSIs for analysis.

Therefore, I used a random sampling

technique to chose 283 cases for the study group and 57 cases for the
control group.

These 340 cases represent 10.7 percent of the PSIs

requested by the Court for the year.
The probation branch in question assigns a case nunber to each
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judicial order for investigation as it is received.

To choose my

sample, I obtained a listing in numerical sequence of every PSI
assigned and arbitrarily selected the eighth PSI assigned during 1979
as the first candidate for selection.

Thereafter, I chose every eighth

number until I had accumulated 353 numbers.

I then obtained the

corresponding indictment numbers for each of these 353 cases from the
clerk's log.

Armed with this list of indictment numbers, I attempted

to locate every judge's file for these cases in the record room of
Brooklyn Supreme Court in order to obtain the plea minutes and note
the case processing particulars of each case.

If the case file did

not contain a transcript of the plea elocution, I later attempted to
obtain these details from the corresponding assistant district
attorney's file.

If the court folder or assistant district attorney's

file indicated that no sentence promise had been made at the time the
plea was entered -- or that the conviction was the result of a trial,
the case was selected for inclusion in the control group.
Because of the unavailability of court, ADA or probation case
folders, 43 cases had to be eliminated, leaving a total of 310 cases.
Because of the low number of cases accumulated at that point for the
control group (only 27, of which 15 were trials and 12 were pleas with
no sentence promise), I randomly selected 20 additional trial
convictions for inclusion in the control group from a list of trial
cases noted in the probation log and located each of the folders.

I

then was forced to peruse 280 more randomly selected court files
before I could locate 10 additional cases wherein a defendant had pled
guilty but received no sentence promise.

The final sample of 340
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cases was then analyzed to determine whether they were truly
representative of the universe of PSRs:

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE WITH POPULATION

Conviction by Plea
Conviction by Trial
Predicate Felony Offender
Youthful Offender
Plea Withdrawn

Sample
N-340 (12'. 11)
N-304 (89.3%)
N« 36 (10.7%)
N= 43 (12.6%)
N« 53 (16.1%)
N= 15 ( 4.4%)

Population^
N=2,803 1100.0%)
N=2,523 ( 90.1%)
N=
280 ( 9.9%)
N=
287 ( 10.3%)*
N317 ( 11.3%)*
N=Not Recorded**

By Disposition
Discharge/Fine/Other
Probation
Jail Term***
State Prison

N= 14
N=149
N= 53
N-104

N*
221 ( 7.9%)
N« 789 ( 28.1%)
N=
234 ( 8.3%)
N-1,559 ( 55.6%)

( 4.3%)
(45.8%)
(16.3%)
(32.0%)

*Pro-rated for King's County based on reported City-wide share.
**My research of probation records found a total of 75 pleas
withdrawn during calendar year 1979, or 2.4% of all dispositions.
***Includes those sentenced to a period of probation following a jail
committment.

The sample is difficult to compare with the total population
for a number of reasons.

First, the statistics compiled by the State

from Kings County do not include misdemeanor convictions, which

^New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services, New
York State Criminal Justice Processing, Felony Offenders Disposed~Tn
1979 (Albany, 1982), pp. 13, 136-3?.
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represent almost eight percent of the sample.

Since a prison sentence

is impossible for a misdemeanor conviction, this would appear to
account for some of the under-representation of prison sentences in
our sample.

For example, Probation records indicate 3,177 convictions

were recorded for the year.

The 1,559 prison sentences recorded by

the State would thus represent 49.1 percent of this total, in
contrast to the 55.6 percent share of felony dispositions only.
However, the difference between our sample and the population, even
adjusted for the omission of misdemeanor convictions in the prison
category (32.0% versus 55.6%) is still significant.

Moreover,

probation sentences and youthful offender adjudications appear to be
over-represented in the sample.

The reason for this is unclear.

A

sampling error might have favored selection of defendants in the study
group for whom a prison or jail sentence was not mandatory (e.g.,
files for defendants sentenced to probation might have been more
available for selection than files for imprisoned defendants because
of appeals or subsequent indictments pending among this latter group
of presumably more criminally active defendants):
TABLE 4
PROPORTION OF MANDATORY JAIL/PRISON CASES
Incarceration
Not Mandatory
Promise
Tomise Made „
(Study Group)
N

~

Total

”

Incarceration
Mandatory

Total

248 (88%)

35 (12%)

283 (100%)

35 (61%)

22 (39%)

57 (100%)

283 (83%)

57 (17%)

340 (100%)

1
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On the other hand, the distribution in our sample, while
appearing to be lopsided in favor of non-mandated sentences, might
relfect reality in one sense.

The control group would be expected to

contain a greater proportion of mandatory prison cases because of the
trial defendants within that sample (trial convictions usually are
associated with more serious charges while plea bargains usually
entail, by definition, some form of charge reduction in return for a
guilty plea).
Neither the court administration, the State, nor the Probation
Department maintained statistics in 1979 which would establish the
absolute number of defendants who were convicted of offenses requiring
incarceration sentences.

However, it is known that in 1980, Kings

County Supreme Court sentenced 52 percent of probation-eligible
offenders to probation, compared to a City-wide average of 44
percent.1

Another finding by the New York State Department of

Correctional Services--which found that 21 percent of state prison
inmates in 1979 were convicted of crimes for which probation sentences
could have been imposed2--suggests that the disparity in our sample
between mandatory and non-mandatory sentences (83% vs. 17%), if
caused by sampling error, at least errs on the side of relevance.
A precoded research instrument (see Appendix) was used to

^Unpublished New York State Division of Probation study,
referenced in agency memorandum of 18 January 1982, "Proposed 3-Tier
Reimbursement."
^Executive Advisory Commission on the Administration of
Justice ("The Liman Commission"), "Report on Proposals Under
Consideration to Address Prison Population Growth and Overcrowding,"
(March 1982), p. 12.
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extract 45 variables from each probation case folder selected.

In

addition to plea bargaining details, probation and prosecutorial
reconmendations and sentencing data, other identified legal and
extra-legal variables noted in the literature as possibly influential
in the sentencing decision were also obtained.

These included: the

defendant's sex, age, race, employment, marital, citizenship and
social status (demographic, or "extra-legal" variables); and the
defendant's prior arrest, conviction and community supervision record,
custodial status, the type of defense counsel assigned, the status of
any co-defendants, the severity of the offense and other case
processing data (legal variables).
The recommendation for each PSR is written by the supervising
probation officer (S.P.O.), with the recommentation of the probation
officer writing the report treated as an intra-departmental document,
and not submitted to the court.

In examining all 340 files however,

we could not locate a single P.O. recommendation which did not agree
with the S.P.O.'s recommendation.

This is not surprising.

Any

disagreement between P.O. and S.P.O. is resolved in-house through a
conference with the Branch Chief.

Rather than involve superiors in

such matters, P.O.'s and S.P.O.'s usually thrash out their differences
and arrive at a consensus recommendation.
Interviews with P.O.'s, S.P.O.'s, the Branch Chief and my own
experience indicate there is rarely any disagreement which is not
resolved below the Branch Chief level.

(This practice differs

substantially in federal court, where the P.O. submits the sentence
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recomnendation to the court after consulting with the supervisor.)
In collecting data on promises, recommendations and sentences,
13 discrete categories were created with probation broken into four
separate categories:

"straight" probation (i.e., a term of probation

supervision with no incarceration, fine or special condition added),
"shock" probation (i.e., a jail term followed by probation
supervision), probation with a fine imposed and probation with a
special condition imposed (the last category frequently entails a
restitution order or a condition that the defendant enter a
drug/alcohol/psychiatric treatment program).
In addition, although the N.Y.C. Department of Probation
discontinued a practice of recommending specific terms of imprisonment
in 1975, data on the length of a prison term promised and actually
imposed was collected, in order to determine whether the PSR had any
influence on the length of incarcerative sentences.
Finally, youthful offender ("Y.O.") adjudication is a device
sometimes used by the court to induce guilty pleas by softening the
blow of conviction for younger defendants.

I collected data on

youthful offender promises, recommendations and adjudications, as an
additional means of measuring the PSR's inpact more precisely.
Of particular importance, content analysis of each PSR was
conducted in order to frame an index of thoroughness for each
investigation.

Thus, each report was skimmed in order to determine

if: 1) the arresting officer or the complainant for the current
offense had been contacted; 2) dispositions were obtained on prior
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arrests; 3) school records or employment verification had been
obtained; 4) parents or spouse of the defendant had been interviewed;
and 5) the report contained a concluding evaluation of the defendant's
recidivism/rehabilitation potential.

A scale of thoroughness was then

constructed with a value of one (1) assigned for each of five facets
of an investigation completed, and a value of zero for each component
not completed.
five:

The score for each PSR was then tallied and divided by

a score of 1 on such an index indicates highest quality and a

score of 0 indicates lowest quality.

Scores of 1, and .8 were

collapsed and considered to be of high quality, while scores of .6,
.4, .2 and 0 were also compressed and considered to be of low
quality.

Low quality reports were hypothesized to have little impact

on the court, even in cases where the judge is unlikely to read more
than the supervising probation officer's one page recommendation,
because it was conjectured that the S.P.O.'s recommendation would be
more persuasive in high quality cases than in perfunctory reports,
which contained little new information of any interest.

For the

purposes of this study, I will assume the validity of the findings of
the 1966 Federal study of the Northern District of California and many
other surveys which report that "some data are dominant as aids to
decision making, notably the current offense [our thoroughness
component #1 above], prior record [our #2 above], and
measures/indicators of stability [our #3 and #4 above]."!

These

findings also conform to common sense.

^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy,"
pp. 513-14.
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All of the data was thereafter transferred onto key-punch
cards, loaded onto tape and processed through a mainframe computer.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences software was then
utilized to analyze the data.

Later this same data was loaded onto a

microcomputer and analyzed using other statistical software.
A multivariate analysis of the data was performed to test the
validity of the following path diagrams:

DIAGRAM 1
HYPOTHESIZED PATH MODEL FOR CONTROL GROUP
(No Sentence Bargain)

LEGAL VARIABL

PSI QUALITY)

DBDGRAPHIC VARIABL]

^SENTENCE
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DIAGRAM 2

HYPOTHESIZED PATH MODEL FOR SAMPLE
(Sentence Bargain)

PROMISE

LEGAL VARIABLES

^ ADA

(PSI QUALITY)

^^ENTEN(CE OR P/W
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

PSI

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Univariate Analysis
In Table 5, the demographic characteristics of the study and
control groups are presented.

Sample 1 consists of 283 defendants who

pled guilty in Brooklyn Supreme Court and were promised sentences of
either probation, discharge, fine, city jail (or combination thereof)
or state prison.

The control group represents 57 defendants who pled

guilty but did not receive a sentence promise or who were convicted
after trial and faced sentences ranging across the same spectrum of
dispositions.
The defendants are largely young black and Hispanic males,
unemployed, single American citizens and from the lower class.

The

control group is significantly older than the study group, owing to
the legal factors associated with trial convictees discussed below.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of processing agents are male,
except for the probation officer, who in 70 percent of the cases was
female (however, the supervising probation officer was a male in fully
79 percent of the cases).

Ill
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TABLE 5
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Sample 1
Control Group
(Sentence Promise Made)
(No Sentence Promise Made)
(N=283)
(N- 57)
Variable
Number
Number
%
SEX
266
-Male
94.0%
56
98.2%
17
-Female
6.01
1
1.8%
AGE
Under 19
19 G Older
Mean Age
Median Age
Mode

103
180
24.0
19.5
17

36.4%
63%

11
46
26.7
24.8
18

19.3%
80.7%

233
50

82.3%
17.7%

45

78.9%
2 1 .1 %

258
24
1

91.2%
8.4%
.4%

50
7
0

87.7%
12.3%

67.1%

40

70.2%

32.9%

17

29.8%

56.5%

32

56.1%

43.5%

25

43.9%

11%
89%

11
46

19.3%
80.7%

RACE
Black
5 Hispanic
White
CITIZENSHIP
- USA
- Alien
- Unknown

EMPLOYMENT
- Unemployed/ 190
Incarcerated
- Enployed/
93
Student
FINANCIAL STATUS
- Welfare/
Lower Class 160
-Working/
Middle Class 123

12

MARITAL STATUS
- Married
- Single

31
252
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TABLE 5 - Continued
Sample 1
Variable
Number
SEX of P.O.
83
- Male
- Female
200

Control Group
Number
29.31
70.7%

23
34

40.4%
59.6%

SEX
-

of Counsel
Male
Female
Unknown

252
19
12

89.1%
6.7%
4.2%

52
5
1

91.2%
7.0%
1 .8 %

SEX
-

of ADA
Male
Female
Unknown

219
35
29

77.4%
12.4%

44

10.2%

5

79.0%
14.0%
7.0%

SEX of Judge
- Male
- Female

274
9

96.8%
3.2%

55

SEX of S.P.O.
- Male
- Female

220
63

77.7%
22.3%

49

8

2

8

96.5%
3.5%

86.0%
14.0%

In Table 6, the legal characteristics of the sample are
presented.

The study group consists largely of first offenders

convicted of probation eligible property crimes (class "D" and "E"
felonies), usually within six months of indictment, on bail or
released in their own recognizance (ROR), with a significant prior
history of arrests and community supervision, represented by legal aid
and court appointed ("18b") attorneys, and prosecuted by the Supreme
Court Bureau of the District

Attorney's Office (the "all-purpose"

bureau which handles those indictments not referred to other
specialized bureaus within the Office, such as the Economic Crime,
Narcotics, Major Offender, Sex Crimes and Rackets Bureaus).
majority of these offenders have no co-defendants.

The
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TABLE 6
LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS
Sample 1
Control Group
(Sentence Promise Made) (No Sentence Promise Made)
(N-283)------------------- (N- 5T)----------Number
Number

Variable
CUSTODIAL
STATUS of Defendant
- Bail/ROR
- Detention
- Fugitive

188
95
0

66.41
33.61

PRIOR ARRESTS
- None
- 1 to 3
- 4 to 10+

48
99
136

PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTIONS
- None or Y.O.
- One or More

25
31
1

43.9%
54.31

17.0%
34.9%
48.1%

8
20

29

14.0%
35.1%
50.9%

252
31

89.1%
10.9%

43
14

75.4%
24.6%

1 .8 %

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER
ELIGIBILITY
- Eligible
- Eligible if
Mitigation Found
- Ineligible

73

25.8%

40
170

14.1%
69.1%

9
43

15.8%
75.4%

CONVICTION MODE
- Plea
- Trial

283
0

100 %

21
36

36.8%
63.2%

TIME ELAPSED.INDICTMENT
TO CONVICTION
- 2 Months
- 2 to 6 Months
- 6 to 12 Months
- 12 Months

105
95
49
34

37.1%
33.6%
17.3%
12.0%

2
13
26
16

3.5%
22.8%
45.6%
28.1%

CHARGE REDUCTION
- None
- One Below Top Count
- Two or More Below

60
171
52

21.1%
60.4%
18.4%

26
19

45.6%
33.3%

12

2 1 .1 %

8 .8 %
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TABLE 6 - Continued
Sample 1
^
Variable
Number
SEVERITY OF OFFENSE
22.6%
- Class A, B or C Felony
64
71.7%
- Class D or E Felony
203
5.7%
- Class A Misdemeanor
16

Control Group
Number

|

25
23
9

43.9%
40.4%
15.7%

TYPE OF OFFENSE
- Property Crime
- Violent Crime
- Weapon/Drug Possession

147
78
58

51.9%
27.6%
20.5%

13
36
8

12.7%
63.2%
14.1%

COURT PART (39 Judges)
- Conference
- Other

78
205

27.6%
72.4%

3
54

5.3%
94.7%

TYPE of DEFENSE COUNSEL
- Legal Aid
- "18b"
- Retained

145
72
66

51.2%
25.4%
23.3%

20
15
22

35.1%
26.3%
38.6%

TYPE of ADA
- Supreme Court Bureau
- Specialized Bureau

227
56

80.2%
19.8%

37
20

64.9%
35.1%

TYPE of SUPERVISING P.O.
- SPO #1
- SPO #2
- SPO #3
- SPO #4
- Other

63
67
83
59
12

22.3%
23.7%
29.0%
20.8%
4.2%

8
12
12
17
2

14.0%
21.1%
31.6%
29.8%
3.5%

The Control Group differs from Sample 1 in a number of
categories which reflect the predominance of trial convictees.

Thus,

the Control Group is more likely to be in detention, charged with
violent crimes, represented by retained attorneys, and convicted of
more severe offenses, with a longer case processing time than Sample 1.
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TABLE 6 - Continued
Sample 1
Number

Variable

%

Control Group
Number
%

PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF
DEFENDANT WITH PROBATION/
PAROLE SUPERVISION
- None
183
- Lower Courts
64
- Felony Level
36

64.7%
22.6%
12.7%

35
10
12

61.4%
17.5%
21.1%

UNDER PROBATION/PAROLE
SUPERVISION AT ARREST
- Yes
- No

52
231

18.4%
81.6%

6
51

10.5%
89.5%

STATUS OF CODEFENDANT
AT TIME OF SENTENCE
- No Codefendant
- Charges Still Pending
- Previously Sentenced

201
57
25

71.0%
20.1%
8.9%

39
7
11

68.4%
12.3%
30.3%

HOW P.O. OBTAINED DETAILS
OF PLEA BARGAIN________
- Not applicable
(i.e., trial)
- Not Indicated
- From Court or ADA
- From Defendant

48
103
132

-17.0%
36.4%
46.6%

36
5
8
8

63.2%
8.8%
14.0%
14.0%

The details of the plea bargain noted in the PSI case file were
more likely to be obtained from the defendant than from the court or
ADA.

I found such information to be accurate in 90 percent of the

cases compared against ADA and court records, with inaccuracies usually
minor in nature.

For instance, the P.O. noted a promise of probation

reported by the defendant when the actual promise was probation and a
fine.

(In 1980, a new form was developed by the N.Y.C. Probation

Department for the court's use in ordering PSI's, which includes
specific details on the nature of any sentence promise.)
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In Table 7, data concerning the quality of the PSR's is
presented, with the data aggragated to form an index in Table 8.
Fully two-thirds of the reports were found to be of high quality
(i.e., containing a quality index of .8 or higher), with the P.O. most
likely to have obtained dispositions of all prior arrests and to have
interviewed the community member closest to the defendant.

The

reports were least likely to contain statements from the arresting
officer or complainant.

TABLE 7
QUALITY OF TIE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Variable
ARRlStlNG 0FFICH1
OR COMPLAINANT CONTACTED
- Yes
- No
DISPOSITIONS OF PRIOR
ARRESTS OBTAINED
-"Tes
- No
SCHOOL OR EMPLOYER
CONTACTED
- Yes
- No
FAMILY MEMBER/ROOMMATE
OF DEF. INTERVIEWED
- Yes
- No.
EVALUATION PRESENTED OF
DEF.'S FUTURE ADJUSTMENT
- Yes
- No

Sample 1
(N-283)
Number
%

Control Group
(N- 57)
Number
%

158
125

55.81
44.2%

39
18

68.4%
31.6%

255
28

90.1%
9.9%

56
1

98.2%
1.8%

213
70

75.3%
24.7%

41
16

71.9%
28.1%

236
47

83.4%
16.6%

46
11

80.7%
19.3%

191
92

67.5%
32.5%

35
22

61.4%
38.6%

*For those cases involving defendants with no prior arrests (N=56j,
a substituted criterion--obtaining a copy of the police ballistics/
laboratory report for weapon/drug possession cases, or obtaining a
synopsis of the indictment from the ADA--was employed.
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TABLE 8
QUALITY INDEX
(An average of 5 components
listed above for each PSR)
3
18
30
44

1.1%
6.4%
10.6%
15.5%

0
2
5
12

3.5%
8.8%
21.1%

- Low Impact

95

33.5%

19

33.4%

- Good (.8)
- Excellent (1)

97
91

34.3%
32.2%

21
17

36.8%
29.8%

188

66.5%

38

66.6%

-

Poor (0)
Minimal (.2)
Low Avg. (.4)
High Avg.(.6)

- High Impact

Tabular Analysis
In Table 9, a cross-tabulation of the sentence promised by the
court at the time of plea by final disposition, is presented for the
study group.

(We eliminated those 35 cases where an incarceration

sentence was mandated by law.)

The promises and sentences are listed

in descending order of severity, with the least severe consisting of
conditional or unconditional discharge, the most severe consisting of
state prison and a line separating non-incarceration from
incarceration promises.
There is exact correspondence between promise and sentence in
193 of the 248 cases, for a 77.8 percent agreement rate between
promise and sentence.

For the 55 remaining cases, 14 (or 5.6%)

received less severe sentences than originally promised, 28 (or 11.3%)
received more severe sentences thar. originally promised, and 13 cases
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(or 5.2%) resulted in the withdrawal of guilty pleas, for an aggregate
11.1 percent of cases wherein the judge amended or dissolved the
sentence promise.
TABLE 9
PROMISE BY SENTENCE
SPJTENCE (N=248)
Frob+ Prob+ Prob +
PROMISE
Disch Fine
Prob SpCon Fine Jail
Jail Prison Tot.
DlscK----------- §-------- T l T ------------------------------------ &
Fine
5
(1)
6
Prob.
9
[2]
[1]
104
(16)
(2)
(3)
(2)
(3)
142
P+SpCon
2
2
P+ Fine
4
4
P+ Jail
TIT m
17
Un.Incar
[1]
2
3
Jail
2
[1]
[1]
15
19
Prison
2
[1J
[1J
(2]
39
45
Total
IT
~7 ~E---1M ---- 23“ “5“ “ 22“ “ 2l“ ~TT

P/Vi

21

Promise = Sentence *= 193 (77.8%)
Sentence = More Severe = 28 (11.3%) (indicated by ())
Sentence * Less Severe = 14 (5.6%) (indicated by [])
Plea Withdrawn (P/W)
= 13 (5.2%).
Collapsing this table into a dichotomous comparison of incarcerative ("in")/non-incarcerative ("out") promises and sentences
(treating probation with a jail term as an incarcerative sanction, and
eliminating withdrawn pleas from consideration while including the 35
mandatory sentence cases) reveals a higher rate of congruence:
TABLE 10
PROMISE BY SENTENCE (FULL DICHOTOMOUS MODEL)

PROMISE
In
Out
Total

SENTENCE (N-270)
Out
In
112(94.1%)
7 (5.9%)
143 (94.7%)
8( 5.3%)

Total
119 (100%)
151 (100%)

T2B

275"

T30
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Only 15 cases, or 5.5% of the 270 in the sample, received
sentences that either eliminated (5.9%) or added (5.3%) incarcerative
sanctions originally promised.

Eliminating further the 35 cases in

the study group whose incarceration was mandatory, produces the
following result:

TABLE 11
PROMISE BY SENTENCE (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES)
___________
PROMISE
In
Out
total

SENTENCE (N-235)________________
In
Out
Total
77 (91.7%)
84 (106%)
7 (8.3%)
8 (5.3%)
98

143 (94.7%)

151 (100%)

150

235

In this cross-tabulation, the likelihood of judges to amend
"in" promises with less severe ("out") sentences (8.3%) rather than
the converse (5.3%) is more evident, since the elimination of
mandatory incarceration cases reduces the number of "in" promises
(from 119 to 84) but does not effect the number of "out" sentences
associated with such promises (7).
In Table 12, a cross-tabulation of the judge's promised
sentence by the PSR recommendation is presented for the same group,
adding the 13 plea withdrawn cases and providing the same expanded
categories detailed in Table 9.
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TABLE 12
PROMISE BY RECOMMENDATION
RECOKflENDATION (N-248)

PROMISE Disch.
2
Disch.
Fine
[2]
Probat.
14]
P+SpCon
Fine
P+ Jail
Un.Incar
Jail
Prison
8
Total

P*

Fine

Prob
(3)

4
[3]

92

[1]

8

11]
13 J
[3]
[5]
107

Prob+
SpCon
(1)

Prob+ Prob+
Fine Jail

(14)
2

(1)

Unsp.
Incar

(1)

(17)

5

(9)
3
9
9
47

2
I2J
[1]

20

3

6

Jail Pris. Total
6
6
142
(10)
2
4
21
( 2)
3
3 ( 3)
19
45
31
3
46
248

Promise = Recommendation ■ 162 (65.3%)
Recommendation ■ More Severe = 61 (24.61) (indicated by ( ))
Reconmendation = Less Severe = 25 (10.1%) (indicated by [ ])

Of the 248 cases where a recommendation was made, 162 (or
65.3%), agreed with the promise made; 61 recommendations (or 14.6%),
were more severe; and 25 (or 10.1%), were less severe than the promise.
Collapsing this data into an "in/out" dichotomy reveals the
following (again eliminating the 35 mandatory prison/jail cases):

TABLE 13
PROMISE BY RECOMMENDATION (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES)

PROMISE
In

PSR RECOMMENDATION (N«248)
In
Out
Total
77 (87.5%)
11 (12.5%)
88 (100%)

Out

28 (17.5%)

111(82.5%)

166 (100%)

Total

m

H3

7M
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Here a much greater congruence of promise with recommendation
is found than in Table 12 (209, or 84.2%, of the 248 cases in Table
13, versus 162, or 65.3% in Table 12).

However, the 39 cases (15.7%)

in Table 13 for which recommendation disagrees with promise is more
than twice the number of cases (15, or 6.4%) for which sentence
disagrees with promise (Table 11).

Moreover, PSR's are more apt to

disagree with promises on the side of more punitive sanctions:

17.5%

(or 28) of the 160 cases promised "out" sentences in Table 13 resulted
in incarceration recommendations, but P.O.'s recommended the converse
("out" when "in" was promised) in only 12.5 percent (or 11) of the 88
cases: P.O.'s recommendations were thus much more likely to conflict
with "out" sentence bargains than judges were likely to amend such
bargains:
TABLE 14
VARIANCE OF PROMISE/SENTENCE VS. PROMISE/RECOKWENDATION
"In" Promise with "Out" Sentence
7 (8.3%) of 84 Promises

"In" Promise with "Out" Recommendation
11 (12.5%) of 88 Promises

"Out" Promise with "In" Sentence
8 (5.3%) of 151 Promises

"Out" Promise with "In" Recommendation
28 (17.5%) of 160 Promises

Total Variance
15 (6.4%) of 235 Promises

Total Variance
39 (15.
of 248 Promises

Ik)

Comparing the reconmendation with the eventual sentence
produced the cross-tabulation presented in Table 15.
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TABLE 15
RECOMMENDATION BY SENTENCE
SENTENCE (N * 248)

RECMDTN. P/W
Disch.
Fine
6
Probat.
P+SpCon
P+ Fine
P+ Jail
Unsp.In. 3
Jail
4
Prison
Total
13

Disch
"4"

Fine
(1)
5

[2]
[1]

7

Recommendation
Recommendation
Recommendation
Plea Withdrawn

6

Prob
(3)
(1)
86
t2]
HJ

Prob+ Prob+
SpCon Fine

(4)
15

[9J

[3]

[6]
108

[1]
23

(2)
(1)
(1)
2

6

Prob +
Jail

(2)
(1)
6
[11]
[1]
[1]
22

Jail Prison Tot,
8
8
(5)
(1) 107
20
3
6
11
48
11
3
2
30
[3]
45
42 248
21

= Sentence = 172 (70.11)
= More severe sentence * 22 (8.9%)(indicated by ())
« Less severe sentence = 41 (16.5%)( "
"
" [])
(P/W)= 13 (5.2%)

In fully 70 percent of the cases, recommendation agreed with
sentence, occupying a median position between the congruence of
promise with sentence (78%), and the agreement of promise and
recommendation (65%).
Adding the 35 mandatory incarceration cases to Table 9 (and
eliminating one case which contained no recommendation) changes the
variance very little:

the study group reflects complete agreement

between PSR and eventual sentence in 72.0 percent of the cases (203
out of 282), with the PSR more likely to have recommended less severe
sanctions (41, or 14.5%) than more severe dispositions (22, or 7.8%)
in cases where disagreement is found.
Collapsing Table 15 into a dichotomous cross-tabulation
(eliminating withdrawn pleas and mandatory sentence cases) reveals an
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overall agreement rate of 881 (207 out of 235 cases), with the court
more likely to follow non-incarcerative (94%) than incarcerative (80%)
recoranendat ions:
TABLE 16
RECOWENDATION BY SENTENCE (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES)

RECOMMENDATION
"In
"
Out
Total

SENTENCE (N-235)
In
Out
TFCS'OVT
19'('2D.1T%)
9(6.4%)
85

Total
93 (100%)

131 (93.6%)

146 (100%)

150

235

To summarize, our study group of cases wherein the court
possessed sentencing discretion, when examined for variation across
the complete spectrum of possible dispositions, shows significantly
more deviation between promise and sentence (22%), promise and
recoranendation (35%) and recommendation and sentence (31%) than when
examined in simple dichotomous terms (6%, 16% and 12%, respectively):
TABLE 17
NUMBER 8 PERCENTAGE OF DISAGREEMENT
FOR PROMISE/RECOMMENDATION/SENTENCE
Dichotomous
Analysis (N=235)*

Full
Analysis (N=248) **

PROMISE BY
SENTENCE

15 (6%)

55 (22%)

PROMISE BY
RECO&MENDATION

39 (16%)

86 (35%)

RECOKWENDATION BY
SENTENCE

28 (12%)

76 (31%)

*The 13 cases involving withdrawn pleas are excluded (since the plea
bargain was dissolved), except for promise by recommendation (n=248).
**"nie 13 cases where pleas were withdrawn are included in these
calculations as part of the variance.
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It is the contention of this dissertation that the full impact
of the PSR on sentencing is more properly assessed by considering all
possible sanctions.

Although it may be argued that there is little

substantive difference between a promise of probation and a sentence
of probation with a special condition added, such an outlook dismisses
the importance of restitution and drug treatment programs that can
frequently impart real meaning to a probation sentence, satisfy
complainants and protect the community.

Moreover, as mandatory

sentencing laws have come to account for a greater proportion of the
court's calendar over the past decade, some judges--to escape a
perceived harshness in dealing with defendants whose crimes might be
mitigated by special circumstances detailed in the PSR--have adopted
jail terms of up to six months, followed by probation supervision, as
a means of satisfying the incarceration requirement.

Finally, there

are a broad range of felony offenses for which either a jail or prison
term is possible.

In such cases, substituting a jail term for a

promised prison sentence when the PSR indicates the less severe
sanction might be more appropriate, would serve to divert deserving
offenders from overly harsh sentences.
In order to determine whether the PSR's sentence
recommendation could account for the 55 amended sentence promises in
our sample, we examined each of these 55 cases and found the following
composite picture:
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TABLE 18
SUMMARY OF AMENDED SENTENCE PROMISES
1) Promise ^Sentence ■ PSR Recommendation = 24
2) Promise ^ Sentence ^ P S R RECOMBTOATION = 18
K>R Influence

- 42

PSR Recommendation = 12
3) Promise ^ Sentence
4) Promise = Recommendation =£-Sentence
= 1
Anomalous Cases

= 13

Total

- 55

For category #2 in Table 18 above, we included cases wherein
the PSR recommended either a less severe or more severe sanction than
promised and the judge amended the sentence promise in the same
direction, although not in an exact one to one correlation (e.g.,
promise «= state prison; recommendation = probation; sentence = jail
term 5 probation).

Thus, the PSR would appear to have had some

influence on 42 of the 55 amended promises.

But what of the third

category, where there was no correlation between any three variables?
Interestingly enough we found 7 of these 12 cases involved cases where
pleas were withdrawn, despite agreement between promise and PSR
recommendation.

TVo judges were involved in six of these cases.

Three were pleas before Judge "X," who attributed two of the withdrawn
pleas to the PSR during an interview I conducted two months later.
In the first instance, a 37 year old male, employed part-time
with a history of four prior arrests, two of which resulted in
misdemeanor convictions, released on his own recognizance since his
arraignment for criminal sale of marijuana, pled guilty following the
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ADA's agreement to reduce the final charge from a class D to a class E
felony and concur with the court's promise of five years probation.
However, the PSR, although recommending probation, quoted the
defendant's assertion to the P.O. that he had earned $100 a week for
the past year--including the two months since his arrest--by selling
marijuana.

The Judge then told the defendant at sentencing that he

believed six months in jail, followed by 4-1/2 years probation, was a
more appropriate sentence in order to effect the defendant's "forced
resignation" from his drug dealing.

The defendant did not agree and

accordingly was permitted to withdraw his plea.

(The case was later

assigned to a trial part where the defendant was sentenced to
probation; the judge who imposed the sentence stated that he was
satisfied that "if the probation department recommended probation
despite this fellow's drug involvement, I felt that the sentence
should stand--but I told this man at sentencing that if he ever sold
marijuana while on probation, I'd send him to state prison for the
'max"').
In the second instance, Judge "X" promised a detained 18 year
old, with a history of 10 prior arrests but no felony convictions, a
sentence of one year in jail, consecutive to the one year jail term he
was presently serving, in return for his plea to third degree
burglary, a class D felony (the ADA having agreed to reduce the
original charge, second degree burglary, if the defendant agreed to
the sentence promise).

The PSR recommended "a sentence to custody,"
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which was not in conflict with the promise, but unaccountably to Judge
"X," in light of the defendant's lengthy criminal record, the PSR also
recommended a youthful offender adjudication, which had not been part
of the sentence promise.

The defendant's attorney, upon learning of

the Y.O. recommendation, urged its adoption.

When the Judge refused,

the defendant demanded to withdraw his plea.

He was permitted to do

so, despite Judge "X'"s right to maintain the original agreed-to
promise, because he wanted to discuss the Y.O. recommendationwith
Probation Department.

the

(Later, the defendant was sentenced to a one

year concurrent jail term by Judge "X," with Y.O.
adjudication denied.)
In the third case involving Judge "X," a bailed 19 year old
defendant with 4 prior arrests and no convictions, was permitted to
plead guilty by the ADA to attempted second degree robbery, a class D
felony, and two counts below the top count of the indictment,, which
rendered him eligible for a promised probation sentence.

The PSR,

which found the defendant possessed of "much potential," recommended
probation as well.

Yet, the ADA, at the sentence hearing, recommended

a state prison term of 1 to 3 years.
the PSR.

Judge "X" asked the ADA toread

After doing so, the ADA was asked whether he still

recommended a prison term be imposed.
recommendation.

The ADA repeated his original

Whereupon, Judge "X" asked what additional material

had come into the ADA's possession since his "magnanimous" consent to
the much reduced final charge, a reduction which required approval by
the ADA's supervisor, under procedural guidelines then in effect in
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the Brooklyn DA's Office.

The ADA responded that the nature of the

offense and the defendant's prior arrest history were the basis for
the recommendation.

The Judge, incensed by the ADA's "ex parte"

recommendation, then dissolved the bargin.

(Later, the defendant was

sentenced to probation, as promised, by Judge "X" despite the ADA's
continuing recommendation for state prison.)
The three cases which

involved Judge "Y”are more difficult to

assess in terms other than judicial temperment.

We interviewed ADA

"P," who prosecuted all three cases, which were remarkably alike:
each defendant pled guilty to a charge one class below the top count
of the indictment in return for a promise of
which the PSR concurred.

Yet

probation, promiseswith

the pleas were all withdrawn, only to be

re-instated on future dates before the same Judge, who sentenced all
three to probation.

ADA "P" identified Judge "Y"'s pique at the

defense attorneys, all of whom were retained, as the reason for the
withdrawn pleas.

In two cases, the bailed defendants and their

counsel arrived late for sentencing and in the third instance, the
retained attorney insisted on adjournment of the sentencing hearing to
allow his appearance in another court on the same day.

In all three

instances, Judge "Y," ironically an ex-defense attorney with a
reputation as a "defense oriented" jurist, according to ADA "P,"
dissolved the plea bargain as a "lesson" to the attorneys.

(The

possibility that these plea withdrawals were actually staged by Judge
"Y" at the request of counsel to obtain their legal fees from
defendants before final disposition was imposed was discounted by ADA
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"P," who suggested that "Judge "Y" would have been more likely to
adjourn sentencing in such a case.

"I think he just didn't like these

attomeys--one in particular was very abrasive.")
As for the remaining plea withdrawn case in this category,
Judge "Z" dissolved a plea bargain, at the request of the ADA, which
would have resulted in a "zip to seven" state prison term when the
defendant, subsequent to plea, agreed to cooperate with "an on-going
investigation conducted by the Office of the District Attorney."

(The

defendant was later sentenced by the same Judge to probation, against
the recommendation of the PSR, which continued to recommend state
prison.)
Of the five remaining cases wherein the eventual sentence
differed from both the original promise and the PSR recommendation,
the PSR itself contained information which had an impact in two cases,
the ADA's recommendation had an impact in two cases and an intervening
variable--the arrest of the defendant subsequent to plea for another
offense--was influential.

In one case, involving a sentence promise

and PSR recommendation of probation, the PSR contained documentation
that the defendant's burglary had caused $51 damage to the
complainant's property, whereupon a special condition of probation
that the defendant pay $51 restitution was added.
In another case, involving a promise and PSR recommendation of
state prison for rape (although the defendant was eligible for a Y.O.
adjudication which would have permitted a probation sentence), the PSR
reported that the complainant was glad that the defendant had pled
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guilty, because she "would never have been able to testify in an open
court room."

According to the ADA prosecuting this case, the defense

attorney--after reading the PSR--related this disclosure to the
defendant, "a 'skel' who really knew how to manipulate the system,"
who promptly demanded to go to trial.

To save the conviction, the

Judge then called upon the ADA to make a mitigation statement which
would have allowed the defendant to escape a mandatory state prison
sentence, in return for the defendant's consent to an amended sentence
of one year in jail.
Of the two cases involving influential ADA recommendations,
one involved a defendant who was cooperating with the prosecution,
whereupon the promised sentence of one year jail was amended to two
months jail and 58 months probation, despite the PSR recommendation of
jail; the other involved a defendant promised a jail term of "no more
than 9 months" and recommended by the PSR for "committment to the New
York City Department of Correctional Services."

The Judge, however, a

former bureau chief in the Brooklyn DA's Office, agreed with the ADA's
recommendation of two months jail and 58 months probation.
Finally, there was one case (category #4 above) in which the
Judge promised "a term of incarceration," the PSR recommended the
same, but the final disposition was 2 months jail, followed by 58
months probation.

Since neither the plea minutes nor the PSR

mentioned probation as part of an intended/recommended sentence, we
interviewed the P.O. and S.P.O. who wrote the report and
recommendation respectively to determine if they could shed some light
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on the disposition.

We learned that the defendant, a 46 year old male

on bail with a history of five prior arrests (including one prior
felony conviction which occurred more than 10 years before the present
offense, thus making him eligible for a non-incarcerative sentence),
with a full-time job, had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.
offense.

He had been arrested twice before for the same

However, when the PSR verified that his employment supported

two children, the Judge, reluctant to sentence him to a year in jail,
contacted the supervising probation officer to ask if he would
recommend a less severe sentence.

The S.P.O. defended his recommenda

tion in light of the defendant's recidivistic drunk driving,

ii.e

Judge's reluctance to amend the sentence without consulting the S.P.O.
was attributed by the S.P.O. to press coverage at the time in the
press regarding perceived unwarranted leniency for drunk drivers by
the courts, and this Judge's desire (considered to be
prosecution-oriented by the S.P.O.) to "protect his reputation" should
the defendant be re-arrested on probation for vehicular manslaughter.
Thus, this disposition would appear to be attributable to the
influence of the PSR, despite its contrary recommendation.
To recapitulate, our analysis of the 55 cases where promised
sentences were amended reveals the following:

TABLE 19
CAUSES FOR AMENDED SENTENCE PROMISES

Attributable
To PSR
47 (85.4%)

Attributable
To ADA
4 (7.3%)

Attributable
To Extraneous
Variables
4 (7.3%)

Total
55 (lOOt)
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Thus, in 55, or 22 percent of the 248 cases in our sample
wherein the court possessed sufficient discretion to amend the
sentence promise,the bargain was either amended or dissolved; and the
PSR appears to have played a significant role in amending 47, or 19
percent of the 248 sentence bargains studied.
Conclusion of Tabular Analysis
A dichotomous analysis of the judge's promise (P), recommenda
tion (R) and the eventual sentence (S) for the 235 cases in Sample 1
where the judge possessed "in/out" discretion and actually imposed a
sentence, revealed the following:
TABLE 20
PROMISE AND RECOfrMENDATION BY SBTTENCE

P
R
P
R

=
=
*

IN
IN
OUT
OUT

P
R
P
R

=

IN
OUT
OUT
IN

S=IK

S-OUT

TOTAL

70

1

71

2

125
126

Subtotal

Subtotal
Total

7
6
13
85

127
198 (84.31)
13

6
18
-' ' 24
ISO

'

24
37 (15.7%)
235 (100%)

In 198 out of the 235 cases (84.31), the promise and
recommendation agreed on either an ''in" or "out" disposition.

And in

195 out of those 198 cases (98.51), the promise, recommendation and
sentence were equivalent.

The three anomalous cases where the court

substantially changed its promise, despite a concurring
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recoranendation, were attributable to: 1) an intervening variable (the
defendant was returned on a bench warrant for failure to appear for
sentencing, having been re-arrested subsequent to the promise, which
was probation, and the recommendation, which was also probation, with
the result that he was sentenced to a one year jail term concurrent
with the similar sentence imposed for the conviction on the
re-arrest); 2) the influence of the PSR (promise = probation;
recommendation » probation with the special condition that the
defendant, who was discovered by the P.O. to be injecting
"speedballs," i.e., a mixture of cocaine and heroin, enter drug
treatment; sentence = a jail term of 60 days, followed by 58 months
probation, a sentence which the defendant preferred to either
outpatient drug treatment or dissolution of the plea bargain); and 3)
the combination of another intervening variable and information in the
PSR (the defendant was promised probation and jail, recommended for
state prison and sentenced to probation--after agreeing to cooperate
with the D.A.'s Office--with a special condition that he cooperate
with counseling for his alcohol abuse noted in the PSR).
Of the remaining 37 cases, the court amended its "in" promise
to grant an "out" sentence recommended by the PSR on six occasions and
amended an "out" promise to impose a recommended "in" sentence on six
occasions, for a total 12 cases in the dichotomous analysis for which
the PSR is presumed to have had an impact on an amended sentence
promise.

It is noteworthy that six defendants agreed to "in"

sentences when "out" dispositions had been promised.

Combined with
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the two anomalous cases already noted above, there were eight
defendants out of 151, or 5.3 percent, who were sentenced to some form
of incarceration despite non-incarcerative promises.

Conversely,

there were seven defendants out of 84, or 8.3 percent, who were
sentenced to non-incarceration sanctions despite incarceration
promises.

This suggests that judges are more likely to amend

incarceration promises, given the reluctance of defendants to accede
to jail/prison terms which did not form part of the sentence bargain
agreement.

Moreover, defendants would appear to be amenable to

avoiding promised incarceration sentences.

Our research indicates

however, that there are some defendants who preferred to serve short
jail terms that were not promised rather than withdraw their pleas,
and a handful who preferred to serve their bargained for jail/prison
terms rather than accept substituted sentences involving five years of
probation supervision.
To summarize, there was an overall agreement between
recommendation and sentence in 207 out of 235 cases, or 88.1 percent.
In 12 of the 207 cases, or 5.8 percent, the sentence represented a
significant amendment of the plea bargain.

Of the 28 cases where the

sentence did not follow the recommendation, 25 represented adherence
by the court to the plea bargain, with judges (and defendants) much
more likely to resist jail/prison recommendations that were contrary
to probation/fine/discharge promises (rejecting such recommendations
in 18 out of 24 cases) than judges were to agree with more lenient
recommendations and to obtain acceptance by defendants to recommended
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"out" sentences when jail/prison terms had been promised (accepting
such recommendations in 6 out of 13 cases).
Thus, a dichotomous analysis of the sentencing process
presented in Table 21 reveals that 17 percent of the time (40 out of
235 cases), there is disagreement between the promise, recommendation
and sentence and in those 40 instances examined, the court is twice as
likely to follow through on its original promise (25) than to amend
the sentence bargain as per the recomnendation (12), with the
remainding anomalous cases (3) attributable to an intervening variable
(re-arrest), data in the PSR (defendant preference for short-term jail
than long-term drug program) or a combination thereof (prosecutorial
intervention and acceptance of counseling recommended by the PSR).
TABLE 21
SUKWARY OF DICHOTOMOUS ANALYSIS

P - R
k
Total

SENTENCE ("In'VOut")
Same As Promised
Different
195 (S-P-k)
3 (S^P5S^RJ
25 (S-k)
12 (S-k)
220 (93.6t)
lS (6.4%)

Total
198 (84.3%)
3 (15.21)
235 (1001)

1

In conclusion, there is a considerable difference in estimating
the influence of the PSR on sentencing, depending on whether the full
spectrum of sanctions or the basic "in/"out" dichotomy is analyzed.
In the former analysis, 19 percent of all sentence bargains appear to
have been affected by the PSR, but in the latter, more limited
comparison, only 6 percent--at best--of the sentence bargains appear
to have been amended as a result of the PSR.

Although it is my

contention that all gradations of sentences imposed should form the
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basis for study, dichotomous analysis does validate our first
hypothesis, that judges are more likely to amend "in" promises in
favor of "out" recommendations, than the converse.
A cross-tabulation of the quality of PSR by sentence for those
cases in which the PSR recommendation differs from the sentence
promise was performed in order to determine if the PSR quality was
significantly better for amended promises attributable to the PSR,
than for those cases wherein the court declined to amend the promised
sentence.
For the 47 cases previously identified as influencing amended
sentence bargains (see page 129), the PSR quality index was found to
have an average value of .81, while the 33 cases in which the court
maintained the plea bargain despite contrary recommendations were
computed to have a significantly lower average index value of .73.
Moreover, for those 12 cases in which the dichotomous "in"/"out"
sentence bargain was presumed to have been influenced by the PSR, the
average index value was found to be an impressive .83.
Thus, there would appear to be some evidence that higher
quality PSRs have more of an impact on sentencing.

It is also

possible that well researched reports are more likely to result in an
independent assessment of the proper sanction for the subject under
investigation--an assessment which would be more forcefully argued in
the S.P.O.'s recommendation--than would be the case for perfunctory
reports in which the P.O. and S.P.O. would be more likely to endorse
the sentence bargain in the absence of any significant information to

138
contribute to the court.

Comparison With Prior Studies
Witztum claimed that PSRs were primarily used in Kings County
Supreme Court--and by extension, throughout New York City--as rubber
stamps for usually inviolate sentence bargains.

Although her findings

resemble mine in terms of the percentage of agreement between promise,
recommendation and sentence, she concludes that an amended plea
bargain rate of approximately 21 percent--which she concedes is
attributable to the PSR--is not significant enough, either
quantitatively or qualitatively, to justify the expenditure of
resources and case processing delays involved in producing PSR's.
Kingsnorth and Rizzo reported significantly less variance between
promise, recommendation and sentence in their "Western City" study but
argued in a similar vein that PSRs merely ratify the sentence
bargain.
I have pointed out in earlier chapters some of the
methodological errors in these studies, most of which were essentially
cross-tabulations of two independent variables with the dependent
variable (sentence).

In order to conduct a more sophisticated

analysis involving multiple regression, which attempts to sort out and
control for the effect of interrelated independent variables upon a
dependent variable, it is necessary to identify those factors which
are most influential in the sentencing decision.
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TABLE 22
COMPARISON OF TABULAR FINDINGS
Percentage of Agreement
STUDY

Promise 5 Recmndtn.

California*
(probation)

Promise

--

Sentence

--

Recmndtn. 5 Sentence

96%
811 (prison)

San Francisco*
(probation)

--

--

96%
81% (prison)

Canada (Hagan)

--

--

80%

"Western City"*

98%

99%

98%

Brooklyn (1972)

69%

73%

79%

Brooklyn (1979)
(Dichotomous)

65%
(84%)

78%
(94%)

69%
(88%)

*Dichotomous study.

Hagan and the San Francisco Project both identified variables
contained within the PSR which exerted significant influence on the
judge and P.O. and helped to explain the perceived high degree of
agreement in sentencing outcomes.

In Table 23, I have isolated those

variables common to both this study and the San Francisco Project to
determine both within and between group rankings and correlations.
(All variables are interval type, except for race, sex and codefendant,
which were recoded as dummy variables.)
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TABLE 23
SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
MOST IMPORTANT FOR JUDGES AND PROBATION OFFICERS
Sample 1 (N»235) vs. San Francisco Project (N»300)

Promise

Variable*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Custodial Status
Offense
Arrests
Employment
Financial Status
Type of Counsel
Sex
Marital Status
Race
Age
Codefendant

1
2
3
4
5
8
6
11
10
9
7

SAMPLE 1
Rec. Sentence
1
2
4
3
5
6
11
9
8
7
10

1
2
3
4
5
6
9
10
8
7
11

SAN FRANCISCO**
Rec.
Sent
2
3
1
5
4
7
8
6
10
11
9

2
1
3
4
5
7
8
6
11
10
9

*Only variables common to both studies were utilized in computing
rank order correlation. Those included are consistently identified
in the literature as the most important.
**As noted in Chapters II and III above, there is no sentence bargain
ing in federal courts. Thus, there is no rank for promise here.

Utilizing the Spearman formula for the rank orders presented
above, I constructed the matrix presented in Table 24.
These results reveal striking correlations within each group of
recommendation with sentence: .96 for Brooklyn and .95 for San
Francisco.

Although comparison across studies would appear to

indicate less correlation, with the Brooklyn promise to San Francisco
sentence correlating the highest (.83) and the Brooklyn recommendation
to San Francisco recomnendation correlating the lowest (.75), the
Kendall test for measuring the association of ranks indicates a very
high correlation among the five ranks of eleven variables presented in

141
TABLE 24
SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX
Sample 1
SAMPLE 1
Promise
Recmdtn.
Sentence

Promise

San Francisco Project

Rec.

Sentence

Rec.

Sentence

.76
.83*

.76
-.96*

.83*
.96*

.79*
.75
.77

.83*
.81*
.81*

.79*
.83*

.75
.81*

.77

SAN FRAN.
Recmdtn.
Sentence

.68

.95*
,95*

*Significant at the .01 level. (All values significant at the .05
level.)

Table 15.

In fact, the correlation of concordance for the set of five

ranks was computed to be .87, which is significant at the .01
level.1

These findings suggest that judges and probation officers

in both localities agree on the significance of certain variables in
arriving at sentencing decisions.

The very close rank order

correlation coefficients for promise and recommendation with sentence
(.99 and .98) in the sample group also suggests that there islittle
"shaping" of the PSR to conform to the promise.

Path Analysis
Based on my review of the literature, my experience as a
probation officer and analysis of the correlations of variables to the
sentencing outcome, I conducted a path analysis of the sample data in

^Michael Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (London: Griffin,
1948), chap. 6 passim.
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an attempt to validate the second, third and fourth hypotheses
enumerated in Chapter IV.

In addition to the eleven independent

variables listed in Table 23, I utilized twenty other variables in
constructing and testing hundreds of multiple regression equations
(never using more than 23 variables in any given equation).
Although it is accepted practice in conducting path analysis
research to dichotomize interval variables, I selected a strategy of
dichotomizing only those independent variables which had skewed
distributions.

For example, although "D.A. Bureau" had seven possible

values--corresponding to the seven different Bureaus prosecuting cases
in the Brooklyn District Attmey's Office--fully 80 percent of the
cases (Table 6) fell in one category, "Supreme Court Bureau" (wherein
most street crimes are prosecuted), while none of the remaining six
values had an aggregate proportion larger than four percent.

Thus, I

recoded "D.A. Bureau" as a dummy variable, assigning a value of "1" to
the "Supreme Court Bureau" and a value of "0" to the other
specialized bureaus (wherein homicides, sexual, economic, organized
and narcotic crimes receive more vigorous prosecution).

Moreover,

Cohen (1983) has convincingly demonstrated that graduated variables,
once dichotomized, result in "a loss of one-fifth to two-thirds of the
variance that may be accounted for on the original variables, and a
concommitant loss of power equivalent to that of discarding one-third
to two-thirds of the sample."1

1Jacob Cohen, "The Cost of Dichotomization," Applied
Psychological Measurement 7 (Summer 1983): 253.
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In this study, the most important variables--promise,
recommendation, sentence, number of arrests/felonies, charge severity,
custodial status, penal law classification, etc.--are all graduated,
with a value of "1" signifying least severe and subsequent values ("2"
through "9" for dispositional variables) signifying increasingly less
favorable characteristics/outcomes.
The assistant district attorney's sentence recommendation was
also added to the multiple regression equations I formulated.
Although no sentence recommendation was made by the ADA in more than
half of the cases, this was not suprising, since it was common
practice in 1979 for ADAs in the Supreme Court Bureau to voice their
views on sentencing at the time of the plea, rather than at
disposition.

In fact, it is possible to argue that the ADA's

recommendation is in fact a disguised sentence promise, in as much as
the ADA is instrumental in stucturing the promise by either consenting
to the concommitant charge reduction and/or setting the sentencing
parameters within which the court operates.

Under the New York State

Criminal Procedure Law, no plea of guilty to less than the entire
indictment can be entered without the District Attorney's consent.

In

any event, the ADA's viewpoint on sentence is usually communicated to
the court during the (bench) conference which normally precedes the
entering of the guilty plea.

Therefore, it is difficult to

conceptualize the ADA's sentence recommendation, if formally announced
or submitted to the judge at sentencing (which frequently is the case
for indictments prosecuted by specialized bureaus within the office),
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as an event subsequent to the plea which influences the sentence.
Multiple regression equations, testing the path model
presented on page 106, and using forward selection to allow for
inclusion of the most significant predictive independent variables (at
the .05 level, with significance at the .001 level indicated by an
asterisk) produced the models which follow.

2

In the Tables presented below, "R " is the regression
coefficient, also referred to as the coefficient of determination,
which reflects the linear fit of the model--i. e., the square of the
simple correlation coefficient between the observed value of the
dependent variable and the predicted value of the dependent variable
from the regression line.

"Beta" is the standardized partial

regression coefficient or weight, which expresses the change in the
dependent variable due to the change in the independent variable, with
other variables held constant.*
TABLE 25
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING CUSTODIAL STATUS
Independent Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

R^

No. of Prior Arrests
.28
Severity of Charge
.40
Type of Counsel
.44
Sex of Defendant
.46
Type of Judge (Trial or Conf.) .47

Beta
.53*
.35*
.22*
-.15
-.10

*Significant at the .001 level.

*Maria J. Norusis, Advanced Statistics Guide (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1984), pp. 17-771
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The number of prior arrests has a large effect on custodial
status: defendants with the fewest arrests in our sample were likely
to be on bail or ROR'd, with recidivists jailed.

In fact, 28 percent

of all the variance in custodial status is predicted, or explained, by
arrest history alone.

Charge severity is another important factor,

with an effect of .35 accounting for 12 percent of custodial
variance.

The type of legal representation is also a significant

indicator of pre-dispositional status, with an effect of .22,
explaining four percent of the variance.

The sex of the defendant is

the only demographic variable related to custodial status--the
negative correlation (-.10) indicates that female defendants are more
likely to be at liberty than their male counterparts.

Finally,

defendants pleading guilty in conference parts are more apt to be
incarcerated than defendants later convicted before trial judges
(prior to the start of trial, of course, since all dispositions in our
TABLE 26
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING PROMISE
Independent Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Custodial Status
D.A. Bureau
Type of Offense
Prior Supervision History
Y.O. Adjudication Promised
Timespan (t months to plea)
Type of Judge
Penal Law Class, of Offense
No. of Prior Felonies/Y.O.'s

^Significant at the .001 level.

R2

Beta

.19
.25
.30
.33
.34
.36
.37
.39
.40

.43*
.25*
.23*
.18
.12
.14
.14
.13
.12

146
study group were plea bargained).

These findings are somewhat similar

to previous studies, particularly the criminal court study conducted
by Davis (see Chapter II, p. 57).*
Table 26 indicates that custodial status is the most powerful
predictor of the sentence bargain, explaining 19 percent of the
variance, with a moderately high effect of .43.

There is much

evidence in the literature that aside from the correlation of severity
of the offense with dispositional outcomes, defendants who are "out"
at the point of conviction tend to stay "out," while those in
detention are more likely to stay there.

Indeed a common scenario I

encountered in the course of interviewing hundreds of detained
defendants involved tacit recognition of this unwritten law of case
processing: having served some three or four months in detention in
the expectation of a better deal, unavailability of complainants or
possible acquital, certain defendants weigh the potential risk of
continuing toward trial against a proferred jail sentence and finally
plead to a one year jail term (if the deal still holds)--a "bullet" in
the parlance of "court speak" in New York City--since good time and
time served combine to reduce the penalty to less than a half of what
it might have been had the same bargain been struck at the outset of
prosecution.

*James Davis, "Sentencing Dispositions," pp. 99-101.
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The significance of prosecutorial policy is suggested by the second
variable selected in the equation, "D.A. Bureau," which also reflects
the relative gravity of the offense, since garden variety strong arm
robberies do not ordinarily qualify for "Major Offender" treatment.
The type of crime (recoded as violent, property, or gun/drug
possession) also has an impact on the promise, as would be expected
intuitively.

The other variables, which acting together with the

afore-mentioned factors explain 40 percent of the sentence bargain,
are all legal in nature: prior community supervision and felony or
Y.O. adjudication histories; the timespan from indictment to
conviction; the type of judge; the promise of youthful offender
adjudication; and the penal law classification of the conviction
(ranging from Class "A" to "E" felonies, in descending order of
gravity, and "A" misdemeanors).
TABLE 27
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING RECOMENDATI ON
Independent Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Custodial Status
Promise
Penal Law Class, of Offense
Prior Supervision
Sex of Defendant
Y.O. Recommended
Violation of Probation Filed

R2

Beta

.29
.41
.47
.49
.51
.52
.53

.54*
.37*
.26*
.16
.14
.11
.11

Custodial status also explains a greater proportion of the
P.O.'s recommendation (29 percent) than the promise (12 percent), and
is a stronger predictor of probation's recommendation than the court's
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promise, which is not surprising, given the practical constraints on
prosecutors and judges in structuring plea bargains.

In other words,

P.O.'s can afford to be more swayed by legal variables which speak
more to the underlying offense or prior community supervision
adjustment than to the bargained adjudication.

Thus, while both the

promise and recommendation are affected by the lack of a prior
probation/parole supervision record, the recommendation is also
influenced by the lack of a violation of such supervision, i.e.,
P.O.'s are more apt to recommend less severe sentences for defendants
who have no history--or a successful history--of prior supervision.
The penal law classification of the offense for which the
defendant has been convicted is a more significant predictor of a
P.O.'s decision-making than a judge's for the opposite reason: there
are a number of cases for which an "out" sentence was not permissable
under the criminal procedure or penal law unless ther were a youthful
offender adjudication or a finding by the court that an incarceration
sentence would not be "in the best interests of justice."

In such

cases, "out" promises are given with a caveat that the PSI does not
uncover countervailing negative material or that the PSR's
recommendation concurs with the lenient promise.

In such instances, a

negative PSR would merely conclude that the the sentence to jail was
mandated by law.

But the court might nonetheless follow through on

the "out" promise because the negative material uncovered might be
interpreted as not being of sufficient gravity to jeopardize the
bargain.

However, in framing the recommendation, P.O.'s are more
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influenced by their own assessment of whether ameliorating youthful
offender treatment is warranted, as opposed to the court's promise of
same, and might recomnend "out" sentences for youthful defendants they
consider salvagable, or who have previously succeeded on probation
supervision.

Such arguments are sometimes convincing enough to result

in amendments of an "in" promise by the court.
Finally, tlie sex of the defendant is the only extra-legal
variable influencing the P.O.'s decision-making in our study group,
with female defendants more likely to be recommended for less severe
sentences than males.

There is considerable evidence in the

literature that favorable outcomes for female convictees is related to
the fact that females are more apt to be convicted of non-violent
crimes which carry less of a penalty exposure.

Indeed, of the 17

female defendants in our sample, only one was convicted of a violent
offense (arson), who was nonetheless recommended for probation and
received it.
TABLE 28
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING SENTENCE
Independent Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Recommendation
Sentence Bargain
Custodial Status
D.A. Bureau
Penal Law Class, of Offense
Timespan
Y.O. Promised

R2

Beta

.57
.71
.73
.74
.75
.75
.76

.75*
.45*
.17
-.10
.10
.08
.08

The model presented in Table 28 explains 76 percent of all the
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variance in sentencing, with the PSR recommendation accounting for 57
percent of the variance alone.

The beat weight of .75 is

significantly large and almost twice the value of the independent
variable with the next strongest effect, the sentence bargain, which
explains an additional 14 percent of the variance in sentencing
outcomes.

The other five variables, taken together, account for an

additional five percent of the variance in sentence, and,
significantly, they were all found to be predictors of the promise as
well.

Penal law classification and custodial status were the only

variables which were found to be significantly related to the promise,
recommendation and sentence.
The models presented above would appear to support the tabular
analysis which found that promise, recommendation and sentence were in
agreement in the majority of cases, but that incongruities were
largely attributable to the presentence investigation.

The models are

also in agreement with most prior studies which have analyzed
sentencing (absent the promise as an independent variable, however)
and found the nature of the offense, prior record and custodial status
to be the most crucial determinants

of felony dispositions.1

*See Leslie T. Wilkins et al., "Sentencing Guidelines:
Structuring Judicial Discretion" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice, 1978); Susan Welch and Cassia Spohn, "Evaluating the Impact
of Prior Record on Judges' Sentencing Decisions: A Seven-City
Comparison," Justice Quarterly 3 (December 1986): 389-90; and Brian
Frost and William M. Rhodes, "Structuring the Exercise of Sentencing
Discretion in the Federal Courts," Federal Probation 37 (September
1973): 9-13. Carl F. Wiedemann and Karl-Heinz Lilienwald ("A Study of
Severity of Sentence at the Bronx County
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Utilizing the path coefficients derived from the equations
above,

a full path model for the sample of 235 cases is presented in

Diagram 3.

Custodial status, through its direct and indirect effects

transmitted to sentence, has an aggregate path coefficient that is
slightly higher (.77) than the direct effect of the reconmendation on
sentence (.75), while the aggregate path coefficient value of promise
to sentence is slightly lower (.73).

The Quality of the PSI as a Factor in Sentencing
In the path models developed, the quality of the presentence
investigation was found to have no significant effect on the
recommendation or sentence.

(The quality of the PSI itself was found

to be effected most by the sex of the P.O., with females more likely
to submit high quality reports than males; more thorough PSI's were
also found to be associated with incarcerated, younger defendants.)
However, the quality of the PSI was found to be influential in
sentencing outcomes when the sample was analyzed utilizing bifurcated
and dichotomous strategies.
First, retaining the full range of interval values for the
dispositional variables, the sample was split into two discrete
categories for the dependent variables of recommendation and sentence.

Supreme Court Using Multivariate Methodology,” paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Criminal Justice Statistical Association, Winter
Park, Florida, February 1980) found custodial status to be the most
influential factor in regressing a number of legal and extra-legal
variables found in presentence reports against the sentencing decision
in Bronx Supreme Court in 1975.
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DIAGRAM 3
FULL PATH MODEL FOR SENTENCE BARGAINED CASES (N=235)
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Diagram 4 indicates the path model found when the dependent variable,
sentence, is analyzed for cases where defendants were recommended for
probation, discharge or fine (A) and for defendants who were
recommended for some form of incarceration (B).
DIAGRAM 4
PATH MODEL BIFURCATED BY RECOMMENDATION
A. Recommendation = Out Only

B. Recommendation = In Only

Recommendation

Promise
Sentence

Custodial Status
Type Crime
Timespan
Arrests
Class, of
Conviction

In this analysis, "out" recommendations are almost twice as
significant in predicting sentence, while "in" recommendations have no
predictive power at all, indicating further support for the hypothesis
that judges are more likely to amend "in" promises in favor of "out"
recommendations than the converse.
This finding is further underscored by a bifurcated analysis
of the sample by disposition itself.

In Diagram 5, the recommendation

is clearly seen as interacting with promise to reduce the severity of
non-incarcerative sentences, since the recommendation is positively
correlated and the promise is negatively correlated with sentence, the
dependent variable.

Moreover, as the quality of the PSI decreases, the
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DIAGRAM 5
PATH MODEL BIFURCATED BY SENTENCE
A. Sentence = Out Only

B. Sentence » In Only
Promise

Recommendation
intence

"^Sentence
Custodial,^
Status

Promise

Recommendation

"out" sentence is more likely to be less severe (i.e., there is less
likelihood of sentences being amended by adding restitution or special
conditions to the bargained disposition, absent a thorough
investigation).

Incarcerative dispositions, however, are controlled

by the promise and custodial status (i.e., promises of jail were
related to sentences of jail; promises of prison were related to
sentences of prison; etc.).
These findings led to the second strategy: dichotomizing
promise, recommendation and sentence as dummy variables (recoding all
incarcerative values as "0" and all non-incarcerative values as "1");
and bifurcating the sample by the PSI Quality Index (see Table 8, page
118).

By segregating those cases with an index value greater than .6

from those cases with an index value less than .6, two equal groups
were formed, and promise and recommendation were regressed against
sentence (and each other) for each group, as shown in Diagram 6.
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DIAGRAM 6
PATH MODEL FOR BIFURCATED DICHOTOMOUS SAMPLE:
PSI QUALITY BY SENTENCE
A. Best PSI's

B. Worst PSI's

Recomraendatior
Sentence

.33

Sentence
Recommendation

Promise

These results reveal recommendation as the most significant
predictor of sentence when the PSI lias been thoroughly conducted,
while the promise controls both recommendation and sentence in cases
where the PSI has been minimally or poorly conducted.

This finding

seems to confirm the hypothesis that presentence investigations of
high quality have an important impact on sentencing, while perfunctory
investigations result in recommendations that merely "go along" with
the promise.

(As noted above, such dichotomization sacrifices

considerable power; a larger sample would be needed to confirm this
finding.)

Control Group Tabular Analysis
Analysis of the 57 cases in which no sentence bargain was
stipulated at the time of the plea was conducted to determine any
significant differences from the sample group.

Table 29 presents a

cross-tabulation of the PSR recommendation by the actual disposition
imposed by the court.
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TABLE 29
REOOKMENDATION BY SENTENCE (CONTROL GROUP)

REC. P/W
Disch.
Fine
Prbtn. 1
P+SpCon
Incar. 1
Jail
Prison

loT.

2

SENTENCE (N * 57)
Disch. Fine Prbtn. P+SpCon P+Fine P+Jai1 Jail Prison T/S Tot.
2
1
(1)
2
11
(1)
(2)
15
2
2
llj
T
1
1
6
[1]
2
3
27
27

1

U]

I

I

Plea Withdrawn
Recommendation
Recommendation
Recommendation

U
=
«
*
■

2

1

2

4

30

I

57

2 (For percentages below, N ■ 55)
Sentence ■ 48 (87.2%)
More severe than sentence = 3 (5.5%) (See [ J)
Less severe than sentence - 4 (7.2%) (See ( ))

There is considerably more congruence between the
recommendation and sentence in the control group: 87 percent versus 73
percent for the sample (see Table 15; withdrawn pleas were not counted
for either group in calculating percentages).

This high agreement is

obviously a reflection of the large share of mandatory imprisonment
cases in the control group--almost 40 percent--which frustrates any
in-depth analysis.

Path Analysis for the Control Group
Table 29 summarizes the findings when custodial status,
recommendation and sentence are each regressed against the same set of
independent variables utilized for the study group (never utilizing
more than six independent variables in the same equation because of
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the small sample size--also, promise and certain other variables
related thereto are not applicable to this group by definition).
TABLE 30
PREDICTIVE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (NO PROMISE)
A. Predictors of Custod. Status
1. Arrests
2. Severity of Charge

R^
.70
.28

Beta
.44*
.29

B. Predictors of Recommendation
1. Arrests
2. Penal Law Class, of Offense

.23
.42

.43*
.44*

C. Predictors of Sentence
1. Recommendation
2. Penal Law Class, of Offense

.58
.63

.76*
.26

As we found with the sentence bargain sample, the custodial
status is correlated with the number of prior arrests and the severity
of the charge.

These two factors explain 28 percent of the variance in

the control group's custodial status, versus 40 percent in the study
group.

The determinants of the PSR recommendation in the control group

are the the number of prior arrests and penal law classification of the
conviction.

The latter independent variable was also found to be one of

the predictors of the study group's recommendation, where it explained
six percent of the variance, as opposed to 19 percent of
recommendation's variance here; the number of prior arrests, however,
was not found to be significantly associated with the recommendation of
the study group, unlike the finding presented in Table 29.
Finally, the variation in sentence explained by the PSR
recommendation for those defendants convicted after trial or who pled
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guilty in the absence of a sentence bargain, was found to be almost
equivalent to that found for the study group: 57 percent for the
former and 58 for the latter.

(The beta weight values were also

equivalent: .76 for the control group, compared to .75 for the study
group.)

Significantly, if the recommendation is removed from the

equation, the penal law classification of conviction controls the
sentence (R =.31; Beta*.56*).

The only other independent variable

selected as explaining a significant proportion of the sentencing
variance in the absence of the recommendation is the quality of the

2
presentence recoranendation (R =.06; Beta®.23).
Thus, path analysis of the control group sentencing outcome
appears to confirm the significance of the presentence recommendation
for judicial decision-making.

Diagram 7 presents the full path model

for the control group.
DIAGRAM 7
PATH MODEL FOR CASES DISPOSED WITHOUT A SENTENCE BARGAIN (N=57)

Severity of Charge
Recommendation

Custodial Status
Age
ADA Rdzommendation

Sex of P.O.

PSI Quality
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Summary of Findings
Tabular and content analysis of 248 cases wherein the
sentencing decision was subject to the widest range of judicial
discretion confirms the hypothesis (H*) that "out" recommendations
have more influence than "in" reconmendations which are contrary to
the sentence promise.

In nearly one out of every five cases, the

presentence report appears to have played an important role in
amending the sentence promised by the court during the plea
negotiation, and judges were found more likely to impose amended
non-incarcerative sanctions than the converse because such a favorable
change for a defendant will usually not jeopardize the plea.
There is less evidence that suggests high quality reports have
more overall influence in amending sentence promises than low quality
reports (H ).

However, better quality investigations appear to have

a significant impact in predicting "out" dispositions, regardless of
the sentence promised, and dichotomous analysis of sentencing suggests
that poor quality investigations predict the plea bargain will control
disposition, while high quality investigations predict the PSR
recommendation as the controlling variable for the sentencing decision.
Analysis of a control group--wherein no sentence promise was
made--appears to confirm the primacy of the PSR recommendation as a
crucial determinant of sentencing outcomes.
There is strong evidence to accept the hypothesis that
recommendation and sentence are largely determined by legal variables
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(H^), and that sex, alone among the demographic variables, has any
discernible relationship to the sentencing outcome (H^), which is
likely an artifact of female defendants' correlation with less serious
crimes, compared to males.
Finally, this study found some evidence that suggests
extraneous variables can sometimes be crucial to a sentencing
decision--but the number of such cases appears to be few (H^).

The

actual sentence imposed is overwhelmingly predicted by the presentence
report's recommendation, followed by the sentence bargain.

Custodial

status, prosecutorial specialization, penal law classification of the
conviction, timespan from indictment to conviction, and a promise of
youthful offender adjudication are also related to the dispositions of
Brooklyn felony court judges.

CHAPTER VI

IN CONCLUSION: THE 1981 PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
CRISIS AND WHAT IT REVEALED.

Introduction
The findings presented in Chapter V suggest that in a
significant number of cases, judges rely on presentence reports to
fine-tune sentence promises and to dissolve plea bargains which appear
to be inappropriate when measured against information and/or
recommendations within the PSR.

Most judges polled for their opinion

on the value of PSRs have also consistently rated them as essential
to their sentencing decisions.1
In 1981, a series of events affecting New York City's criminal
justice system offered more evidence of the importance of PSRs to the
judiciary and corrections.

As we shall see, the City's Criminal

Justice Coordinator, and to a lesser extent the Probation Department's
own management, in attempting to deal with a jail overcrowding crisis,
operationalized the long-standing argument that the PSR was rendered
inconsequential by: sentence bargaining; reduced judicial discretion;
and other sources of information available to correctional
decision-makers (see Chapter III).

However, the City's effort

ISee the Harris Survey presented in the Morgenthau
Committee, Report, pp. 230-31
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was rebuffed within six months and a status quo ante bellum restored
as the result of the unforeseen disruption of post-conviction
operations which the evisceration of the PSR engendered.

Origins of the Crisis
In the aftermath of state legislation which mandated
incarceration sentences for violent, armed, juvenile and repeat
offenders (and prevented post-indictment charge reduction to
non-violent offense categories for violent offenders), local and state
correctional facilities reached capacity in 1980.

Also contributing

to the lack of space was an increase in crimes reported to the police,
arrests and indictments.

In fact, indictments filed in New York City

rose 15 percent during 1980 and then increased again the following
year, which represented the high-water mark for the reported
occurrence of index crimes in New York City--more than 725,000, up 17
percent from 1979.1

The Supreme Courts in the City were thus

confronted with a backlog of 10,000 indictments as 1981 began, amidst
a 20 percent increase in new indictments during the first quarter,
prompting an emergency transfer of civil court judges to the criminal
term by New York State's Chief Judge.2
In early 1981, the New York State Correction Commission found

l"City Felonies Last Year Rose Much Slower Than in 1980,"
New York Times 27 February 1982, p. 28; "Serious Crimes Nearing Record
in New York," New York Times 18 November 1980, p. 1; and "Crime Index
for NYC 60% Over Nation's for Six Months," New York Times 7 December
1980, p. 1.
2"37 Civil Judges Will Assist City in Felony Trials," New
York Times 19 March 1981, p. 1.
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that all state and local facilities for sentenced and detained adults
were either at or above capacity.

It ordered the three counties

closest to New York City (Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk) to reduce
their jail populations or face civil suits and, in March, it gave the
City 10 days to develop a plan to relieve the jail overcrowding which
had led to 9,200 inmates being held in a system geared to house a
maximum of 8,300.1

The Commission did not have to threaten the City

with court action, however--a suit had already been brought in federal
district court by the Legal Aid Society's Prisoner's Rights Project,
which contended that the overcrowded conditions constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Judge Morris Lasker (U.S. Southern District of New York), in
response to the original litigation brought in 1973 during a period of
similiar congestion, had ordered the closing of the deteriorating
Manhattan House of Detention for Men ("the Tombs") in 1974 and its
inmates transferred to other facilities.

When the Adolescent

Detention and Reception Center population on Riker's Island doubled in
1980, with the overflow assigned to the House of Detention for Men,
the Prisoner Rights Project brought another suit.

The City responded

with a plan to sell the Riker's Island facility to the State, with the
State in turn building eight new jails for the City throughout the
boroughs.

Judge Lasker granted the City time to complete the

negotiations, but when the deal fell through in mid-1980, he
threatened to take steps to relieve the congestion if the City did not

^''Overcrowded City Jails Present a Tangle of Problems," New
York Times 12 March 1981, p. B3.
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act.l
In an attempt to ward off judicial intervention, the City: 1)
obtained agreement from the State to accept the transfer of 90 inmates
serving weekend sentences; 2) requested the City's Chief
Administrative Judge to conduct bail reviews of 1,800 inmates whose
bail had been set at $1,000 or less; 3) planned the addition of
prefabricated housing units to its major facility, Riker's Island,
which would increase its capacity by 600; and 4) ordered probation
officers to submit PSRs within two weeks of conviction, rather than
the customary four to six week interval, regardless of the actual
sentence date set by the court.
Of all the actions planned or actually undertaken by the City
to deal with the crisis,

the fourthmeasure produced the most positive

results, but not withoutmodification of the initial

PSI speed-up

directive and fierce resistance fromthe judiciary.

In the end,

however, none of the City's measures, including its attempt to
eviscerate the PSR, could stem the steadily increasing numbers of
detainees and Judge Lasker's eventual action in November of 1983 which
forced the City to release 611 inmates.

And despite institutionalized

productivity gains within the Probation Department during the past
five years and an excellent track record in submitting PSRs within
shortened time frames (made possible by the expenditure of millions of
dollars in staff overtime), as of this writing the City's jails remain
overcrowded, Judge Lasker continues to loom large in the City's

^'U.S. Judge Who Shut TombsSeeks Meeting on Deteriorating
Jails," New York Times 23 May 1980, p. Bl.
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consciousness and other remedies that will forestall another
federal intervention are vigorously pursued.

(The City's 1987

strategy involves siphoning honor inmates onto refurbished ferry boats
moored at Riker's Island to free up more secure cells.)

The PS1 Speed-Up
1981 was not the first time that the PSI was identified as a
major bottleneck in inmate processing during times of jail
overcrowding.

In 1973, at the recommendation of the Board of

Correction, county courts completely eliminated the practice of of
adjourning sentencing sine die for detained convictees.

This custom

had formerly given P.O.'s in some courts (particularly Kings County)
the discretion of calendaring sentencing proceedings upon completion
of PSRs.

(There is evidence that such discretion had led to abuse by

some habitually tardy P.O.'s, according to veteran probation
supervisors in Kings County Supreme Court.)

Similarly, in the late

1960s and again in the early 1970's, probation branches serving the
felony courts in New York City had utilized "pro forma" PSRs (i.e.,
reports which contained condensed legal and social histories) to deal
with an enormous increase in indictments and subsequent convictions
during that period.

However, such modifications were implemented with

the cooperation and direction of the county court administrators to
whom chief probation officers were then answerable.

With the

consolidation of county probation offices into a unified City agency
in 1974, probation administrators were now controlled by the executive
branch and thus, 1981 represented a new organizational alignment which
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pitted an antagonistic municipal administration (frequently critical
of the judiciary) against court administrators resentful of being
"scapegoated" by other actors in the criminal justice system during a
period of increasing public alarm over an increase in crime.

In the

middle of these combatants stood the Probation Department.
In February of 1981, in response to the pending federal
litigation, the Criminal Justice Coordinator's Office began to examine
ways to reduce jail overcrowding and thereby render the lawsuit moot.
Research of Correction Department records identified approximately
1,000 inmates who had been convicted in felony and misdemeanor courts
and were awaiting sentence.

It was felt that the average elapsed time

of eight weeks separating conviction from sentence date was largely
attributable to PSR production and that if the reports could be
produced within two weeks, this population could be effectively halved
within six months, even allowing for other delays, if the judiciary
could be persuaded to cooperate.
Accordingly, on 10 March 1981 the Probation Department issued
a staff directive which instituted the following changes:

1) PSRs for

all jailed defendant's were to be submitted to the court within 10
working days of conviction, regardless of sentence date set by the
judge; 2) pro forma reports were to be submitted for all jailed
defendants convicted of "D" and "E" felonies who were not promised
state prison or probation sentences; 3) the legal history section,
wherein prior and subsequent arrests and convictions (and details of
each) are presented was to be eliminated and in its stead, the
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computerized New York State Identification and Information System
(NYSIIS or, later, NYSID) printout of the defendant's arrest history
was to be stapled to the PSR with any open dispositions to be updated
by hand on the actual computer paper; 4) PSRs for all bailed
defendants were to be submitted within two weeks to promote
calendaring efficiency; 5) the Correction Department would
automatically bus detained inmates to court holding pens within 72
hours of conviction to allow P.O.'s to conduct multiple interviews of
PSR subjects in rapid succession, eliminating the need for P.O.'s to
visit convictees in any other correctional facility; and 6) P.O.'s
were to be authorized to accumulate a maximum of 20 hours overtime a
week to complete PSRs.
This directive met with immediate resistance from P.O.'s, with
the union leader widely quoted in the press that "a two-week
investigation is no investigation at all," complaining that "(t]he
Mayor does not know what a presentence report entails."*

Later,

when the United Probation Officers' Association (UPOA) sued the City
in Manhattan Supreme Court to reinstall the traditional four week time
frame for PSRs, the Criminal Justice Coordinator maintained that
P.O.'s could "do a reasonable job within a two week period," while the
Probation Department's Deputy Commissioner admitted that there were
"definite problems" with the new schedule but that only "in some

ln2-Wk. Probation Report a Laugh:
Daily News 10 March 1981, p. 15.

Union Leader," New York
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cases," would two weeks not be enough time to complete a PSR.*
Tliis same Deputy Commissioner, in reaction to staff
resistance, convened a task force to review the new PSI proceedures.
Composed of representatives of all levels of probation staff, the task
force was scheduled to meet four times during the Summer of 1981, but
because of a disastrous first meeting which ended in acrimony over
perceived "after the fact" input from line officers to changes already
institutionalized, it was decentralized to the county level, as each
probation branch was encouraged to forge their own proceedures within
established criteria to fine-tune the speed-up.
As a member of this task force, I was told by the Deputy
Commissioner that the pro forma PSR should be viewed as not just a
stop-gap measure but as "the wave of the future," since "probation is
no longer in the business of treatment primarily, but rather serving
as a secondary social control agent."

2

This viewpoint in essence

identified the primary use of PSRs as diagnostic devices and, arguing
that the medical model no longer appertained, concluded that they
could be modified so as to fulfill the statutory requirement, itself
viewed as an artifact of the treatment-oriented view of sentencing.
This rationale advanced by probation administrators represented a
ratification of the previous decade's denunciation of PSRs as

^''Probation Union May Sue to Nullify Keating Order,"
Chief, 28 July 1981, p. 3.
2Interview with Kevin Benoit, Deputy Commissioner for
Planning, N.Y.C. Probation Department, 17 June 1981.

The
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meaningless in the sentencing decision because of plea bargaining,
while at the same time endorsing the justice model of corrections
which holds that interposition of rehabilitation treatment concepts in
a coercive context lends itself to abuse, the avoidance of which
outweighs any potential benefits.

Such a synthesis however, ignores

the "social control" contribution PSRs can make to sentencing, as
demonstrated by our study of their impact in Brooklyn Supreme Court.
It is instructive to note in this context that the principal architect
of the speed-up, the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinator, like his
predecessor and successors, was a former assistant district attorney
(who later was appointed to the bench by the Mayor and ironically now
is an administrative judge).
Thus, the only ally for line P.O.'s discouraged by
administrative

dismissal of PSRs as moribund survivors in a system

geared more toward efficient than individualized justice, was the
judiciary.

Judicial Reaction
From the outset, court administrators and individual judges
were critical of the revised PSI process.

This was partially

attributable to their perception that the Koch administration had once
again set up the judiciary as "the fall guy" for systemic conditions
that reduced the efficiency of the courts in general, and contributed
to jail overcrowding in particular.

In a testy exchange in the Spring

of 1981, the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the city's court
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system--which is funded and managed by the State--refuted the Mayor's
charge that the courts could reduce overcrowding through bail review,
claiming that such reviews were already institutionalized and new
reviews could not produce "dramatic results," since judges would
continue to use the same bail criteria, regardless of over
crowding.*

Later, when the City was forced to release over 600

detainees by Judge Lasker, Mayor Koch blamed the lack of court
cooperation for the politically embarrasing outcome, claiming
that judicial foot-dragging prevented expeditious case processing.
But the major reason for judicial resistance was the resultant
reduced content and quality of the PSRs--a reduction which a State
audit in May of 1981 confirmed.

2

In testimony before the New York

State Assembly Codes Committee, a number of New York City Supreme
Court judges claimed that the new PSRs were "lacking in proper
sentencing information," "too skimpy," and led to sentencing delays to
obtain more information, since judges did not want to risk imposing
improper sentences on the basis of "wholly inadequate" reports."*

1"Panel In Conflict Over Jail Release," New York Times, 9
June 1985, pp. 1, 46.
2New York State Legislative Commission on Expenditure
Review, State Division of Probation Programs Program Audit (Albany,
June 1982), p. 29.
^Ibid. Also see, "Judge Assails City Agency on Its
Presentence Reports," New York Times 14 October 1981, p. 29; and
"Justice Aides in Dispute Over Lag in Sentencing," New York Times 3
October 1981, p. 29.
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My interviews and contacts with Brooklyn Supreme Court judges
during this same period indicated that this response reflected not
merely irritation over the lack of consultation by the City in
drafting the new format, but also arose out of a genuine concern that
defendants would be improperly sentenced.

Most judges reacted with

particular vehemence to the substitution of NYSID printouts for the
formerly detailed legal history section, pointing out that NYSID
arrest records were already available to the court, the ADA and
defense counsel at the time of plea.

What they needed most was a

"fleshing out" of these arrests, verification of prior felony
convictions and dispositions of the arrests listed, the last component
being frequently absent from the computerized listings.

The Probation

Department had thus institutionalized a dubious reform suggested four
years earlier by the Economic Development Council, later highlighted
by the Morgenthau Committee, without ever researching its validity.
A Probation Department memorandum (dated 24 July 1981) relates
the judicial reaction to the "revisions in PSI protocol:"
the feedback we have received from the judiciary clearly
indicates that a revision of the original guidelines is in order
at this time.

Judges have complained that the NYSID reports they

received were often illegible and even when legible they were too
often sketchy and uninformative.

The Judges have therefore

insisted that we no longer attach the NYSID sheets to our PSI
reports.

They want us to resume our former practice of including

all the NYSID sheet information within the body of the PSI report.
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This will, of course, include the dispositional data on all
arrests.

Additionally, the Judges have complained that they have

found the disposition data alone is inadequate and they have
therefore requested that we [return to providing] them with brief
thumbnail sketches of significant prior arrests.*
Although the legal history section was restored to the PSR,
criticism continued to pour in from other actors in the system who
were beginning to feel the effects of the March reforms.

Thus, in a

letter dated 7 August 1981, the State Director of the Division of
Probation (the agency which provides half of the funding for the
City's probation system and monitors local compliance with State rules
and regulations) appealed to the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinator
to revise the City's PSR policy in light of the many complaints he had
received from other agencies in the justice system:
We must all understand that the PSR is not only used by the
courts for sentencing, but by the New York State Department of
Correctional Services in classifying inmates and by the New York
State Division of Parole in parole decision-making.

I am

enclosing copies of letters received from both of these agencies
during the past week complaining about PSI's from New York City.
It appears that with the arrival of the new inmates, a large
number of them are being classified to maximum security by the

^Memorandum from A1 Garfinkel, Deputy Commissioner,
Management Services, Department of Probation, to Kevin Benoit,
"Revisions in PSI Protocol," 24 July 1981.
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classification committee due to the lack of necessary information
which would ordinarily be contained in the presentence
investigation.

This creates problems in attempting to secure the

necessary bedspace....we must now develop a format for PSI's that
will meet the needs of both the courts and the other agencies that
rely heavily on PSI's for decision-making.*
Thus, on 20 August 1981, as the result of continuing
complaints, the City acceded to the demands of court, correctional,
parole and probation administrators and scrapped the short-lived
"Condensed Generic PSI Report."

2

In the end, despite a further lengthening of the PSR
turn-around time for jailed defendants from two to three weeks, the
Probation Department and the judiciary both responded with alacrity to
the jail overcrowding crisis.

Of 1,130 jailed defendants awaiting

sentencing in March, 1981, only 30 remained unsentenced six months
later.3

Despite the speedy processing of these defendants, most of

whom received prison terms (the State Department of Correction, beset
by similar overcrowding, was joined to the federal suit as a
co-defendant for failure to take speedy delivery of such inmates from

^Letter from Thomas J. Callanan, Director of N.Y. State
Division of Probation, to Robert Keating, N.Y.C. Criminal Justice
Coordinator, 7 August 1981.
^Memorandum from Townsend Barnett, Deputy Commissioner,
Adult Court Services, to Kevin Benoit, A1 Garfinkel, Assistant
Commissioners, Branch Chiefs, et al.
^N.Y.S. Legistative Commission, State Division of Probation
Audit, p. S-3.
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the City), overcrowded jails remained the norm throughout the city,
state and federal correctional systems for the next two years.
(Ironically, the state's request to lease federal prison space in July
of 1981 was rejected by the Bureau of Prisons because its own
population was nearing capacity).
Finally, in the Fall of 1983, with the City's inmate
population nearing 11,000 in a system with a capacity of 10,300 and no
remedy in sight, Judge Lasker capped the population, forcing the City
to release 611 pre-trial inmates.

The Department of Correction

screened its population and released the "least dangerous" detainees,
which, according to its criteria, consisted of those with the lowest
bail and/or charged with non-violent crimes.

A number of these

releasees were subsequently re-arrested (one on the subway ride home
from Riker's Island) and almost one in five subsequently failed to
appear in court.

Publicity surrounding these events caused a public

uproar (despite assurances that the percentage of releasee absconders
was almost equivalent to the general pre-trial failure to appear rate)
and prompted a 16 month inquiry by the State Investigation Commission.
The Commission's six members issued three separate reports in
June of 1985, which sharply disagreed in apportioning blame for the
episode.

Three conn issioners blamed a lack of coordination among the

component agencies of the criminal justice system and recomnended the
creation of "a true interagency criminal-justice system on a statewide
level" modeled after the U.S. Department of Justice which emphasized
planning, "coordination, conmunication and cooperation."

This report,
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authored by Charles Hynes, a former prosecutor, envisioned the pooling
of state and local correctional resources to better manage
overcrowding and, while acknowledging the need for the judiciary to
remain independent of political control, criticized the lack of
judicial cooperation with the City as "an extreme example of judicial
noninvolvement.
Two other commissioners, in a report authored by Bernard
Smith, former Suffolk County District Attorney, rejected the Hynes
call for a statewide unified justice system because it threatened the
autonomy of local district attorneys and blamed the defense of the
federal suit presented by the City Law Department for failing to
emphasize the proactive measures which New York undertook to deal with
the overcrowding.

The Smith report also reconmended: short and long

range planning by correction agencies; State cooperation in accepting
"state ready" prisoners; and "expedited production of probation
reports" to "speed up the sentencing process and...allow for an
earlier delivery of prisoners to the state."

2

This report also

recommended exploring "the current trend towards privatization of
correction facilities, on both a state and local l e v e l . T h e third
report, by Commissioner Thomas Culhane, a former police officer,
blamed the City for not building more jail cells:

"For four years

^Temporary State Commission of Investigation, Report on
Release of New York City Inmates (New York: June, 1985), p. 15.
2Ibid., p. 5.

3Ibid., p. 8.
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they did nothing until the patience of Judge Lasker was
exhausted."*

Of all the reports, Culhane's was the most sympathetic

to the judiciary, praising its resistance to bail reduction as a
solution to the problem and declaring that "judges...must never
consider an overcrowding problem when imposing sentence.

The length

of incarceration should be based on the severity of the crime and not
influenced by a governmental failure to provide the necessary jail
space."

2
Both the Smith and Culhane reports were adamant in their

opposition to the Hynes proposal for unification of the justice
system.

Culhane argued that the system, despite the competition of

its constituent agencies with their "countervailing interests,"
nonetheless "achieved honest results because of its built in checks
and balances."^

Smith encapsulated in one question the larger

problem which the crisis posed--and which any consideration of endemic
correctional underfunding must address--"How do you coordinate a
system that was never meant to be coordinated and, indeed, should
4

remain constitutionally divorced?"

The Changing Function of
The Presentence Investigation
Despite a continuing trend across the United States during the

ilbid., p. 9.

2Ibid., p. 11.

4"Panel in Conflict," p. 46.

3Ibid., p. 19.
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past decade toward adoption of the justice model of corrections, which
favors uniformity and fairness in the processing of offenders, and
attendant limitation of sentencing and parole-granting discretion, the
presentence report has survived, even in those jurisdictions where
parole and the indeterminate sentence have been abolished.

Although

its prevalence has traditionally varied widely from state to state,
half of the 50 states require a PSR before imposition of a felony or
probation-eligible sentence.*

Thus, while the PSR's utility for

correctional institutions, parole boards and parole officers
diminishes (although 36 states still retain an indeterminate
sentencing structure, according to the most comprehensive recent
survey conducted in 1985),

it still provides significant assistance

to its primary user, the sentencing judge, since some jurisdictions
which have adopted sentencing guidelines and fixed penalties are now
using the PSR as the instrument for determining aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that allow deviation from legislatively
prescribed sanctions.
In 1984 the Congress enacted sweeping reforms of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code affecting criminal procedure ("The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984").

In effect, the new legislation, which will

1American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures (New York: Institution of Judicial
Administration, 1968), pp. 202-3.
^Shane-DuBrow, et al., Sentencing Reform in the United
States, pp. 282-83.
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begin to take effect in late 1987, phases out parole over a five year
period and severely limits the indeterminate sentencing scheme that
has predominated in federal jurisprudence for half a century.

In

fact, presently (and until the newly created Federal Sentencing
Coranission's guidelines are approved by Congress), only a handful of
offenses are considered probation ineligible in federal court,
principally those "punishable by death or by life imprisonment."*
And unlike most states, there is no "predicate felony" statute on the
federal level, with the result that second and third felony offenders
still are eligible for non-incarceration penalties.
At recent hearings of the Sentencing Commission in U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Commission
discussed the revised role of the P.O. in the sentencing process as a
"fact finder" concentrating on gathering information related to the
offender's legal history and the details of the crime.

2

Under a

point system which assigns fixed weights to certain variables, the
predominant emphasis will be on the present offense and prior criminal
record, with social history and rehabilitative potential relegated to
very minor importance in the scoring system that will determine
sanctions and their severity.

*Rule 32(e), Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18, United
States Code.
^Hearing, 21 October 1986, U.S. Courthouse, Foley Square,
New York.
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In this justice model of sentencing, the P.O.'s major role
during the PSI might very well consist of mediating an agreement
between the Assistant U.S. Attorney and defense counsel to resolve
conflicting arrest, court and correctional data present in the
record.

In fact, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

envisages the P.O.'s major function under the new system, as indeed it
has always been, will be to advise the court on the appropriate
sentence.

In so doing, the P.O.'s discretion will be limited by the

guidelines and the PSR will undoubtedly be subjected to much more
rigorous analysis by defense attorneys.

While a social work trained

P.O.'s analysis of an offender's social history is more susceptible to
challenge--given the inexact nature of the social sciences--it seems
likely that the P.O.'s expertise in ferreting out court and
correctional data will continue to give the PSR an important role to
play, even in a justice model-oriented sentencing process.

Victim Impact Statements:

Another

Important Component of the PSR
There has also been a growing trend since the 1970's to make
the criminal justice system more responsive to victims.

This has

evidenced itself in the assignment of more female police officers and
prosecutors to sex abuse
cases, and in the establishment of victim service agencies as adjuncts
of prosecutorial agencies, to cite two popular examples.

In addition,

administrative changes in court and prosecutorial case processing,
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with many jurisdictions assigning the same judge and/or prosecutor
from arrest (or indictment) to disposition, has produced an ancillary
benefit of allowing complainants to track progress of the case more
readily (and avoid multiple interviews with newly assigned
prosecutors), in addition to speeding adjudication of the case.
As part of this trend, many states as well as the Congress,
have enacted legislation requiring that "victim impact statements" be
made available to the sentencing judge.

In most instances, the PSR

has been mandated as the vehicle through which this statement is to be
delivered.

Thus, in 1982, New York State amended its Criminal

Procedure Law to require inclusion in the PSR of "the consequences of
the (felony) offense for the victim, including the extent of the
physical injury or economic loss and the amount of restitution sought
by the victim."*

Despite the fact that PSR's in New York City have

traditionally contained a "complainant's statement" section (since at
least the 1920's),
innovation.

the new law was widely reported as an

Indeed, Elizabeth Holtzman's successful 1981 campaign for

the post of Kings County District Attorney highlighted the need for
the judiciary to be more responsive to victims in their sentencing
decisions.

And publicity attending the signing of the new law by the

Governor emphasized that the PSI had previously dealt "with the

^Chapter 612 of the New Laws of 1982, amending New York
State Penal Law Section 1.05 and Criminal Procedure Law Section 390.30.
^New York City Department of Probation, Manual for
Presentence Investigations, 1975 edition, p. 15.
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convicted felon, not the victim."*
This episode, and many others previously discussed, illustrate
the viewpoint, predominant among criminal justice managers and the
political community, of the PSR and probation itself as a "treatment"
oriented vestige of the medical model of corrections.

On the other

hand, the legal community often assails the PSR and probation for a
lack of client-oriented rehabilitation plans and being too closely
allied with the prosecutorial viewpoint.
Such contradictory criticisms can be seen as by-product of
popular displeasure with a judiciary perceived as too dispassionate
and too independent in an era of rising crime, while at the same time
reflecting increasing judicial discomfort over the introduction of
justice model concepts into a probation conmunity engulfed by record
numbers of supervisees and the lack of individualization such case
loads dictate.

In response, "privately commissioned" PSR's have

become more commonly used by the defense bar, but have
failed to usurp probation in this sphere because of the private PSR's
inherent advocacy function.

2

Yet, the PSR remains resillient, as a fine-tuning mechanism
for sentence bargains, as an arbiter of sentencing guideline formulas,
as a case management tool for correctional agencies, and as a vehicle

l"New Law to Aid Victims," New York Daily News 10 August
1982, p. 5.
^Thomas Rodgers and Thomas Gitchoff, "The Privately
Commissioned Pre-Sentence Report: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach," 2
Criminal Justice Journal (Spring 1979): 271-79.
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for providing some measure of victim and offender catharsis in an
often times impersonal bureaucratic setting.

Conclusion
This dissertation, in attempting to determine the impact of
PSR's on sentencing decisions, has found confirmation for its salutory
effect on plea bargains.

Since sentence bargains are frequently

engineered without due consideration to the plethora of options
available to the court beyond the basic dichotomous decision of
whether to incarcerate or release an offender, the PSR is frequently
used to adjust such bargains, most often within the limits of change
which can be accomodated without jeopardizing the plea, but also, in a
suprising number of cases the PSR leads to substantial modification
of, or dissolution, of the sentence bargain.

It has found that in New

York, probation is often bloodied by the countervailing pull and push
of executive and judicial branch tensions.

And our study suggests

that despite dramatic changes in the sentencing process since the
presentence investigation was bom, including the ascendency of
prosecutorial influence in determining the final parameters of most
convictions, itself an outgrowth of public support for a more
incapacitation oriented justice system, the presentence report will
remain a necessary ancillary tool of any sentencing or correctional
scheme that does not regard its deviant population as "entirely
fungible."
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Indeed, as David Rothman predicted in a 1983 essay which
traced the history of sentencing reform in the United States, the
momentum for determinate sentencing appears to have slowed
considerably within the past year, and it is not altogether clear as
of this writing whether the U.S. Sentencing Commission's proposed
reforms will survive congressional review.
But whether discretionary power is shifted to other actors in
the system or remains in its more visible judicial guise, we can only
hope, with Professor Rothman, that the ascendancy of the quantitative
analyst and "the search for mathematical precision in sentencing"*
will yield to a realization within the criminal justice community that
rigid formulas, much like the "treatment modalities" of previous
generations, promise much more than they can ever hope to deliver.

*David J. Rothman, "Sentencing Reform in Historical
Perspective," Crime and Delinquency 29 (No. 4, 1983): 646.

184
appendix

a

Precode 1 Research Ins 1.rumen t
I don ti Pyi nr In forma t.ion
a) Probation Cane No.________
b)

Indictment No._________

I I . The

Pefendant
1 ) Case No.
rcoi umn Ti P

.’) A e x :

Vale
Pol . 3/1

TP

Fema le
A o I . •'/,

j) Arc:
Col.
’!) Pace:

5, D

Plack
“771

Hispanic

D) Marital: Dingle

Karriec

~trv

Widoweu

~wf

Unemployed

971

7) Economic:

Welfare

Divorced
- it

F/T

P/T

D tudent

Retired

9 /2

9/3

9 /9

9/5

Armeu Forces
>/?'

Working Poor

"1 0 /P

Incarcerated
973

Working Class

1072

1073

Middle Class

' pper Middle

l P 777

10/5

3) Citizenship:

U .D .A .

Registered Alien

11/1

TT72

Illegal Alien

11) Y.O.

Recommendation

Unknow

10/6

10/7

Naturalized

11/3
lip"

III . Youthful Offender Data
9) Y.O. Eligibility: Eligible
12/1
Promise:

Upper

Unknown

11/9

10) Y.O.

Aran
"777

Engagen

>i/(,

Housewife
77

Oriental
" pP

Consensual
c71

VT

Separated

6) Employment:

Ahito
v/c

Promised
137P

Ineligible
1272

Not Promisee
"■ 1372

(3.P.O.):

Grant

19/ P

Eligible iC
12/3
Not Applicable
13/5

Deny

l*'/2

None

19/3

A FTKTJi ’ I X

12) Y.O Mis posit, ion:

IV. Legal Variables
13) Custodial Status:

185

(Sort'd)

Cranted
15/1

R .0 .K .
16/1

I on ie <i
1‘/2

Bail
16/2

N/A
15/3

Detention
1 6 /?

Convicted In absentia
Tup

Doing Tire
16/6

Returnee

In res ioential treatment
i"m 7 t
Id) Ar'est Record:

None
17 A

15) Felony Convictions:

1 to 3

None
l6/l

u to M
17/3

16)

Conviction Type:

I fe 1 . .<1 1 Y.O.
18/3

2 fe I s . &
' W

2 m t h s . or less
20/1
12-15 m t h s .
20

A

18) Charge Reduction:

19)

Conviction Class:

None
2171

"D“ felony
22 A

20) Specific Offense:

Plea

1 Y.O.
1o/1 Y.O.

during trial
1972

Trial by Judge
19A
2-6 m t h s .
20/2

18-23- mths.
2075

1 class down

"A" felony
2271

10__er
Tt 7

3 or more
13/3

Trial by .Jury
1973
17) Time Elapsed :
(Indictment to
conviction)

7 1° 9
177 m
2 felonies
1871

Plea before trial
“TTTI

21/2

’

facility

1 felony
~
18/2

j felonies
13/7

. w
l< T

6-12 mths.
20/3

23+ mths.
207Z

2 down
2l/3

"B" felony
2272
”E" felony
2275

3 down
21/3

"C" felony

2273
"A" Misdem
22/6

_________________________ 23,

23

186

APPKN1'IX

<I1) Type of Counsel:

(0 on t '<1)

Le/^al Aid

Assi.fried ( "18b")

he tained

22/3

Not indi ca ted

ZbA

2 5A

... ) I).A. Bureau:

Pro do

Zb/z

25/1

iN.O.B. Homicide

Zt/\

Hacke is
“ 26/3

26/2

■>upremo C o u r t
, ."/'"

Fconomic Crime

//A*

.'ox Crime.;
" .:rI/ c

Narco t ics
' A ’,'

■ipocial .•l>~osociil o r _
23) Co-do fendar. t: None

:>f*:d itw

.'"‘A

.•'/."

Kami ly C o ur 1

"arrau t

' isms

' .~ 7•

.

. "/••

■'amo ;:ot:1»■: q T oro .a-vere

Less severe
;_ 7 _ sentence

.2 ) Prior -Supervision: Juveni le

~zWT
All

Criminal Court

"

ZZ'
2 out of j
28 /p

3

2 3/4

Federal
2 b/d

"

:,upre::e C

“
Parole

ZT~
Any rir

2 8
//

None
2 ?/l

2971

'

.No '.'0? (prob.)
29/3

■

Penuiny

.-Supervision Terminated

Not Applicable
2 9 7 A ^ --V. The Actors
26) Counsel:
30,

31,

32

29/2
No VOP

Prior to Off

A PPKNDI X

(Cunt'-i)

27) A . D . A . : ___________ _______ ____________________
33, 3'4
28) J u d r e : __________________ _____________ ________
1 % 3A
29) P.O.:
37,

38

30) ...P.O.:
34
VI. The Promise
31) Plea Info.:

Obtained
W i

from .PM'.

No mention

ho/

From Oourt

.Not. Applicab!"

“•'.()A

3

32) J u u r e ’s Promise:

33)

....

-

If jail/Pr ison Promised:__ __________ _____ __________________
( Length)
0 3, l'-h

VII. The Recommendations
3h) A.D.A. Recommendation:

35)

or P.A.

__________________

If jail/pr ison Recommended:

36) .3.P.O.

_____________
'*5, 56

__________ _________________
Tlen^th)
A?, 68

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : __________________ ______
h9.

VIII. The Disposition
37) Sentence:

-

__________________

51,
38)

If jail/prison sentence:

(Length)

39)

50

52
_______________
53, 5U

If plea withdrawn (A): Eventually sentenced by same .jud/te

5571
Eventually sentenced by different

5 5/2
Mot Applicable

5573

AP I

7-0) If plea withdrawn

. : 11 X

( 0=

188

' 11 )

Kventual sentence Game a a prom
s77T~
Jentenee more severe
36/l>

Les s g o v
r; C 7 T

Not Applicable

56A
IX. Pr-1-Jentence Report Quality Index
7l) Police or C/W Contacted?

7.:)

l)

■■'l )

7?)

Prior Dispositions Obtained?

-•chool/Fmployor Non t.i. )oi?

Community Contact?

rro<Tiosis/iri n a 1 K v a lua t.ion?

YL-M
37/1

NO
37A '

Yes
7P v T "

w

Yes
c J/l

'

Yes
'o7i—

^o7T

Yes
f' 1 / 1

No
7:
No
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